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We increasingly expect start-ups to tackle the great systemic problems of the world, with a rising demand 
for game-changing innovations that are both sustainable, responsible and economically viable. However, 
most of these ventures fail to realize their envisioned growth, or do not even survive their first four years  
of existence. This is because entrepreneurs face three hard-to-overcome: acquisition of financial 
resources, the attraction of talent and the organization of this talent into an effective team. In this 
dissertation, I espouse the roles of vision communication and the management of team dynamics in 
facing these three challenges.
First, the dissertation investigates how entrepreneurs’ vision communication affects the way investors 
and potential recruits view the venture. Results point out that disruptive and social vision communication 
strongly affect their perception about the venture. Specifically, both types of visions may have unforeseen 
downsides in convincing investors and recruits to join the start-up’s pursuits. Second, we show that 
the management of team membership change is elementary to sustaining the high performance of 
venture teams. We find that both entrepreneurs and managers should attempt to minimize membership 
change in high performance teams. Overall, this dissertation provides numerous practical and academic 
contributions to the fields of entrepreneurship, impression management, vision communication and  
team dynamics.
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Start-ups are the key source of technological breakthroughs, economic growth, and 
disruptions of the marketplace (Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004; Penrose, 1959; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Start-ups are defined as the newly founded ventures that aim to 
create scalable, high growth businesses (Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; DeSantola 
& Gulati, 2017; Gundry & Welsch, 2001). They open society up to new 
technologies, products and services; and create entirely new market segments and 
jobs along the way (Carree & Klomp, 1996; Feldman & Audretsch, 1999; Glaeser, 
Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992). However, as prior work documents, most 
start-ups fail to realize their envisioned impact or do not even survive their first four 
years of existence (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, 2014). This 
observation is not surprising, given the fact that the entrepreneurs face hard-to-
overcome challenges in the early stages of the venture’s life cycle (e.g., Fisher, 
Kotha, & Lahiri, 2016; Huang & Knight, 2017). Inter alia, three of these challenges 
stand out as particularly important in determining start-up growth and survival 
(DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). 
The first challenge is the acquisition of financial capital. Access to funding is the 
central driver of growth and success from the onset of venture life (Brush, Greene, 
& Hart, 2001; Huang, 2018). Financial capital is needed to develop new products 
and offerings, acquire assets, and attract valuable human resources. However, 
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acquiring these resources is perhaps also the most daunting challenge of early stage 
high growth entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). New ventures and their 
entrepreneurs are new to the world and, thus, relatively unknown to wider audiences 
(Stinchcombe, 2000). Therefore, there is considerable uncertainty about their 
potential for success, making investors reluctant to provide resources (Hallen & 
Pahnke, 2016; Hellmann, 2002; Ruhnka & Young, 1991). Our understanding of how 
to surmount the challenge of acquiring financial investments is of key importance 
to both entrepreneurs and academics. 
The second challenge, assuming that some entrepreneurs acquire financial 
capital, is to attract talent to the venture. Dedicated talent is essential for start-ups in 
the development of the innovative offerings that will fuel high growth (DeSantola 
& Gulati, 2017; Sauermann, 2017). Nonetheless, similar to the challenge of 
attracting investments, the uncertainty around early stage ventures makes the 
attraction of crucial human resources on itself a pressing challenge. In particular, 
early stage growth ventures expect demanding work of their employees, while 
lacking the resources to offer them the same benefits as established firms (Barber, 
Wesson, Roberson, & Taylor, 1999; Burton, Dahl, & Sorenson, 2018). Thus, our 
understanding of how entrepreneurs can convince talent to join the venture makes 
for a second important query.  
Assuming that some entrepreneurs manage to attract dedicated talent to the 
venture team, entrepreneurs are presented with the third challenge of managing the 
rapidly growing venture team (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). They need to build the 
structures and routines for an effective new venture team that is organized for high 
performance and high growth (Klotz, Hmieleski, Bradley, & Busenitz, 2014). 
Specifically, as the venture team grows it becomes highly dynamic. There is a 
constant influx of new people that help further grow the business, but also an 
outflow of old team members as they and the changing team grow apart (Boeker & 
Karichalil, 2002). Balancing this membership change, in order to ensure their team’s 
future performance, is the entrepreneurs’ third major challenge. 
In this dissertation, I shed new light on entrepreneurs’ ability in overcoming 
these three hurdles to venture success: (1) the acquisition of vast amounts of 
financial capital, (2) the attraction of dedicated talent to the venture team, and (3) 
the management of team dynamics. In the next sections of this Chapter, I will 
explain the theoretical angles I use in my investigations and lay out the contents of 
this dissertation. 
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1.2 CHALLENGE 1: ATTRACTING FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
Entrepreneurship refers to the enactment and exploitation of opportunities for new 
means-end relationships in firms, markets and society that may provide gains 
through addressing competitive imperfections in product or factor markets (Alvarez, 
Barney, & Anderson, 2013; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016; Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000; Wood & Mckinley, 2017). To achieve the exploitation of those opportunities 
they need funding and other resources (e.g. expertise, network, etc.) provided by 
investors. However, a good idea by itself does not guarantee that the needed 
investments will flow into the venture. This is because there is an information 
asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, resulting in considerable 
uncertainty regarding a start-ups potential for growth and survival (Shane, 2003). 
As a consequence, entrepreneurs’ have to proactively convince stakeholders to 
support the venture. In fact, the entrepreneurship literature is shifting its attention 
from the characteristics of entrepreneurs and their discovery of entrepreneurial 
opportunities, to the actions and behaviors of entrepreneurs and their interplay with 
stakeholders, in explaining entrepreneurial outcomes (for reviews, see Alvarez & 
Barney, 2010; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). From that viewpoint, new 
venture creation is a way to pursue the opportunities, and entrepreneurs are the 
individuals who seek to enact and exploit them through on-going interaction with 
stakeholders (Alvarez & Barney, 2013; Wood & Mckinley, 2017).  
In investigating these interactions between entrepreneurs and stakeholders, 
entrepreneurship research draws from literature on impression management. 
Impression management research dictates that the uncertainty about the value of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity, between entrepreneurs and resource holders can be 
addressed through communications (e.g., Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Fisher, 
Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, 
Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011). The communications by 
entrepreneurs help establish identities that distinguish the venture from other market 
constituents in the eyes of the audience (i.e., optimal distinctiveness, Glynn & 
Navis, 2013). These identities define who the entrepreneurs are and what the venture 
does (Navis & Glynn, 2011), and aim to position the venture as “desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Both Chapter 2 and 3 build on theories of 
impression management. 
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1.2.1 Vision Communication 
Specifically, I focus on the entrepreneurs’ communication of visions. This 
impression management activity is likely to shape the sensemaking of 
entrepreneurs’ actions in the eyes of external audiences (Bird & Schjoedt, 2009; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Navis & Glynn, 2011), and convince them of the 
opportunity that the venture represents (Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015; Garud, 
Gehman, & Giuliani, 2014). Consider the examples of Elon Musk with Tesla and 
SpaceX, Travis Kalanick with Uber, or Boyan Slat with The Ocean Clean-up. For 
example, Musk envisions a future were humankind explores space and colonizes 
Mars, Kalanick wants to evolve the world of transportation, and Slat sees a future 
with oceans free of plastic. Their visions are the “elaborate fictions of proposed 
possible future states of existence” (Gartner, Bird, & Starr, 1992, p. 17) aimed at 
provoking thought and action (Smith & Anderson, 2004) 
In Chapter 2, I point out that vision communication prompts distinctive cues of 
entrepreneurial identities (cf. Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014; Navis & Glynn, 2011; 
van Werven, Bouwmeester, & Cornelissen, 2015). This is because visions outline 
‘what the venture will become,’ and ‘what it will attain’, by conveying stories and 
images of the future of the venture and its ecosystem (e.g., including technology, 
customers, and/or competitors) (Berson, Shamir, Avolio, & Popper, 2001; Garud et 
al., 2014; House & Shamir, 1993; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). In particular, 
the contents of these visions affect investor perceptions of the intrinsic or 
substantive value of what the venture aims to achieve (Cornelissen & Werner, 
2014), and influences what people think is desirable or possible for members of the 
ecosystem and for themselves to achieve (Stam, Lord, Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2014; 
Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011). Entrepreneurial visions can, thereby, motivate 
audiences to act in support of the venture’s pursuits (Baum, Locke, & Kirkpatrick, 
1998; Stam et al., 2014). 
1.2.2 Audience Sensemaking.  
Of particular importance in the investigation of the relationship between the 
communication of these visions and entrepreneurial outcomes is theorizing about 
audience sensemaking (cf. Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). How specific 
audiences, such as investors and potential employees, make sense of entrepreneurs’ 
communications can help future research better understand the underlying 
mechanisms of various vision content types. It enables us to understand the 
audiences perspective on entrepreneurs’ communications (Fisher et al., 2017). This 
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is important, because prior research on audience sensemaking tends to be theoretical 
and case-based, and so-far forgoes specific interpretations of vision content (e.g., 
Garud et al., 2014; Huang, 2018; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007). 
Therefore, in Chapter 2 I focus on a type of vision content popular in practice and 
its effects on attracting financial investments.  
1.2.3 Disruptive Vision and Financial Investments 
I investigate how the venture’s communication of a disruptive vision—one that 
promotes the notion that the venture’s activities will fundamentally change, disturb, 
or re-order the ways in which organizations, markets, and ecosystems operates—
affects their ability to acquire a first round of funding. I test my hypotheses on a 
dataset of 918 Israeli start-ups and with an online randomized experiment. I find 
that start-ups that communicate with a disruptive vision have 22 percent higher odds 
of acquiring a first round of investments, but obtain 24 percent less funds in that 
round.  
Expectation of Extraordinary Return. In my explanation of investors’ sensemaking 
of disruptive visions I zoom in on their expectations of extraordinary return as the 
underlying mechanism. Investors construct interpretations around risks and 
uncertainties in the early stage of venturing that motivate them to invest (Huang & 
Knight, 2017; Huang, 2018). Therein, the concept of extraordinary return in early 
stage investor sensemaking has received increasing attention (Huang & Pearce, 
2015; Maples Jr., 2016). Despite its appearance in prior academic literature, Chapter 
2 is the first work to empirically document that the investors’ expectation of 
extraordinary return1 underlies early stage investment decision making. Disruptive 
vision communication can foster these expectations, because the image of disruption 
suggests that the venture may cause an industry shake-out, with the candidate 
venture controlling the dominant design (Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015). 
Thus, yielding extraordinary returns for the responsible venture and its investors. 
Chapter 2 also shows that, beyond the positive effect of disruptive vision 
communication on the likelihood of receiving a first-round investment, there is a 
negative effect of communicating a disruptive vision on the amount of funds 
                                                     
1 Expectation of extraordinary  return involves the notion that a venture’s business idea 
is “something so ridiculous that it could actually work” (Huang & Pearce, 2015, p. 641), 
potentially culminating in market leadership, and possibly generating returns on investment 
(ROI) of tenfold or better (Sahlman, 1990) through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or exit 
sale to another entity (Prowse, 1998). 
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received. This is because investors initially have no incentive to provide large sums 
of money to a venture that communicates a highly risky and hard-to-achieve plan. I 
find that this effect upholds, even when controlling for the positive effects of 
investor expectations of extraordinary return. 
1.3 CHALLENGE 2: ATTRACTING TALENT  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the second challenge of early stage entrepreneurs: 
attracting talent to the venture team. Start-ups may struggle in attracting talent 
because they are quite unknown to wider audiences (Stinchcombe, 2000), lack  
resources to offer the same job benefits as established firms (Barber et al., 1999; 
Burton et al., 2018; Cardon & Stevens, 2004), while expecting potential recruits to 
go outside their formal role descriptions and work long hours (Cardon & Stevens, 
2004). Similar to Chapter 2, I approach this challenge from the lens of vision 
communication and audience sensemaking. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I focus on 
another popular type of vision content often used to attract talent in practice. 
Specifically, I investigate how the communication of a social vision by an early 
stage venture affects their ability to attract talent to the venture team. A social vision 
presents an image of the future where current issues revolving around physical earth 
and/or societal welfare (e.g., disadvantaged groups) are being addressed by the 
venture’s activities. In this chapter, I test my hypotheses through a field-experiment 
with 102 job seekers. I find that a start-up that communicates with a social vision 
has 72 percent lower odds of eliciting either contact details or an application from 
job seekers. Additionally, I find that talent sets a premium of 252 euros on the 
minimum required gross monthly salary for considering employment at the start-up 
that communicates with a social vision. 
Perceived Opportunity for Achievement. I focus on job seekers’ perceived 
opportunity for achievement as the underlying sensemaking mechanism. From a 
vast stream of work in social psychology, we know that people innately desire 
personal development and growth, and, hence, achievement (Deci, Olafsen, & 
Ryan, 2017; Harackiewicz, Abrahams, & Wageman, 1987; Senko & Harackiewicz, 
2005). Their decision to work at the start-up will at least depend partly on perceiving 
it as an opportunity for personal advancement, influence, distinction and excellence 
(e.g., Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2001; Wanous, Keon, & Latack, 1983). Despite the 
scholarly interest in entrepreneurs’ social vision communications, to date it remains 
unclear how job seekers interpret social visions in relation to their personal desire 
for achievement. I show that social vision communication negatively affects talent 
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attraction and elicits higher salary premiums, because job seekers perceive the start-
up communicating with a social vision to a lesser extent as an opportunity for 
personal achievement than a start-up that does not communicate a social vision. 
1.4 CHALLENGE 3: MANAGING OF VENTURE TEAM DYNAMICS 
Whereas Chapter 2 and 3 cover the two hurdles of financial capital and human 
resource acquisition, Chapter 4 will elucidate how the management of venture team 
dynamics affects venture team performance. As the entrepreneurs of the venture 
attract talented recruits, they start growing and organizing themselves into an 
effective team (Lichtenstein, Dooley, & Lumpkin, 2006; Mueller, S., Volery, & von 
Siemens, 2012). Venture teams include all team members that actively participate 
in both the development, implementation, and execution of the new venture’s 
evolving strategy (cf. Klotz et al., 2014). As these members start performing well 
together, they converge in their thinking and create efficient coordination routines 
(Brannick, Roach, & Salas, 1993; Marks, Mathieu, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2001; 
Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & 
Gibson, 2008). However, venture teams are not stable and members change very 
often as new people are hired and old ones leave. This raises the question how 
regular membership change affects high performance venture teams (i.e. those that 
have come as far as scaling-up their business). Despite a substantial literature on 
new venture management teams (e.g., Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Fiet, Busenitz, 
Moesel, & Barney, 1997; Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007; Klotz et al., 2014; Lim, 
Busenitz, & Chidambaram, 2013), the research about venture teams in general is 
scarce (DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Therefore, Chapter 4 look at the issue from the 
standpoint of the conventional literature about team dynamics, since there is no 
reason to suspect that venture team processes would work differently from high 
growth teams in general. 
Team dynamics literature suggests that when the teams start performing well, 
their team members converge in thinking and develop rigid routines (Mohammed et 
al., 2010; Peterson & Behfar, 2003; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), stifling 
creativity and subsequent performance (Katz, 1982; March, 1991). They suggest 
that team membership change can counteract inertia and stagnation, and promote 
innovation (e.g., Choi & Thompson, 2005; March, 1991; Perretti & Negro, 2007) 
through the influx of new ideas and perspectives. In Chapter 4, I challenge this 
received wisdom with respect to the effects of membership change on team 
performance, for high performance teams. 
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Coordination. In doing so, I draw from the often used concept of coordination. 
Teams that achieve high performance, do so because they have effective 
coordination among their members. Coordination is “the process of orchestrating 
the sequence and timing of interdependent actions” (Marks et al., 2001, p. 367-368) 
and involves explicit and purposeful exchange of information to synchronize team 
members’ actions and behaviors (Brannick et al., 1993; Rico et al., 2008). It is built 
on team members’ shared understanding about members' knowledge, roles, and task 
environment, and how these factors contribute to team success (Brandon & 
Hollingshead, 2004; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Ren & Argote, 2011). In 
Chapter 4, I show that membership change disrupts the coordination routines of high 
performance teams, and leads to detriments in subsequent performance. Whereas 
low performance teams may use membership change to improve their coordination, 
and enhance their subsequent performance as a result. Thereby, this Chapter 
contributes to a pressing issue in research on (venture) team dynamics. 
1.5  SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION 
Start-up growth and survival are inextricably linked to the entrepreneurs’ ability to 
overcome the challenges of acquiring financial resources, attracting talent, and 
organizing of this talent into an effective team. In the Chapters of this dissertation, 
I provide new insights into the roles of vision communication and the management 
of team dynamics in facing these aforementioned challenges.  
Entrepreneurs’ communications are often coined as elementary in attracting both 
financial and human resources. However, despite the prevalence of vision 
communication in practice, it remains unclear how visions and their particular 
content affect the sensemaking of investors and job seekers. Therefore, this 
dissertation investigates how disruptive (Chapter 2) and social vision (Chapter 3) 
communication by early stage venture affects their ability to attract investments and 
new recruits, respectively. Furthermore, once the entrepreneurs have managed to 
build and organize their new venture team into a high performance team, the 
question becomes how they can maintain this high performance as their organization 
continues to grow. Literature on teams currently provides conflicting accounts of 
whether membership change will help or hamper teams that have achieved high 
performance before. Thus, in this dissertation I investigate exactly that (Chapter 4), 
and focus on the underlying mechanism that explains the relationship. 
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I conclude this dissertation by providing numerous opportunities for future 
research and practice to deepen the understanding of how entrepreneurs attract and 
manage financial and human resources. 
1.6 OUTLINE AND KEY FINDINGS OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2: Do disruptive visions pay off? The Impact of Disruptive 
Entrepreneurial Visions on Venture Funding. 
- Start-ups that communicate with a disruptive vision have 22 percent higher 
odds of acquiring a first round of investments, but obtain 24 percent less 
funds in that round. 
- Investors’ expectations of extraordinary return mediate the positive 
relationship between disruptive visions and the investment decision. 
Chapter 3: Making the world a better place with you? Attracting talent through 
entrepreneurs’ social vision communication. 
- A start-up that communicates with a social vision has 72 percent lower odds 
of job seekers’ providing their contact information or of them applying for 
the job. 
- A start-up that communicates with a social vision elicits a premium on 
minimum required salary of 252 euro’s from job seekers. 
- Job seekers’ perception of the start-up as an opportunity for achievement 
mediates this negative relationship between social vision communication 
and the attraction and salary outcomes. 
Chapter 4: Never Change a Winning Team? The Moderating Effect of Prior 
Team Performance on the Membership Change - Venture Team Success 
Relationship. 
- Membership change negatively impacts the performance of venture teams 
with high prior performance, but boosts the performance of venture teams 
with low prior performance. 
- Team coordination mediates the moderated relationship between team 
membership change and team performance. 
1.7  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS THESIS 
This section summarizes the contributions of all individuals and organizations to the 
chapters in this thesis. 
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1.7.1 Data Collection 
- Data for Study 1 in Chapter 2 were obtained with the cooperation of Start-
up Nation Central, from their Start-up Nation Finder platform. Lior Karol 
and Daniela Kandel assisted in providing access this data and helped in 
understanding the nature of the Israeli start-up scene. Murat Tarakci created 
access and later assisted the author in managing the relationship with Start-
up Nation Central. 
- Data for Study 2 in Chapter 2 were obtained using an online randomized 
experiment on the survey platform Prolific academic. Participants were 
recruited and selected through the platform on the basis of scientific 
standards, and received a monetary compensation in accordance with 
Prolific academic’s regulations.  
- Data for Chapter 3 were obtained using a field experiment with Master of 
Science students from the Technology and Operations Management 
department at the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM). The academic 
directors of the masters, RSM program management, and the master 
coordinators assisted the author by providing student contact details and 
background information. 
- Data for Chapter 4 were obtained by means of a web scraper from the online 
database MobyGames, a comprehensive community based repository. 
Murat Tarakci initiated the collection of this dataset through the hiring of a 
web programmer. The author manually corrected all team data with the 
assistance of three Master students. These data were also used in the 
author’s MPhil thesis, and feature in the theses of four additional MSc 
students, of which two were supervised by the author and two by Murat 
Tarakci. 
1.7.2 Research 
The chapters and underlying research presented in this thesis were written and 
conducted mostly independently by the author. The author was responsible for 
studying all relevant literature, collecting and analyzing the data, and writing the 
research and chapters in this thesis. Several individuals have substantially 
contributed to the quality of the research in the following chapters: 
- Chapter 1 and 5: Jan van den Ende and Murat Tarakci were involved in 
providing feedback on the content and structure of this dissertation. 
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- Chapter 2 and 3: Murat Tarakci was involved in defining the research 
questions, developing the conceptual frameworks, providing feedback on 
the analyses, and co-authored both chapters. Ashish Sood co-authored 
Chapter 2, providing feedback and guidance on the conceptual frameworks 
and empirical research. Daan Stam provided extensive feedback on Chapter 
3. 
- Chapter 4: Murat Tarakci was involved in defining the research questions, 
developing the conceptual frameworks, providing feedback on the analyses, 
and serves a co-author of this chapter.  
- Chapter 2, 3 and 4 all received feedback and reviews from colleagues, both 
internal and external to the Rotterdam School of Management. 
1.7.3 Publishing Status 
Chapter 2:  
- The chapter has been published in Journal of Management Studies: 
van Balen, T., Tarakci, M., & Sood, A. (2019). Do disruptive visions 
pay off? The Impact of Disruptive Entrepreneurial Visions on Venture 
Funding. Journal of Management Studies.56(2): 303-342. 
- A summary version of Chapter 2 was published in Harvard Business 
Review: 
van Balen, T., Tarakci, M., & Sood, A. (2018). Disruptive Startups Get 
Funding More Easily, but Less of It. Harvard Business Review. 
https://hbr.org/2018/09/disruptive-startups-get-funding-more-easily-but-
less-of-it.  
- The chapter was presented at AOM conference 2017 and Druid conference 
2017, and published in their proceeding.  
Chapter 3: 
- The chapter is being prepared for submission to the Academy of 
Management Journal. 
- The chapter has been submitted to the Academy of Management 
Conference. 
Chapter 4: 
- The chapter remains a work in progress and is being adjusted based on the 
reviews from reviewers at Journal of Applied Psychology and Journal of 
Management. 
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- Chapter 4 was presented at the INGRoup conference 2015 in Pittsburgh and 
the AOM conference 2016 in Anaheim. It was also published in the best 
paper proceedings of the latter conference.
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
DO DISRUPTIVE VISIONS PAY OFF?  
The Impact of Disruptive Entrepreneurial Visions on 
Venture Funding2 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Disruption has become a hot topic in recent years both in research (Hopp, Antons, 
Kaminski, & Oliver Salge, 2018) and in practice (Christensen, Raynor, & 
McDonald, 2015) – from practitioners citing lists of successful disruptors (Howard, 
2013), encouraging ventures to develop disruptive business models (e.g., Berry, 
2012), appointing ‘Chief Disruption Officers’ (Carr, 2013), to naming an entire 
entrepreneur trade show (e.g., TechCrunch Disrupt). While there is disagreement 
over how to define and identify disruptive innovations in both academic literature 
(Christensen et al., 2015; Danneels, 2004; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015) and the 
business press (Lepore, 2014; The Economist, 2015), there is general consensus on 
the outcome of disruption being a fundamental change, disturbance, or re-ordering 
of the ways in which organizations, markets, and ecosystems operate. For disruption 
to occur, the entrepreneur’s communications are crucial in persuading ecosystem 
members to embrace the new venture and its innovation (Ansari, Garud, & 
Kumaraswamy, 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). Communications by entrepreneurs 
can motivate potential customers to try new products, encourage suppliers and 
incumbents to collaborate, and, above all, convince investors to fund the venture. 
                                                     
2 This chapter is based on published work by van Balen, T., Tarakci, M., & Sood, A. 
(2019). Do Disruptive Visions Pay Off? The Impact of Disruptive Entrepreneurial Visions 
on Venture Funding. Journal of Management Studies, 56(2): 303-342. 
Chapter 2 
22 
For example, investors often rely on the entrepreneur’s communications to make 
sense of the new venture, especially in early-stage investments where the 
uncertainty surrounding a venture’s viability is highest (e.g., Busenitz et al., 2005; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011). 
As documented by prior research into disruption and impression management, 
entrepreneurs follow impression management strategies (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; 
Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & 
Glynn, 2011; Wry et al., 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007) that showcase high-status 
affiliations (Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002), industry leadership (Martens et 
al., 2007), entrepreneurial track record, and the venture’s resource base (e.g., 
Bernstein, Korteweg, & Laws, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) in order to shape 
investors’ sensemaking of the venture. However, these impression management 
strategies are backward-looking entrepreneurial communications, describing ‘who 
the entrepreneurs are’ and ‘what the venture does’. Although Garud et al. (2014) 
have recently recognized the importance of future-oriented communications that 
promote ‘what the venture will become’ and ‘what the entrepreneurs will achieve’, 
there is little research on the extent to which forward-looking communications 
influence investor perceptions of a venture. Gaining insight into the entrepreneur’s 
future-oriented communications is vital as it enables scholars in entrepreneurship, 
disruption and impression management fields to obtain a better understanding of the 
relationship between the entrepreneur’s activities and disruption, which is 
essentially a future event that the entrepreneurs may aim to achieve. 
As a form of future-oriented impression management in the disruption process, 
we introduce and define disruptive visions – the thematic content of vision 
communication that articulates intentions to disrupt organizations, markets, and 
ecosystems. Vision communication aims to impart stories and images of the future 
of a collective (e.g., technology, customers, or ecosystems) (Berson et al., 2001; 
Garud et al., 2014; House & Shamir, 1993; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014) Similar 
to the use of ‘disruptive innovation’ as a modifying label for innovations aiming to 
upend incumbent offerings (Christensen, McDonald, Altman, & Palmer, 2016; 
Christensen, 1997), we use ‘disruptive vision’ as a label for an entrepreneur’s vision 
to upend existing market structures. In that regard, our conceptualization of 
disruption and disruptive vision reflects how entrepreneurs and investors understand 
disruption in practice (e.g., Cosper, 2015; Rachleff, 2013; The Economist, 2015). 
We examine how the communication of a disruptive vision drives the likelihood 
and the amount of an initial round of funding. We argue that the more that a 
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venture’s vision communication portrays an image of disruption, the higher the odds 
of receiving first-round funding, since the game-changing appeal of a potential 
disruption fosters expectation of extraordinary investor returns. However, a highly 
disruptive vision also conveys uncertainty regarding a venture’s potential for 
success, deterring investors from making large speculative investments into the 
venture. We thus hypothesize that communicating a more disruptive vision 
increases the likelihood of first-round funding (i.e., Seed funding or Series A) while 
it shrinks the amount of capital received. We tested these hypotheses in two 
complementary studies. In Study 1, we used a unique dataset of start-ups in Israel – 
a well-known cradle of entrepreneurship with more high-tech start-ups per capita 
than any other country (Senor & Singer, 2009). We found that increasing a venture’s 
disruptive vision communication by one standard deviation improved the odds of 
receiving funding by 22 per cent. We also noted that one standard deviation increase 
in disruptive vision communication cut the amount of funds invested by 24 per cent 
– amounting to a $87,000 drop for a typical venture in the Seed round, and a 
$361,000 reduction in the series A funding round. In Study 2, we replicated these 
results in a randomized online experiment to ascertain whether investor expectation 
of extraordinary returns is the mechanism driving these results.  
We offer several contributions to the literature on disruption, impression 
management, and entrepreneurial visions. First, in its classical formulation, the 
disruption process is explained as relative performance trajectories of competing 
technologies (Christensen, 1997). Recent research, however, has also unearthed the 
role of entrepreneurs’ framing of innovations during the disruption process (e.g., 
Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses and Ozcan, 2015). We introduce and provide a deeper 
understanding of the role entrepreneurial visions play in acquiring resources critical 
to the disruption process. Second, we contribute to the burgeoning stream of 
literature on impression management, which notes that entrepreneurs frame 
communications to foster categorization and to establish their ventures’ identities 
(e.g., Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; 
Werven, Bouwmeester, & Cornelissen, 2015; Zott & Huy, 2007). Until now, there 
has been limited examination of the relative impacts of future-oriented 
communications on outcomes at the venture level (Garud et al., 2014). We assess 
the efficacy of future-oriented communications for early-stage ventures and 
introduce a new category of impression management strategies: the communication 
of disruptive visions. Third, we integrate research on real options and impression 
management by positing how impression management affects investor evaluations 
of ventures as real options. We demonstrate opposing effects of impression 
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management on the selection and endowment of investment options. Fourth, we 
challenge prior research on entrepreneurial visions espousing only a positive impact 
from strong vision communication (e.g., Baum et al., 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; 
Elenkov, Judge, & Wright, 2005). Our study is the first to show that specific 
thematic contents of entrepreneurial visions may damage an entrepreneur’s ability 
to attract large investments. Equally important, we offer practical advice for 
entrepreneurial framing of disruptive visions and highlight the consequences of 
following it. 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.2.1 Impression Management and Investor Sensemaking 
Prior research on disruption and impression management has argued that 
entrepreneurs’ impression management efforts are key in the disruption process. 
Ansari et al. (2016) and Gurses and Ozcan (2015) have shown that framing value 
propositions as complementary to incumbents has been critical for achieving 
disruption in the digital video recording and pay-TV industries. Impression 
management activities have also included communications about venture activities, 
innovations, capabilities, achievements, and affiliations that help regulators, 
competitors, suppliers, and investors to embrace the venture (Fisher et al., 2017; 
Hallen, 2008; Huang & Pearce, 2015; Martens et al., 2007; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 
2014; Zott & Huy, 2007). These communications attempt to establish identities that 
distinguish the venture from other market constituents in the eyes of investors (i.e., 
optimal distinctiveness, Glynn & Navis, 2013). Such well-established identities 
define who the entrepreneurs are and what the ventures do (Navis and Glynn, 2011). 
These presentations aim to showcase the venture as ‘desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and 
definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
Entrepreneurs attempt to set themselves apart in at least three ways (e.g., 
Bernstein et al., 2017; Burton et al., 2002; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Huang 
& Pearce, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Maxwell, Jeffrey, 
& Lévesque, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007). One, they may feature track records and past 
performances of the entrepreneur(s) and/or the team (e.g., entrepreneur or employee 
tenure, experience, or successful prior exits). Two, they may highlight market 
success as a venture (e.g., attaining industry leadership or first-mover status, 
winning awards and prizes, or achieving customer favour). Three, they may stress 
resource-based advantages (e.g., networks, affiliations, technologies, patents, or 
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prototypes). Appendix Table AII lists examples of such communications within our 
dataset. 
These impression management efforts are, by their very nature, backward-
looking, with a focus on the entrepreneurs’ and/or ventures’ identities and past or 
current accomplishments (see Hallen, 2008). While the extant literature has recently 
recognized the importance of future-oriented communications (Garud et al., 2014), 
studies of disruption and impression management have omitted vision 
communication – that is, conveying stories and images of the future of the venture 
and its ecosystem (e.g, including technology, customers, and/or competitors) 
(Berson et al., 2001; Garud et al., 2014; House & Shamir, 1993; Van Knippenberg 
& Stam, 2014). Specifically, entrepreneurial visions are future-oriented impression 
management efforts and outline ‘what the venture will become’, and ‘what it will 
attain’. This is a key omission since vision communication prompts distinctive cues 
of entrepreneurial identities (see Navis and Glynn, 2011; van Werven et al., 2015).  
Specifically, vision content (e.g., with a focus on disruption) affects investor 
perceptions of the intrinsic or substantive value of what the venture aims to achieve 
(Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), and influences what people think is desirable or 
possible for members of the ecosystem and for themselves to achieve (Stam et al., 
2014; Wry et al., 2011). Entrepreneurial visions can, thereby, motivate audiences to 
act in support of the venture’s pursuits (Baum et al., 1998; Stam et al., 2014). Since 
stakeholders within a venture’s ecosystem shape how the disruption process unfolds 
(Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses and Ozcan, 2015), some entrepreneurs choose to 
articulate disruptive visions to influence investors. In the following section, we 
introduce and conceptualize disruptive visions to develop a more complete picture 
of how the disruptiveness of entrepreneurial visions affects acquisition of funding.  
2.2.2 Disruptive Vision 
Disruptive innovation theory defines disruptive innovations as innovations with 
initially inferior performance attributes, with the potential to dethrone incumbent 
technologies, services and/or business models (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003). However, there is a heated ongoing debate of how to define 
disruptive innovations (e.g., whether they underperform initially, whether they 
improve over time, whether they are introduced by new entrants, whether they 
progress toward the mainstream solely through a niche market, etc.) (Christensen et 
al., 2015; Danneels, 2004; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Markides, 2006; Tellis, 
2006). The core insight emanating from this debate is that disruptive innovations 
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should be separated from their outcome: disruption (Sood & Tellis, 2011). 
Understood from a practitioner perspective (The Economist, 2015), old market 
linkages in a disrupted market or ecosystem become uprooted in favour of new ones. 
Therefore, a disrupted market or ecosystem hosts new firms, new market leaders, 
new products, and new ways of doing business. This view also aligns closely with 
the description of disruption by Christensen et al. (2015, p. 46) as being ‘able to 
successfully challenge established incumbent businesses’. Similarly, Ansari et al. 
(2016, p. 4) place disruption in ecosystem domains where incumbent business 
models are disturbed by the adoption of an innovation in that ecosystem. Thus, while 
the extant research still lacks consensus on the antecedents, drivers, or definition of 
disruptive innovation, there is more convergence on the generally observed 
outcomes of disruption. 
Disruption is contingent upon the persuasion of various stakeholders in the 
ecosystem, which can be achieved through the entrepreneur’s communications 
(Ansari et al., 2016). Hence, a disruptive vision communicates an image of 
disruption. A disruptive vision details deficiencies in the current market, and 
promises a paradigm shift that will mark ‘a [considerable] difference or break from 
the previous business models and products in an industry or market’ (Cornelissen, 
2013, p. 708). This impending change is framed as an opportunity for improvement 
and advantage (Mullins & Komisar, 2010). Since fundamental changes tend to arise 
from innovations (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003), disruptive visions cast their 
images of a disrupted market as completely new approaches to business stemming 
from innovation. Therefore, a disruptive vision spotlights an innovation that 
promotes new functionality, formerly unseen in the market, and that purports to 
achieve conventional market objectives in a very different way. See Appendix for 
examples within our dataset. 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.3.1 Disruptive Visions and Investment Acquisition 
To explain how a disruptive vision affects investor sensemaking, we turn to the 
literature on impression management and real options theory. Both are often used 
to explain investment decisions under uncertainty (Huang & Knight, 2017; 
Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). Impression management refers to the entrepreneur’s 
communication of symbolic cues and narratives to investors that, in turn, influence 
how investors make sense of the venture. Sensemaking is the process by which 
investors rationalize what the venture is doing and give meaning to its assessment 
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as an investment opportunity (see Navis & Glynn, 2011; Weick et al., 2005). The 
central premise underlying real options theory is that an investor has the ability or 
freedom to act (e.g., exercise, defer, expand, or abandon) at any point in time on the 
options they hold (Klingebiel & Adner, 2015). An early-stage investment can be 
viewed as a real option since investors have the ability to fund a position later when 
new details about a venture’s prospects arise. The value of a real option is 
determined by investors’ perception of the balance between the venture’s potential 
upside and any associated risks (Hoffmann & Post, 2017). We argue that this 
perception, and thus real option valuation, can be influenced by an entrepreneur’s 
impression management efforts, on top of traditional data on venture or entrepreneur 
status, experience, and prior achievements available to investors. 
Disruption, if achieved, has the power to create new industry leaders and shift 
overall market demand from existing products, services, or business models to new 
ones. A successful disruption may create an industry shake-out, with the candidate 
venture controlling the dominant design (Argyres et al., 2015), thereby yielding 
extraordinary returns for the responsible venture and its investors. Thus, ventures 
can create the expectation of extraordinary returns by communicating a vision of 
disruption. Such ventures may be alluring options among wider holdings of early-
stage investments, since returns in such portfolios tend to follow the power law 
whereby the best-return investment exceeds the combined returns of all remaining 
investment options (Maples Jr., 2016). Therefore, a single huge success can ensure 
the viability of the investor’s entire portfolio (Ruhnka & Young, 1991). 
Conversely, images of disruption may also be associated with greater potential 
exposure to uncertainty. Nonetheless, investors are often prepared to accept risk of 
the unknown if the focal venture has a chance of becoming a great success (Huang 
and Pearce, 2015). Here, a large gain not only ensures portfolio viability, but also 
improves public image among fellow investors (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 
2007; Gompers, 1996). Moreover, risk tolerance is bolstered when the option 
permits the exercising or abandoning of an investment at a later stage, when the 
speculative risks become clearer. 
A highly disruptive vision also instills a fear of missing out on the next big 
change in the market. Investors may act on the anticipated regret of forgone 
extraordinary returns. This is especially the case when the investors face the 
prospect of a competitor capitalizing on the ensuing upheaval in the marketplace 
and the extraordinary returns associated with such a change (Hooshangi & 
Loewenstein, 2018). Hence, a fear of missing out a potentially significant 
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investment opportunity may drive investors to select the venture as an investment 
option. 
Furthermore, since a venture’s vision of disruption implies the potential loss of 
valuable competencies in current market structures and dynamics (Henderson, 
2006), as well as potential obsolescence in an investor’s current portfolio, market 
linkages between ecosystem participants may not persist. This drives investors to 
select an option that hedges against the potential loss of market access and increases 
the flexibility to exercise diversified strategic alternatives at a later stage. 
Consequently, early-stage investors may be prompted by disruptive vision 
communication to see the venture as an option for future extraordinary returns. 
Therefore, we argue that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more disruptive a venture’s vision communication, the 
higher the likelihood of attracting financial investments. 
 
2.3.2 Disruptive Visions and Amount of Investment Acquired 
We hypothesize a negative effect of disruptive vision on the amount of funding 
provided by investors. We return to real options theory and impression management 
literature to elaborate the negative effect of disruptive vision. Because options (e.g., 
the right to increase or abandon an investment) can be exercised at later stages of 
market development when the level of uncertainty regarding the new venture has 
reduced, there is less incentive for investors to provide large amounts of capital 
during initial stages (Klingebiel & Adner, 2015).  
While investments in all young ventures are risky and uncertain, the perception 
of this risk and uncertainty is largely shaped by how the entrepreneurs communicate 
their visions and form impressions in the minds of potential investors (Huang and 
Pearce, 2015; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). These perceptions affect the amount of 
funding acquired from investors. Articulation of a highly disruptive vision increases 
uncertainty about the outcome. The more disruptive the vision, the more likely is 
the investors’ perception that a venture may need to diverge from specific plans 
(Garud et al., 2014). Additionally, research has shown that excessive promotions of 
innovation and novelty force investors to weigh the challenges in commercializing 
the innovation more carefully (Dimov & Murray, 2008; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 
2014) and may point investors toward the possibility that unknown fatal flaws in the 
business idea exist (Maxwell et al., 2011). 
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A disruptive vision thus discourages high-volume stakes in a venture. This is 
because investors tend to be risk-averse toward low probabilities of success that 
hinder overall portfolio returns (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Instead, investors 
take smaller positions (i.e., investments) in a venture that communicates a more 
disruptive vision than in a less disruptive one, and await market news before 
exercising further options. We argue that the communication of a disruptive vision 
has a direct negative effect on the amount of financial funding in a first investment 
round. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Communicating a more disruptive vision lowers the amount 
of venture funding. 
 
2.3.3 Expectations of Extraordinary Returns and its Mediating Effects 
When ventures successfully ‘disrupt’ the status quo of existing products, firms, or 
markets, they may create an industry shake-out with the candidate venture becoming 
the dominant player. Ventures that communicate a disruptive vision often promise 
huge opportunities for investors. However, disruption is difficult to achieve and the 
necessary steps and timing are largely unknown. The distant and volatile nature of 
disruption entails high risks that are unknowable. The tension between the great 
potential opportunity and the endemic riskiness fosters an investor mindset that a 
venture’s business idea is ‘something so ridiculous that it could actually work’ 
(Huang and Pearce, 2015, p. 641), possibly generating returns on investment (ROI) 
of tenfold or better (Sahlman, 1990) through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or exit 
sale to another entity (Prowse, 1998). Overall, this game-changing appeal of a 
disruptive vision lures investors with the expectation of a significant investment 
outcome among a portfolio of early-stage investments. 
The expectation of extraordinary returns logically increases the likelihood of 
funding. Investors naturally pursue unconventionally high investment returns 
(Huang and Pearce, 2015). Yet, early-stage investments are also associated with 
higher likelihood of subsequent losses. As an offset, early-stage investors expect 
exceptionally high rates of return (Ruhnka and Young, 1991) that help ensure the 
viability of their portfolios (Maples, 2016).  
Moreover, seizing investment opportunities that yield large ROIs increases the 
visibility and standing of investors among fellow capitalists (Dimov et al., 2007). 
For example, early investors in ventures that disrupt markets and ecosystems are 
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often celebrated in entrepreneurial circles (e.g., Peter Thiel for Facebook; Jeremy 
Liew’s Lightspeed Venture Partners for Snapchat; Chris Fralic’s first round capital 
for Uber). Such gains in visibility are important as they may attract larger capital 
flows to the investor’s fund later (Gompers, 1996). In addition, leaving such an 
opportunity unexploited adds to the anticipated regret of missing out on the potential 
monetary and social gains. 
In contrast, the lack of a disruptive vision may cool expectation of extraordinary 
returns, hampering the venture’s profile as a valuable investment option among 
others. Thus, the stronger the expectation of extraordinary returns created by a 
disruptive vision, the more likely it is that investors will take an option in the 
venture.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the disruptiveness of a 
venture’s vision communication and the likelihood of attracting financial 
investments is mediated by the investor’s expectation of extraordinary 
returns. 
 
Arguably, investors who perceive a venture as likely to offer extraordinary 
returns might also increase their stakes in that venture. For example, if investors 
believe it to be highly likely that the venture will increase its valuation tenfold within 
five years, they may be more inclined to capitalize on the opportunity, seeking a 
higher stake in the venture and thus endowing the venture with more financial 
capital. In such a case, there should be a positive relationship between the 
expectation of extraordinary returns and the amount funded. Because highly 
disruptive visions positively affect the expectation of extraordinary return, we argue 
that disruptive visions also exert a positive, indirect impact on the amount of funding 
from investors (i.e., similar to our arguments for Hypothesis 3) through the 
expectation of extraordinary returns.  
Despite this positive, indirect effect of a disruptive vision through the 
expectation of extraordinary returns, we still expect a negative, direct effect of the 
disruptive vision on funding amounts (see arguments for Hypothesis 2). This is 
called inconsistent mediation (for details, see Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley, 2017; 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; for recent empirical examples, see Gardner, 
Wright, & Moynihan, 2011; Jayasinghe, 2016). With inconsistent mediation, the 
direct effect of the independent variable has an opposing sign to the mediated effect. 
Incurring the opposite mediating effect from the expectation of extraordinary 
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returns helps expose the direct negative effect of the disruptive vision on the 
amounts of funding acquired. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Expectation of extraordinary returns mediates the 
relationship between the disruptiveness of a venture’s vision 
communication and the amount of venture funding. 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
The aim of our paper is to investigate the efficacy of disruptive visions for acquiring 
a first round of funding. We tested our hypotheses using two complementary studies. 
Our first study uses an archive of Israeli start-ups. With this study, we empirically 
tested the main effects of disruptive visions on investment decisions (i.e., 
Hypotheses 1 and 2). This field study also provided ecological validity for our 
findings. Study 2 was comprised of a randomized online experiment that both 
replicated findings from the first study and identified the mechanism underlying the 
positive effects of disruptive visions on investment decisions (i.e., Hypotheses 3 and 
4). This experimental study generalized our findings beyond the Israeli venture 
context, and the randomized control nature of the experiment pinpointed the 
causality driving our results. 
2.4 STUDY 1: THE DISRUPTIVE VISIONS OF ISRAELI START-UPS 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Sample 
We test our hypotheses using a comprehensive database of Israeli start-ups. Israel 
is often dubbed a ‘Start-up Nation’ for its strong entrepreneurship scene, having the 
most high-tech start-ups per capita (Senor and Singer, 2009) and a vibrant venture 
capital scene (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2006). Israeli start-ups are young, 
internationally oriented, knowledge-intensive organizations that mainly produce 
innovative, proprietary self-developed technologies (Engel & del-Palacio, 2011). 
We obtained data from Start-Up Nation Central – a private non-profit organization 
that has exhaustively collected and accurately stored data on all Israeli start-ups 
since 2013 (www.startupnationcentral.org). The data featured on Start-Up Nation 
Finder (Start-Up Nation Central’s ‘Innovation Discovery Platform’, 
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https://finder.startupnationcentral.org) provide detailed information on venture 
activities, products, locations, founders, management teams, funding, and investors. 
This dataset is uniquely qualified for testing our hypotheses for two reasons. 
First, it offers rich and reliable information on venture, entrepreneur, and funding 
outcomes. Second, the data allow us to correct for selection bias since they include 
firms that obtained funds and those that did not. Prior research has mainly 
considered ventures that have already obtained funding (e.g. Gompers, 1995; Kanze 
& Iyengar, 2017; Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016), creating a 
methodological sample-selection problem. With our data, we can regress the models 
on both the likelihood of funding and the amount of funding to properly correct for 
selection bias. 
We sampled ventures founded between 2013 (when Start-Up Nation Central 
began) and 2016, including only their first round of funding (Seed or A round). Our 
cross-sectional sample totals 2139 ventures. We randomly chose 1000 start-up firms 
from this sample. After removing missing values for the variables selected in our 
models, the final dataset contained 918 start-ups. 
2.4.1.2 Measures 
Dependent Variables.  
We coded ventures that had first-round funding as investment received (1 if yes, 0 
otherwise). The amount of funding received was measured as the amount of funding 
in US dollars that a venture received in its first funding round. Generally, the first 
funding round referred to a Seed round, but in some cases, ventures skipped the 
Seed round and went straight to the A series – a recent trend known as bootstrapping 
(Newlands, 2015). We applied the natural log of this variable because of skewness 
(Skewness = 4.17, Kurtosis = 21.92, Shapiro–Wilk test W = 0.56, p < 0.001). 
Independent Variables.  
We followed the standard practice of coding vision statements (e.g., Baum et al., 
1998; Baum and Locke, 2004; Berson et al., 2001) to measure disruptive vision. 
Vision statements were displayed on the Start-Up Nation Finder for investors. Since 
the Start-Up Nation Finder platform is used by investors to seek and select 
promising start-ups, these statements are important in entrepreneurs’ 
communication with investors. Two graduate assistants coded the vision statements. 
After initial instruction meetings and resolution of disagreements on a trial set of 
vision statements, the two coders were directed to proceed in isolation and refrain 
from any further discussion.  
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A disruptive vision conveys a drastic change in the way organizations or 
ecosystems operate, showcasing a significant break from existing products, 
services, and business models (Cornelissen, 2013). Since fundamental changes tend 
to emerge from innovations (Ireland et al., 2003), disruptive visions evoke images 
of a disrupted market and a new approach to business stemming from innovation. 
Therefore, we operationalized disruptive vision using the following four items 
indicating (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) whether the vision statement (i) ‘promotes drastic 
[or fundamental] change in the future: it makes a claim of pursuing dramatic change 
at a market or larger level, with implicit consequences for multiple stakeholders’ 
(Kappa = 0.61); (ii) ‘features a future that contrasts with the status quo: it delineates 
deficiencies in the current market situation and promises a substantial improvement’ 
(Kappa = 0.66); (iii) ‘includes ideas, plans or other evidence of achieving the 
conventional market objective in a completely different manner’ (Kappa = 0.46); 
and (iv) ‘promotes the venture’s innovation or activities as enabling a completely 
new function’ (Kappa = 0.21). Because of the low Kappa value of the last item, we 
removed it from our measure for empirical purposes.3 On the three-item measure, 
both coders presented sufficient agreement across items per vision statement (mean 
Rwg = 0.83). Next, the average for the two coders was calculated for each item. The 
resulting averages were then summed to calculate a disruptive vision score per 
statement. The coders displayed good agreement and reliability in the calculated 
disruptive vision measure (mean ICC2 = 0.82). 
Control Variables.  
We drew from prior literature to identify four sets of control variables in our models 
related to the characteristics of the venture and its communications, the founders, 
the product and market, and the funding round. 
The first set of controls included traits of a venture’s communication style and 
reach. We controlled for a venture’s social media exposure, since this may increase 
the visibility of the venture and enhance investor awareness (Fischer & Reuber, 
2011). Start-Up Nation Finder displays direct links to various social media 
platforms (i.e., Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, and Twitter). We operationalized 
social media exposure by measuring the number of social media platforms for which 
the venture had a link in the Start-Up Nation Finder database.  
                                                     
3 We tested and ascertained the robustness of our findings when this item is included. 
See the Robustness Checks section of Study 1 in the Results section. 
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We also controlled for the extent to which a venture’s vision statement includes 
the promotion of achievements. Investors may conduct their own due diligence 
about a venture’s and its entrepreneur’s achievements, having alternative sources to 
assess claims. However, prior research on impression management agrees that 
investors also rely on cues conveyed by entrepreneurs. In particular, the emphasis 
on achievements may be an important determinant of the credibility and legitimacy 
of a venture’s claims in the eyes of investors. The coders rated each company 
statement regarding three items indicating (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) whether it (i) 
‘features evidence of past performance/experience of entrepreneurs and employees’ 
(Kappa = 0.69); (ii) ‘presents evidence of past and current successes of the venture 
in the market, including customers, locations, market leadership, and awards and 
prizes’ (Kappa = 0.63); and (iii) ‘features claims of accrued resources, such as the 
latest/proprietary technology, partnerships/networks/affiliations, and 
patents/prototypes’ (Kappa = 0.61). Both coders had high agreement across items 
per vision statement (mean Rwg = 0.88). Next, the average for the two coders was 
computed for each item, and resulting averages were then summed to calculate a 
score per venture. The coders showed good agreement and reliability in the summed 
promotion of achievements measure (mean ICC2 = 0.84). 
Vision communication is often associated with imagery (Emrich, Brower, 
Feldman, & Garland, 2001). Messages high in imagery induce more vivid portraits 
of what is communicated (Carton, Murphy, & Clark, 2014). We controlled for 
imagery to isolate the effect of disruptive visions beyond imagery. We used the 
Toronto Word Pool, which rates words on degrees of imagery using a 1-to-7 scale 
(Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982). Imagery scores were then averaged 
for the words in a venture’s vision statement. 
The second set of controls pertained to features of the venture itself. Venture 
capitalists and angel investors who focus on early-stage investments are more likely 
to favour younger ventures (Huang and Pearce, 2015; Ter Wal et al., 2016). 
Therefore, we controlled for venture age by subtracting the year of founding from 
2016. Furthermore, if start-ups stated in the vision statement that they were a part 
of another firm, we coded them as Subsidiary ventures. We included this as a control 
since these ventures may require and receive different levels of external funding due 
to affiliation with a larger established firm (D’Mello, Krishnaswami, & Larkin, 
2008). We also coded whether ventures were members of (corporate) accelerators, 
co-working environments, or entrepreneurship programs, as these relationships 
assist ventures in developing their activities, markets, strategy, and resources. These 
programs may also offer networking, educational, mentorship, and pitch-making 
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opportunities (Cohen, 2013). We mark ventures as a Member of a program using a 
dummy variable in our models (member = 1, non-member = 0). 
Additionally, Start-Up Nation Finder displays categorizing tags on a venture’s 
page. By clicking a tag, ventures with similar characteristics can be found. By 
including the Number of tags in our models, we controlled for the exposure to 
investors through Start-Up Nation Finder. This skewed variable was log-
transformed (Skewness = 1.03, Kurtosis = 3.73, W = 0.95, p < 0.001). Finally, 
ventures in our dataset were assigned to one sector: software, healthcare, security 
and safety technologies, or other. We included sector dummies because funding 
requirements and timing vary across sectors. 
The third set of controls pertains to founder, and product and market 
characteristics. We controlled for serial entrepreneurship. Serial entrepreneurs can 
call upon amassed experience and networks that enable access to valuable resources 
(Cassar, 2014). We coded Serial entrepreneur as 1 if a (co-)founder appeared as a 
(co-)founder of another start-up in our full database (i.e., including all ventures in 
the Start-Up Nation Finder database that were founded before 2017). We controlled 
for geographic scope since the number of target markets can affect sales and growth 
potential as well as capital needs in serving different markets (Gupta & Sapienza, 
1992). Start-Up Nation Finder lists each start-up’s geographical target markets. 
Geographic areas included North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East, and Oceania. Geographic scope was proxied by tallying the regions 
where a venture was active. Furthermore, products in research and development 
phases are riskier investments than those already launched (Audretsch, Bönte, & 
Mahagaonkar, 2012). We controlled for the stage of development by including a 
dummy variable, Released product, marked as ‘1’ when a venture’s products were 
released commercially, or as ‘0’ otherwise.  
Finally, we included two control variables for a venture’s first-round funding. In 
our analysis, we included only ventures initiating Series A or Seed funding. 
Generally, funding levels increase with the funding series, and start-ups can leapfrog 
through bootstrapping – i.e., building and growing a venture with personal finances 
or using initial operating cash flow (Newlands, 2015). We included a dummy 
variable in our models for A-Round funding to indicate ventures that bypassed the 
Seed round and went straight to A-series in their first round. Lastly, we controlled 
for investor prior experience as this may influence investment decisions (Huang and 
Pearce, 2015). We operationalized investor experience by averaging the total 
number of funding rounds the investors took part in before the focal funding round. 
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We calculated this variable using the full database, including all funding rounds in 
the Start-Up Nation Finder database that occurred prior to 2017.  
2.4.1.3 Analytical Approach 
The fact that funding decisions by investors are not random may introduce bias into 
our coefficient estimates for the amount of funds acquired. To mitigate sample-
selection bias induced by a non-random selection of observations for received funds, 
we applied the Heckman correction using ‘full-information maximum-likelihood’ 
estimation (FIML). The FIML estimator offers more efficiency than the two-step 
estimator (Greene, 2012) since all parameters of the selection and outcome 
equations are estimated simultaneously using the likelihood function (Certo, 
Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 2016). 
Prior research advises an exclusion restriction such that there is at least one 
variable with a non-zero coefficient in a selection equation estimating acquired 
funds that is excluded from the outcome equation estimating funding amount (Certo 
et al., 2016). We used number of tags and social media exposure as exclusionary 
variables since they proxy the probability that an investor landed at the venture’s 
page on Start-Up Nation Finder via click-through (internal and external, 
respectively). Both elements primarily influence the awareness of a venture and, 
thus, its likelihood of funding, but not the amount of funding. After all, the number 
of tags or social media links is quite uninformative about venture risk or upside 
potential. In the results section to follow, we discuss diagnostics regarding our 
selection correction approach.  
We used Probit regression to estimate the selection equation for a venture’s 
propensity to receive a first investment round. To test Hypothesis 1 concerning the 
likelihood of obtaining a first funding round, we conduct and report on a logistic 
regression instead of the Probit selection equation4. The model specification of our 
logistic regression was identical to that of the Probit selection equation. 
 
2.4.2 Results 
                                                     
4 Although logistic regression and Probit regressions provide similar results and 
conclusions, the interpretation of their coefficients is not identical because of the difference 
in link functions (Greene, 2012). In a Probit model, the value of a coefficient is understood 
as the increase in z-value on a cumulative distribution function. 
Do Disruptive Visions Pay Off? 
37 
We first report the descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations as model-free 
evidence. Tables Ia and Ib present descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 1. 
We observe that ventures were almost two years old on average, operated mostly in 
one geographic area, and that 43 per cent of ventures operated in the software sector. 
 
Table Ia. Study 1 descriptive statistics for continuous variables. 
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Amount of funding 
received (in ’000$) 
10.00 1000.00 2199.39 905.23 25 000.00 3521.71 
Disruptive vision 0.00 0.50 0.61 1.45 3.00 0.78 
Promotion of 
achievements 
0.00 0.50 0.52 1.42 3.00 0.62 
Imagery 0.00 0.04 0.05 1.04 0.21 0.03 
Social media 
exposure 
0.00 2.00 1.79 2.43 4.00 1.35 
Venture age 0.00 2.00 1.94 2.79 3.00 0.86 
Number of tags 1.00 7.00 7.60 7.96 31.00 3.32 
Geographic scope 1.00 1.00 1.25 2.19 6.00 0.63 
Investor 
experience 
1.00 4.00 9.30 6.28 85.00 13.02 
 
Table Ib. Study 1 descriptive statistics for dummy variables. 
 0 1 Percentage 
Investment received 782 136 14.81 
Subsidiary 849 69 7.52 
Member of program 768 150 16.34 
Sector Software 522 396 43.14 
Sector Healthcare 807 111 12.09 
Sector Security and Safety 837 81 8.82 
Serial entrepreneur 486 432 47.06 
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Product released 565 353 38.45 
A-round 112 24 17.65 
 
Furthermore, we note that 38 per cent of ventures had released products, 47 per 
cent were founded by at least one serial entrepreneur, nearly 18 per cent had an A-
series as first-round funding, and that 7.5 per cent of ventures were subsidiaries. 
Importantly, only 14.8 per cent of ventures received an investment, and those that 
did, acquired an average of $905,227 (geometric mean).  
Table II presents the Pearson correlations. We observe that venture age has a 
significant positive association with having received an investment, but a negative 
association with the amount of funding received. Older ventures also are more likely 
to release products and to be active in social media. Importantly for the exclusion 
restrictions, ventures with more links to social platforms and more tags on their 
Start-Up Nation Finder page were positively correlated with receiving an 
investment, but not with the amount of investment received. We also observe that 
the promotion of achievements was positively and significantly correlated with both 
receiving funding and acquiring higher amounts. Regarding our main variable of 
interest: we observe a positive significant association of a disruptive vision with 
receiving an investment; and while not significant, but in line with our inconsistent 
mediation hypothesis, we note a negative association of a disruptive vision with the 
amount of funding. 
2.4.2.1 Sample-Selection Correction Diagnostics 
Sample selection impacted our data since the independent variable predicted 
significantly in the selection equation, and rho emerged as significant in our full 
model (rho = −0.81, S.E. = 0.13, p < 0.001, Model 4 in Table III) (Certo et al., 2016). 
Moreover, our independent variable did not correlate with error terms of the 
selection equation (r < 0.01, p = 0.94) or the outcome equation (r < 0.01, p = 0.99), 
and thus proved to be exogenous. Therefore, we deemed the results of our outcome 
equation to be unbiased (Certo et al., 2016). Also, the correlation between our 
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Table III. Study 1 results. 
Dependent variable  Investment received (1 = Yes) 
Amount of funding received 
(’000$) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Estimate  
(Std .Error) 
Estimate  
(Std .Error) 
Estimate  
(Std .Error) 
Estimate  
(Std .Error) 
Intercept -4.16***  
(0.72) 
-4.30***  
(0.73) 
15.38***  
(0.79) 
15.27***  
(0.85) 
Disruptive vision  0.20*  
(0.10) 
 -0.27**  
(0.11) 
Promotion of 
achievements 
0.27**  
(0.09) 
0.26**  
(0.10) 
-0.02  
(0.13) 
0.00  
(0.13) 
Imagery 0.02  
(0.10) 
-0.03  
(0.11) 
-0.20┼  
(0.11) 
-0.13  
(0.11) 
Social media exposure 0.69***  
(0.12) 
0.68***  
(0.12) 
  
Venture age 0.13  
(0.11) 
0.11  
(0.11) 
-0.24┼  
(0.14) 
-0.22  
(0.14) 
Subsidiary 0.02  
(0.38) 
0.00  
(0.38) 
0.87┼  
(0.46) 
0.90*  
(0.45) 
Member of program 0.63**  
(0.24) 
0.62**  
(0.24) 
-0.45  
(0.32) 
-0.47  
(0.32) 
Number of tags (log) 0.70*  
(0.30) 
0.76*  
(0.31) 
  
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Serial entrepreneur 0.36┼  
(0.21) 
0.36┼  
(0.21) 
0.10  
(0.28) 
0.13  
(0.28) 
Geographic scope -0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.05  
(0.10) 
-0.25┼  
(0.14) 
-0.26┼  
(0.13) 
Released product 0.30  
(0.22) 
0.34  
(0.22) 
-0.61*  
(0.27) 
-0.64*  
(0.28) 
A-round 
  
1.42***  
(0.31) 
1.43***  
(0.31) 
Investor experience 
  
0.24*  
(0.11) 
0.27*  
(0.11) 
AIC 685.42 683.60   
Sigma 
  
1.70***  
(0.25) 
1.64***  
(0.26) 
rho 
  
-0.82***  
(0.11) 
-0.81***  
(0.13) 
Log likelihooda (df.) -328.71***  
(14) 
-326.80***  
(15) 
-547.90***  
(30) 
-544.26***  
(32) 
Likelihood ratio test 
against competing 
modelsb (df.) 
 
3.83┼  
(1) 
 
7.28*  
(2) 
Observations 918 918 136 136 
┼ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard 
errors are in parentheses (S.E.). a Significance refers to the results of a likelihood ratio test of model 
fit against the null model. b For the OLS regression, the Wald test was used (F-test statistic), and the 
logistic regression applied a likelihood ratio test (χ2 test statistic). 
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independent variable and the inverse Mills ratio was lower than 0.30 in absolute 
terms (r = −0.24, p < 0.001), indicating sufficient strength for our exclusion 
restrictions (Certo et al., 2016). Last, a likelihood ratio test (χ2 = 52.52, df. = 2, p < 
0.001) between the over-identified model (i.e., using our full model specification; 
log likelihood = −544.26) and the just-identified model (i.e., model without 
exclusion restrictions; log likelihood = −570.52) showed that applying our exclusion 
restrictions significantly improved the overall fit of the model. These results 
validated the adequacy of our analytical approach and the selection of exclusion 
restrictions. 
2.4.2.2 Testing 
Table III shows results of the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of venture 
funding. Model 1 included only control variables. As expected, ventures with more 
social media exposure (β = 0.69, S.E. = 0.12, p < 0.001), a larger number of tags (β 
= 0.70, S.E. = 0.30, p = 0.02), and that promoted more achievements (β = 0.27, S.E. 
= 0.09, p = 0.004) were more likely to be funded. Furthermore, the model showed 
that ventures that are members of an accelerator program (β = 0.63, S.E. = 0.24, p = 
0.009), that were founded by serial entrepreneurs (β = 0.36, S.E. = 0.21, p = 0.08, 
significant at the α < 0.1 level), and that served the healthcare (β = 0.69, S.E. = 0.36, 
p = 0.06) and security and safety (β = 1.30, S.E. = 0.33, p < 0.001) sectors were 
more likely to obtain funding than those in the ‘other’ category. A Wald test showed 
the overall effect of the sector variable to be significant (χ2 = 19.39, df. = 3, p < 
0.001), while the difference between the healthcare and security and safety sectors 
was not significant (χ2 = 2.3, df. = 1, p = 0.13). Model 2 included the main effects 
of our independent variable and the control variables on the odds of receiving a first 
investment round. The results of Model 2 supported Hypothesis 1, stating that a 
disruptive vision positively predicts the likelihood of receiving funds (β = 0.20, S.E. 
= 0.10, p = 0.048). We found that one standard deviation increase in disruptive 
vision increases the odds of acquiring funding by 22 per cent. 
Table III also displays results of our outcome regression equations where we 
estimated the level of funding received by ventures in the first round. Model 3 
included control variables. Intuitively, we note that ventures with Series A funding 
(β = 1.42, S.E. = 0.31, p < 0.001), those from the software sector (β = 0.70, S.E. = 
0.29, p = 0.016), and those with subsidiary ties (β = 0.87, S.E. = 0.46, p = 0.06, 
significant at the α < 0.1 level) received significantly more capital. In addition, 
experienced investors were inclined to provide higher amounts of funding (β = 0.24, 
S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.026). Conversely, older ventures (β = −0.24, S.E. = 0.14, p = 
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0.078), ventures with a larger geographic scope (β = −0.25, S.E. = 0.14, p = 0.069, 
significant at the α < 0.1 level), and those with released products (β = −0.61, S.E. = 
0.27, p = 0.027) received lower amounts of funding. 
The results in Model 4 depict the main effects of disruptive visions. Model 4 
confirmed Hypothesis 2 stating that disruptive vision has a negative effect on the 
amount of funding (β = −0.27, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.017). Quantitatively, one standard 
deviation increase in disruptive vision reduced the amount of funding by 24 per cent. 
We used the estimations of our full model to calculate the average dollar impact of 
one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication5. For a typical 
venture with a Seed type first round, a one standard deviation increase in disruptive 
vision communication led to an $87,000 decrease in funding received. For a typical 
venture with an A series first round, a one standard deviation increase in disruptive 
vision communication led to a $361,000 decrease in funding received. 
2.4.2.3 Robustness Checks 
As seen in Table Ib, the distribution of the dependent variable ‘investment received’ 
is skewed with only 14.8 per cent of ventures receiving investment. In our logistic 
regression models, this may have caused separation (Heinze & Schemper, 2002) or 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Donkers, Franses, & Verhoef, 2003). We saw no 
trace of separation in our models6. To assess the consistency of parameter estimates, 
we ran additional analyses using randomly drawn, balanced samples (see the 
Appendix A for details). Consistent with our main analyses, we observed a 
significant and positive effect of disruptive visions over 10,000 bootstraps (Odds 
ratio = 1.33, 95% CI = [1.10, 1.69], p = 0.005). 
The fourth item of the disruptive vision measurement yielded a low Cohen’s 
Kappa of 0.21. Therefore, we excluded the item from the measure of disruptive 
                                                     
5 We used our model estimations to predict values for typical ventures. We only varied 
disruptive vision and round type, taking the average value for all other continuous variables 
and the most frequent value for dummy variables. We let the disruptive vision variable vary 
from its lowest to its highest possible value, in one standard deviation increments. To 
calculate the average dollar impact, we took the average of the differences between 
subsequent predicted values. Since our dependent variable was log-transformed, we 
corrected the predicted values for the logarithmic scale in accordance with Duan (1983). 
6 In the fitting process of a logistic model, separation (or monotone likelihood) can occur 
if the likelihood converges while at least one parameter estimate diverges to infinity. We 
applied the ‘detect separation’ function from the ‘brglm2’ package in the statistical software 
R (Kosmidis, Pagui, & Sartori, 2017; R Core Team, 2017). 
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visions in our main analysis. Nevertheless, the item is relevant for theoretical 
reasons: Central to a new venture’s disruptive vision is an innovation (i.e., any novel 
approach, technology, or business model) allowing it to pursue disruption. When 
including the focal item in our measure for disruptive vision, the results remained 
qualitatively similar for both the likelihood of receiving first-round funding (Model 
2, Table III: βexcluding item = 0.20, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.048; βincluding item = 0.24, S.E. = 0.10, 
p = 0.019) and the amount of funding (Model 4, Table III: βexcluding item = −0.27, S.E. 
= 0.11, p = 0.017; βincluding item = −0.34, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.003). 
2.4.3 Discussion 
Study 1 found that a disruptive vision increased the likelihood of first-round funding 
while decreasing the amount of funding. Study 1 offered these insights from a 
unique and relevant empirical field setting that advises both business practitioners 
and researchers to consider disruptive vision communication when making 
investment decisions. However, the cross-sectional nature of our archival data limits 
claims of causality. Also, generalizing the findings requires replication in other 
contexts, and the lack of data on investor sensemaking did not allow us to investigate 
the mechanisms driving the results. To address these issues, we conducted a 
randomized online experiment described next. 
2.5 STUDY 2: ONLINE EXPERIMENT ON DISRUPTIVE VISIONS  
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
Two hundred and fifty-three people were enlisted on the Prolific.ac website, a 
platform for surveys and experimental projects. The survey took 12 minutes on 
average, for which we offered compensation in accordance with Prolific.ac rules. 
To ensure participant quality, we prescreened according to the following 
specifications: first, participants had investment experience with exchange-traded 
commodities or funds, government bonds, stocks, unit trusts, angel (syndicate) 
investing, private equity funds, venture capital funds, options, or crowdfunding. 
This ensured a representative sample of respondent investors. Second, task 
acceptance rates had to exceed 90 per cent. Third, the level of education had to be 
undergraduate or higher. Fourth, participants had to be at least 25 years old (i.e., no 
students) with residence in the European Union (including the UK), US, or 
Australia. In both the introduction page and in the survey, we included attention 
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checks to filter out participants who answered carelessly. Our final sample 
comprised 203 participants with 50 per cent female, averaging 40.5 years old (S.D. 
= 11.19), with 27 per cent having invested in entrepreneurial ventures. 
2.5.1.2 Design 
We designed a 2 (low and high disruptive vision) × 2 (low and high promotion of 
achievements) randomized between-subjects experiment. For each condition, we 
created a vision statement using the same fictitious venture. The vision statement 
was based on a venture from our Israeli database, adapted, and edited to match our 
purposes (See Appendix B). 
We anonymized the names of the venture and its founders. To improve the 
overall credibility of the experiment, we added fictitious company information to 
the vision statements similar to profiles presented on Start-Up Nation Finder. This 
information, as well as the formatting and layout of the entire vision statement, was 
identical across all four conditions. Fictitious profiles featured: founding date, 
funding stage, geographical target markets, product stage, number of employees, 
business model, customers, and estimated valuation. 
2.5.1.3 Procedure 
The participants first read an introduction page explaining the purpose: to 
investigate early-stage investment decisions. We also informed them that we would 
ask them to answer a survey about their investment decisions regarding the venture 
to be presented. Each participant was randomly assigned a condition and read only 
the venture vision statement central to that condition. After manipulation checks, 
participants were asked if and how much they would invest and answered questions 
to inform our mediator and control variables. The survey ended with a page thanking 
the participants, informing them of the fictitious nature of the information presented 
about the venture, and referring them to the Prolific.ac website for compensation. 
2.5.1.4 Dependent Variables 
Our two main dependent variables were whether a respondent funded the venture 
(investment received) and the amount of funding they offered. To mirror the Study 
1 analysis, we used the log-transformed values of funding amount in our models. 
For the investment decision questions, we introduced the following vignette: 
‘Imagine that you are an investor working for an investment company (e.g., a 
venture capitalist firm). You have to decide how to invest the $500,000 funds 
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you are managing. You are expected to earn a minimum of 15% return per year 
on the fund over the next 5 years. 
ProSearch is one of several investment opportunities. ProSearch is looking for a 
$100,000 investment, offering 20% equity ownership (valuing the venture at 
$500,000).’ 
We next posed the following question to log a participant’s investment decision: 
‘Would you… (1) leave the money in the bank, earning a steady 5% yearly 
interest rate, and wait for the next investment opportunity or (2) Invest (part of) 
the money in ProSearch?’ 
To measure the investment amount, we asked (on the next page): 
‘Regardless of your answer on the previous question, if you were to invest in 
ProSearch, how much would you invest in exchange for 20% equity ownership 
in ProSearch?’ 
Participants answered this question on a slider ranging from $1 to $100,000. 
2.5.1.5 Independent Variables 
Our manipulation of disruptive vision is detailed in the Appendix B. We 
incorporated it as a dummy variable in our analyses7. For this variable, zero (0) 
meant survey participants were exposed to low disruptive vision conditions, and one 
(1) indicated participation in high disruptive vision conditions.  
We measured expectation of extraordinary returns using four items adapted 
from Huang and Pearce (2015). We asked using a five-point Likert scale (1: Very 
unlikely, 5: Very likely): “What do you think is the likelihood ProSearch will 
achieve one of the following successes?” The outcomes included: ‘Being acquired 
by another firm at a high price’, ‘Having a successful Initial Public Offering (IPO)’, 
‘Yielding tenfold returns to investors’, and ‘Becoming a market leader’ (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = 0.79). 
2.5.1.6 Control Variables 
                                                     
7 Since our experimental manipulations used a 2×2 disruptive vision–promotion of 
achievements design, we included the interaction term in our models as a robustness check. 
By doing so, we aimed to rule out the ‘high disruptive vision–high promotion of 
achievements’ condition as driving the observed effects. In none of our models did we find 
strong evidence of an interaction effect (lowest p-value = 0.09; interaction added to Model 
8, Table V). 
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Distinct from Study 1, our data for Study 2 posed no variation in venture 
characteristics. Control variables in Study 2 thus pertained only to elements of the 
manipulation and to investors. Via experimental design, we controlled for 
promotion of achievements. Similar to our disruptive vision variable, we treated the 
promotion of achievements as a dummy variable in our analyses. Additionally, we 
controlled for participants having investment experience in nascent ventures. 
Experience with early-stage ventures may shift a participant’s perception of the 
attractiveness of the investment opportunity. Since risk preference shapes how 
willing one is to invest in risky efforts, such as young ventures, we included risk 
preference as a control variable. Following Koudstaal et al. (2015), we asked the 
participants to rate on a five-point Likert scale ‘How much do you describe yourself 
as willing to take risks?’ We also included participant age and gender as controls. 
Lastly, to avoid sample-selection bias (that was remedied statistically in Study 1), 
we included investors declining first-round investment into our regressions on 
amount. This possibility emerged since we asked respondents to select an amount 
even when refusing to invest at all. To control for potential variance in the amounts 
chosen among ‘yes’ and ‘no’ investors, we included the investment made variable 
in our regressions on the amount of funding chosen. 
Table IV displays the Pearson correlations among the variables in Study 2. 
2.5.1.7 Analysis 
We applied logistic regression to estimate likelihood of funding. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate the effect of disruptive vision on the 
expectation of extraordinary return and on the amount of funding awarded by 
participants. To assess mediation, we conducted causal mediation analysis using the 
‘mediation’ package in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017; Tingley et 
al., 2014). 
Our analysis involved inconsistent mediation, expressed when the sign of the 
independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable negates due to opposing 
underlying effects (MacKinnon et al., 2007). A common example of this model is 
the relationship between intelligence and production mistakes as mediated by 
boredom. In McFatter’s (1979) hypothetical example of an assembly-line, 
intelligent workers easily got bored and made more production mistakes even 
though smart people tend to be better at preventing production mistakes. As a 
contradiction, the overall relationship between intelligence and production mistakes  
C
h
a
p
te
r 
2
 
4
8
 
 T
ab
le
 V
. 
P
ea
rs
o
n
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
o
f 
S
tu
d
y
 2
. 
 
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
1
 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
re
ce
iv
ed
 (
1
 =
 Y
es
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
fu
n
d
in
g
 
0
.4
5
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
D
is
ru
p
ti
v
e 
v
is
io
n
 (
d
u
m
m
y
) 
0
.1
4
┼
 
-0
.0
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
 r
et
u
rn
 
0
.4
8
*
*
*
 
0
.4
1
*
*
*
 
0
.1
3
┼
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 o
f 
ac
h
ie
v
em
en
ts
 
(d
u
m
m
y
) 
0
.1
8
*
*
 
0
.1
6
*
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.2
1
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 (
1
 =
 Y
es
) 
-0
.0
2
 
0
.0
0
 
-0
.0
8
 
0
.1
5
*
 
0
.0
3
 
 
 
 
7
 
R
is
k
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
  
0
.1
3
┼
 
0
.0
3
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.1
4
*
 
-0
.0
1
 
0
.1
6
*
 
 
 
8
 
A
g
e 
 
-0
.1
5
*
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
6
 
-0
.0
7
 
0
.0
1
 
0
.0
2
 
-0
.1
4
*
 
 
9
 
G
en
d
er
 (
M
al
e 
=
1
) 
-0
.0
3
 
-0
.0
9
 
-0
.0
1
 
-0
.2
0
*
*
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
5
 
0
.2
2
*
*
 
-0
.0
5
 
┼
 p
 <
 0
.1
0
, 
*
 p
 <
 0
.0
5
, 
*
*
 p
 <
 0
.0
1
, 
*
*
*
 p
 <
 0
.0
0
1
. 
Do Disruptive Visions Pay Off? 
49 
measured zero. However, adding boredom as a mediator unveiled the otherwise 
hidden opposing impact of intelligence versus boredom on production mistakes. 
2.5.2 Results 
2.5.2.1 Manipulation Checks 
To gauge the effectiveness of our manipulation, we queried the sample on several 
manipulation checks. To assess the disruptive vision manipulation, we asked 
participants to answer on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree / strongly 
agree) how much they agreed with these statements: ‘ProSearch says it aims to 
disrupt the product search and discovery industry’, and ‘ProSearch has a vision 
about the future of product search and discovery’. One-way ANOVA showed large 
differences between conditions for the ‘disrupt’ (F(3, 199) = 43.10, p < 0.001) and 
‘vision’ (F(3, 199) = 2.67, p = 0.049) queries. For the ‘disrupt’ question, post-hoc 
contrast analysis indicated significant mean differences between all conditions 
involving ‘high disruptive vision’ and those invoking ‘low disruptive vision’ (mean 
diff. = 3.60, S.E. = 0.32, p < 0.001; Bonferroni adjusted). For the ‘vision’ question, 
a post-hoc contrast analysis of the two conditions involving ‘high disruptive vision’ 
showed participants viewing the ‘high disruptive vision’ conditions as more 
visionary than those of the ‘low disruptive vision’ (mean diff. = 0.49, S.E. = 0.18, p 
= 0.01; Bonferroni adjusted).  
To assess the effectiveness of our ‘promotion of achievements’ manipulation, 
we asked participants to answer on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree / 
strongly agree) how much they agreed with the statement: ‘ProSearch and its 
founders communicate their accomplishments’. One-way ANOVA showed 
significant differences between conditions on this question (F(3, 199) = 35.31, p < 
0.001). Post-hoc contrast analysis indicated significant mean differences between 
all conditions involving “high promotion of achievements” versus “low promotion 
of achievements” (mean diff. = 2.51, S.E. = 0.25, p < 0.001; Bonferroni adjusted). 
2.5.2.2 Testing 
Table V provides the results of our analyses. Model 4 replicated our findings from 
Study 1 and offered evidence favouring Hypothesis 1. Again, we find that ventures 
conveying a more disruptive vision are more likely to acquire first-round investment 
(β = 0.74, S.E. = 0.33, p = 0.023). In our experiment, using a highly disruptive vision 
(vs. no disruptive vision) increased the odds of receiving funds by 110 per cent. 
Hypothesis 3 posited that an expectation of extraordinary returns mediates the  
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relationship between the venture’s use of a disruptive vision and an investor’s 
investment decision. Model 2 indicated that communicating a highly disruptive 
vision prompted the expectation of extraordinary returns (β = 0.31, S.E. = 0.13, p = 
0.02). Model 5 next showed that an expectation of extraordinary returns 
significantly increased the likelihood of an investor opting to fund the venture (β = 
1.48, S.E. = 0.27, p < 0.001). In our experiment, one standard deviation increase in 
the expectation of extraordinary returns boosted odds of acquiring an investment 
4.41 times. Subsequently, we conducted mediation analysis and detected for the 
mediating effect of expectation of extraordinary returns (β = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.02,  
0.15], p = 0.016, 10 000 bootstraps8), thus supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Models 6 to 8 in Table V show our test of Hypothesis 2 (i.e., communication of 
a more disruptive vision negatively affects the amount of funding). Model 7 offered 
initial support for Hypothesis 2, showing significant negative effect of a disruptive 
vision on the amount of funding (β = −0.25, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.021). Model 8 clearly 
showed that the effect of a disruptive vision sharpens when controlling for 
expectation of extraordinary returns, implying that inconsistent mediation is present.  
We tested the inconsistent mediating effect of extraordinary returns and found 
evidence for both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 in Model 8. Specifically, 
expectation of extraordinary returns positively mediated the relationship between 
the disruptive vision and the amount of funding (β = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.2, 0.17], p 
= 0.015, 10,000 bootstraps), while a disruptive vision had a significant negative 
direct effect on the amount of funding (β = −0.29, 95% CI = [−0.49, −0.07], p = 
0.006, 10,000 bootstraps). Specifically, touting a highly disruptive vision lowered 
the amount of funding by 25 per cent when controlling for its positive indirect effect 
on the amount of funding through an expectation of extraordinary returns. 
2.5.2.3 Robustness Analysis 
In Study 2, we asked participants to state the amount of money they would invest 
in the venture, regardless of whether they decided not to invest initially. Thereby, 
our analysis of the amount of funding in Study 2 includes potential investors that 
decided not to invest initially. By doing so, our experiment avoids sample-selection 
bias by design, rather than statistically correcting for it afterwards. We conducted a 
subset-analysis for our regression models on amount, excluding people who initially 
                                                     
8 We used non-parametric bootstrapping with bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) 
confidence intervals (DiCiccio and Efron, 1996). 
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decided not to invest in the venture. Results remained consistent with our main 
analysis: In comparison to Model 8 in Table V, we again observed a significant 
effect of disruptive vision on the amount of funds allocated by investors (βdisruptive 
vision = −0.24, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.022; βextraordinary return = 0.24, S.E. = 0.06, p < 0.001). 
2.5.3 Discussion 
Results of Study 2 indicated that a more disruptive vision boosted the likelihood of 
receiving investment since it creates an expectation of extraordinary return in the 
investors. Yet, when controlling for this effect on the amounts of funding awarded, 
we observed that communicating a disruptive vision negatively impacted the 
amount of funding. Study 2 complemented Study 1 in two very important ways. 
First, Study 2 replicated findings for Hypotheses 1 and 2 in a randomized controlled 
setting to uphold the generalizability and the causality of results beyond the cross-
sectional nature of the Israeli data. Second, it allowed the discovery of expectation 
of extraordinary returns as a key mechanism shaping our results from testing 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
2.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
2.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
First, our findings demonstrate the importance of disruptive vision as a new form of 
thematic vision content used by entrepreneurs to promote their innovations. This 
new form of vision content enriches research on disruptive innovation and the 
disruption process, which has thus far focused on the process of disruption where 
underperforming performance attributes gradually satisfy customer needs 
(Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). However, prior research has 
also documented that not all potentially disruptive innovations ‘disrupt’ (Sood and 
Tellis, 2011). This variation signals the existence of factors that have been 
overlooked in examining what drives the disruption process (King and 
Baatartogtokh, 2015; Tellis, 2006). We argue that one of these omitted factors is an 
entrepreneur’s vision communication. Recent research has suggested that the 
process of disruption is best understood from the viewpoint of ‘disruptors’ and how 
they frame their ventures (Ansari et al., 2016). Our results show that disruptive 
visions are more likely to convince investors to get on board – albeit with a smaller 
amount than for less disruptive narratives. We thereby contribute to recent research 
on disruptive innovations regarding the ways in which firms can manage their 
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ecosystems through communication and framing (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses 
and Ozcan, 2015). 
Second, we explore how a particular way of framing an entrepreneurial venture 
can affect investors’ sensemaking of the venture as an investment opportunity. In 
that light, we contribute to burgeoning research on entrepreneurs’ efforts in 
managing the impressions of stakeholders (e.g., Fisher et al., 2017; Martens et al., 
2007; Navis and Glynn, 2011; van Werven et al., 2015; Zott and Huy, 2007). 
Impression management research has recognized the importance of future-oriented 
communications (Garud et al., 2014), but has not yet studied the impact of such 
communications on venture-level outcomes. To address this oversight, we highlight 
the importance of investigating vision communication as part of impression 
management efforts.  
Vision communication is a category of impression management (see Zott and 
Huy, 2007, p. 72). In contrast to other forms of impression management, visions 
showcase the future – that is, what the venture/entrepreneur will do and become. As 
such, the aim of entrepreneurial vision communication is to affect audiences’ 
perceptions of the intrinsic or substantive value of what the venture aims to achieve. 
While prior research has empirically investigated how ventures legitimize identity 
claims, it has focused predominantly on backward-looking communication. 
However, ‘track record touting’ alone does not explain how entrepreneurs build 
trust toward their ventures’ proposed activities. With our investigation of 
entrepreneurial visions, we address this caveat and help scholars to understand how 
future-oriented communications and their contents shape investor sensemaking. In 
particular, we not only debut and affirm the gravity of disruptive visions (i.e., 
increasing the probability of acquiring funding from investors), but also uncover a 
potential downside to such communications (i.e., attracting lower amounts of 
funding from investors).  
In addition, our findings enhance the understanding of entrepreneurs’ impression 
management approaches in their quest for acquiring investments. Past research has 
elaborated on various aspects of entrepreneurial communications that affect 
investment acquisition through the establishment of optimal distinctiveness. For 
example, researchers have noted that elements such as aggressiveness, 
assertiveness, competitiveness, and blasting are powerful tools entrepreneurs may 
use to distinguish themselves in the eyes of investors (Parhankangas and Ehrlich, 
2014). Similarly entrepreneurs may use the communication of accomplishments and 
accrued resources to legitimize their identity claims (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2017; 
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Burton et al., 2002; Hallen, 2008; Martens et al., 2007; Navis and Glynn, 2011; Zott 
and Huy, 2007). Many of these impression management tactics and symbolic 
aspects yield synergistic effects that strengthen a distinct, collective perception 
about ventures and entrepreneurs (e.g., a high growth venture, Baum et al., 1998; an 
aspiring market leader, Martens et al., 2007; a collaborator or competitor, Ansari et 
al., 2016). Articulation of integrative themes may serve special purposes for 
entrepreneurs. For example, research by Hallen (2008) has suggested that 
communication of prior accomplishments helps young ventures to form notable ties 
with key ecosystem members. By conceptualizing disruptive visions, we promote 
valuable understanding of integrative themes in entrepreneurial communications; 
this opens the door for future research to further investigate how particular content 
in an entrepreneurial communication may influence audience sensemaking and 
venture outcomes.  
Third, we provide new insights regarding both real options and impression 
management theories to explain investment decisions under uncertainty. On the one 
hand, the main underlying rationale in impression management theory is that the 
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding entrepreneurial activities make it hard for 
investors to assess the quality of a venture’s value proposition. This is why investors 
rely on cues communicated through entrepreneur’s impression management efforts. 
Still, it is important to note that impression management research alone does not 
fully explain our findings. Indeed, this stream of research would predict a positive 
effect of disruptive vision on amounts of funding, since the use of disruptive visions 
has become increasingly popular (Christensen et al., 2015), and entrepreneurs derive 
legitimacy for their touted identities from innovation, novelty, and publicized 
change (Navis and Glynn, 2011). On the other hand, real options theory builds its 
arguments on the intricate balance between upside potential and risk that motivates 
real options logic in investors. However, this stream of research cannot explain how 
communicating a disruptive vision would affect investor real option decision 
making when it has thus far overlooked the role of impression management (see 
Trigeorgis and Reuer, 2017). We combine both streams of research to explain how 
disruptive visions affect investment decisions. Here, our work shows that 
impression management efforts, such as disruptive visions, may have variant effects 
on how investors select ventures as real options and how they allocate funds to them. 
In so doing, we not only draw from these research streams, but also significantly 
advance them and motivate researchers in both fields to integrate the two in 
understanding investor decision making.  
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Fourth, our results challenge prior research that has highlighted unilateral 
positive returns from strong vision communication (Baum and Locke, 2004; Baum 
et al., 1998; Van Knippenberg and Stam, 2014). We engage the calls for research 
into vision content (for a recent review, see Van Knippenberg and Stam, 2014) and 
propose the framing of vision content with a focus on disruption. Specifically, prior 
vision research has centered strongly on how visions are communicated (style) 
rather than on what is communicated (content). For example, scholars have focused 
on the effectiveness of repetition, rhythm, balance, contrasts, lists, puzzles, 
alliteration, imagery, analogies and metaphors, classification, generalization, and 
authority (Carton et al., 2014; Conger, 1991; Den Hartog & Verburg, 1998; Hill & 
Levenhagen, 1995; van Werven et al., 2015). Yet, these investigations omit the 
influence of vision content. Our emphasis on vision content allows a more in-depth 
understanding of the vision content–vision pursuit relationship (Stam et al., 2014), 
reminding scholars that the framing of visions is an essential part of an 
entrepreneur’s communications, but may have downsides that should be duly 
investigated.  
2.6.2 Managerial Implications 
Our findings have strong implications for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs must be 
made aware that the content of their vision communication affects investors’ 
perceptions of their venture. The vision statement plays a critical role in 
communicating the goal and purpose of the organization and must be crafted with 
care. In particular, despite the popularity of disruptive visions in practice, our study 
suggests that entrepreneurs should use them judiciously. While communicating a 
highly disruptive vision increases the likelihood of receiving an investment, it 
subsequently reduces the amount of funds endowed in that investment. Furthermore, 
our operationalization of disruptive vision provides entrepreneurs with a template 
for the key characteristics of a specific form of vision content, allowing them to craft 
vision statements in ways that exploit or avoid communicating a disruptive vision. 
Expanding beyond prior vision communication research, our study specifically 
enables entrepreneurs to purposefully evaluate the content of their vision statements 
based on a pre-defined set of items, granting them greater control over their 
impression management efforts. 
2.6.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Investors’ funding decisions are more complex than we explain in our study, since 
the investment process is inherently multistage and involves communications at 
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each stage (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006; Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, & 
Strebulaev, 2016). While we show that entrepreneurial visions matter at the first 
stage in the investor selection process, future research should assess the 
consequences of entrepreneurial vision communication at later stages in the funding 
process, such as when moving toward an IPO.  
Since visions of entrepreneurs regarding their ventures are not static, neither are 
disruptive visions. Entrepreneurs may revise their visions over time as they acquire 
new information or experience. Rapid achievements may trigger the creation of 
grander visions, and failures could serve as reality checks that, instead, moderate 
visions. Recent research has advised that ventures presenting disruptive frames may 
go on to alter their communications to be more respectful of competitive pressures 
(Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses and Ozcan, 2015). Since refinements are rare in the 
early stages of venture funding (e.g., the first funding rounds), we do not expect this 
factor to affect our results. Future research can examine changes in vision content 
over time.  
Finally, we acknowledge that firms can also promote themselves as disruptors or 
as having achieved disruption. Thus, disruption can also form an integral part of 
how ventures craft their identities in their communications about the past. However, 
our current operationalization of promotion of achievements did not consider this, 
since it is unlikely that younger ventures can legitimately claim much history of 
successful disruption. Future research can investigate whether older, more 
established ventures may also frame their identities around disruption and if this 
helps them in acquiring funds during later rounds.  
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APPENDIX A. BALANCED SAMPLE BOOTSTRAP ANALYSIS 
To assess the robustness of our parameter estimates in Study 1, where data showed 
imbalance in the dependent variable of our logistic regression, we ran a balanced 
sample non-parametric bootstrap analysis (as suggested by Donkers et al., 2003). 
For each bootstrap iteration, we randomly drew (with replacement) a subsample of 
ventures in which no investment was made, equal in size to the subsample of 
ventures that did obtain investment. Since we observed 116 ventures receiving first-
round investment, we randomly drew 116 ventures that did not. Each bootstrap thus 
features a sample size of N = 232. 
Since each logistic regression was estimated on its own log scale, we may 
compare only standardized effects, even when model specifications remain identical 
for subsequent analyses. Therefore, we used the odds ratio for each bootstrap 
coefficient to compute mean bootstrapped effects for each variable. Additionally, 
we report bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals below (DiCiccio & 
Efron, 1996), as well as p-values that correspond to the proportion of coefficients 
opposing the reported effects (Tingley et al., 2014). To clarify, a p-value of 0.01 
signifies a 1 per cent chance that (given our bootstrapped analysis) the odds ratio is 
actually 1. 
Table A1. Balanced sample bootstrap results. 
 Odds Ratio Lower CI Upper CI p-value 
Intercept 0.09 0.03 0.56 >0.001 
Disruptive vision 1.33 1.10 1.69 0.005 
Promotion of 
achievements 
1.35 1.07 1.78 0.016 
Imagery 1.00 0.84 1.22 0.914 
Social media exposure 2.05 1.61 2.71 >0.001 
Venture age 1.14 0.91 1.42 0.285 
Subsidiary 1.46 0.76 5.22 0.564 
Member of program 1.96 1.21 4.11 0.023 
Number of tags (log) 2.48 1.37 5.12 0.010 
Sector dummies Included 
Serial entrepreneur 1.47 0.99 2.34 0.098 
Geographic scope 0.98 0.80 1.37 0.751 
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Released products  1.34 0.86 2.22 0.267 
We used 10 000 bootstraps with bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence 
intervals. 
 
APPENDIX B. ONLINE EXPERIMENT VISION STATEMENT 
MANIPULATIONS 
Experimental Condition 1: High disruptive vision – high promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
ProSearch is revolutionizing Product Search & Discovery: we provide a groundbreaking 
data infrastructure for matching products to user intent with an unprecedented degree of 
accuracy, nuance, and coverage. 
 
Our product 
Most e-commerce companies are still relying on keyword matching and behavioral data to 
power their search. Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial 
intelligence layer that helps retailers really understand what their customers want and 
present them with the best search results. We only take a small percentage of each sale 
made with our system. 
 
Our vision 
ProSearch will change the way in which people search and discover new products. We 
have envisioned a disruptive product search technology tailored to the highly competitive 
e-commerce industry. With our new cutting-edge approach to cleaning and structuring 
data, we enable a search experience that revolutionizes the capabilities of major search and 
e-commerce companies in understanding their users’ needs and providing qualified, 
relevant results. This inevitably boosts relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater 
profitability. We will disrupt the world of e-commerce and become the global leader in 
product search and discovery!  
 
Where we are today 
By partnering with leading scientific institutions in the field of data science, we have 
created a patented unique approach that significantly outperforms existing product search 
technologies, including those of major retailers and search engines. We make products and 
product-related information easily accessible and extremely useful to users, ultimately 
removing barriers in, and redefining ways of dealing with product selection and purchase 
decisions. We have recently attracted large corporate customers from the United States, 
thereby expanding our operational scope. ProSearch was finalist in the 2016 International 
Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, and New Products, and took home a cash prize of $500. 
The team 
ProSearch employs a visionary team of data scientists and engineers —ex-Google, IBM, 
BCG, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Duke, with over 30 US patents in search-related 
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fields between them. The company is led by Jeff Martin (CEO and co-founder) and Darryl 
Walker (CTO and co-founder), two ex-Google 
PhDs with accomplished track records in start-ups and multinationals in the fields of 
search and e-commerce. They envision a future where consumers find products effortlessly 
and instantly. 
 
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
Customers: 9 
 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
Experimental Condition 2: High disruptive vision – low promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
ProSearch is revolutionizing Product Search & Discovery: we provide a groundbreaking 
data infrastructure for matching products to user intent with an unprecedented degree of 
accuracy, nuance, and coverage.  
 
Our product 
Most e-commerce companies are still relying on keyword matching and behavioral data to 
power their search. Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial 
intelligence layer that helps retailers really understand what their customers want and 
present them with the best search results. We only take a 
small percentage of each sale made with our system.  
 
Our vision 
ProSearch will change the way in which people search and discovery new products. We 
have envisioned a disruptive product search technology tailored to the highly competitive 
e-commerce industry. With our new approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a 
search experience that revolutionizes the capabilities of major search and e-commerce 
companies in understanding their users’ needs and providing qualified, relevant results. 
This inevitably boosts relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater profitability. We 
will disrupt the world of e-commerce and become the global leader in product search and 
discovery! 
 
Where we are today 
We have created a unique approach that significantly outperforms existing search 
technologies, including those of major retailers and search engines. We make products and 
product-related information easily accessible and extremely useful to users, ultimately 
removing barriers in, and redefining ways of dealing with product selection and purchase 
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decisions. ProSearch presented their idea at the 2017 International Trade Fair for Ideas, 
Inventions, and New Products. 
 
The team 
ProSearch employs a visionary team of data scientists and engineers. The company is led 
by Jeff Martin (CEO and co-founder) and Darryl Walker (CTO and co-founder). They 
envision a future where consumers find products effortlessly and instantly.  
 
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
Customers: 9 
 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
Experimental Condition 3: Low disruptive vision – high promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
ProSearch has developed a Product Search & Discovery solution: we provide a data 
infrastructure for matching products to user intent with a high degree of accuracy, nuance, 
and coverage. 
 
Our product 
Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps 
retailers understand what their customers want and present them with the best search 
results. We only take a small percentage of each sale made with our system. 
 
Our goal 
ProSearch delivers a superior search and discovery technology for products. Our product 
search solution is tailored to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our 
cutting-edge approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a search experience that 
helps major search and e-commerce companies to understand their users’ needs and 
provide qualified, relevant results. This increases relevancy and conversion rates, leading 
to greater profitability.  
 
Where we are today 
By partnering with leading scientific institutions in the field of data science, we have 
created a patented approach that outperforms existing product search technologies. Tests 
show that 90 per cent of users recommended our solution over existing solutions. We make 
products and product-related information easily accessible and useful to users, facilitating 
product selection and purchase decisions. We recently attracted large corporate customers 
from the United States, expanding our operational scope. ProSearch was also finalist in the 
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2017 International Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, and New Products, and took home a 
cash prize of $500. 
 
The team 
ProSearch employs an elite team of data scientists and engineers—ex-Google, BM, BCG, 
Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Duke, with over 30 US patents in search-related fields 
between them. The company is led by Jeff Martin (CEO and co-founder) and Darryl 
Walker (CTO and co-founder), two ex-Google PhDs with accomplished track records in 
start-ups and multinationals in the fields of search and e-commerce.  
 
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
B2B customers: 9 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
Experimental Condition 4: Low disruptive vision – low promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
ProSearch has developed a Product Search & Discovery solution: we provide a data 
infrastructure for matching products to user intent with accuracy, nuance, and coverage. 
 
Our product 
Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps 
retailers understand what their customers want and present them with the best search 
results. We only take a small percentage of each sale made with our system. 
 
Our goal 
ProSearch delivers a superior search and discovery technology for products. Our product 
search solution is tailored to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our 
approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a search experience that helps major 
search and e-commerce companies to understand their users’ needs and provide qualified, 
relevant results. This increases relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater 
profitability.  
 
Where we are today 
We have created an approach that outperforms existing product search technologies. We 
make products and product-related information easily accessible and useful to users, 
facilitating product selection and purchase decisions. ProSearch presented their idea at the 
2017 International Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, and New Products.  
 
The team 
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ProSearch employs a team of data scientists and engineers. The company is led by Jeff 
Martin (CEO and co-founder) and Darryl Walker (CTO and co-founder).  
 
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
B2B customers: 9 
 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
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 w
e 
co
u
ld
 e
n
ab
le
 a
 s
ea
rc
h
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 t
h
at
 w
o
u
ld
 r
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
iz
e 
th
e 
ca
p
ab
il
it
ie
s 
o
f 
m
aj
o
r 
se
ar
ch
 a
n
d
 e
-c
o
m
m
er
ce
 c
o
m
p
an
ie
s 
to
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
 t
h
ei
r 
u
se
rs
’ 
n
ee
d
s.
 T
o
d
ay
, 
o
u
r 
u
n
iq
u
e 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
 t
o
 c
la
ss
if
y
in
g
, 
re
co
m
m
en
d
in
g
, 
an
d
 d
is
p
la
y
in
g
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 o
u
tp
er
fo
rm
s 
ex
is
ti
n
g
 s
ea
rc
h
 t
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
ie
s,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 t
h
o
se
 o
f 
m
aj
o
r 
re
ta
il
er
s 
an
d
 s
ea
rc
h
 e
n
g
in
es
. 
U
si
n
g
 o
u
r 
ex
p
er
ti
se
 i
n
 s
ea
rc
h
 a
n
d
 d
at
a 
sc
ie
n
ce
, 
w
e 
m
ak
e 
p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
an
d
 p
ro
d
u
ct
-r
el
at
ed
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 e
as
il
y
 
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
 a
n
d
 i
n
cr
ed
ib
ly
 u
se
fu
l 
to
 u
se
rs
, 
w
h
ic
h
 u
lt
im
at
el
y
 r
em
o
v
es
 b
ar
ri
er
s 
in
 d
ea
li
n
g
 w
it
h
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
 s
el
ec
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 p
u
rc
h
as
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
 T
ea
m
 T
w
ig
g
le
 i
s 
m
ad
e 
u
p
 o
f 
an
 e
li
te
 t
ea
m
 o
f 
d
at
a 
sc
ie
n
ti
st
s 
an
d
 e
n
g
in
ee
rs
 –
 e
x
-G
o
o
g
le
, 
IB
M
, 
B
C
G
, 
H
ar
v
ar
d
, 
S
ta
n
fo
rd
, 
P
ri
n
ce
to
n
, 
an
d
 D
u
k
e,
 f
ro
m
 
to
p
 i
n
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 u
n
it
s 
o
f 
th
e 
Is
ra
el
i 
A
rm
y
, 
w
it
h
 o
v
er
 3
0
 U
S
 p
at
en
ts
 i
n
 s
ea
rc
h
-r
el
at
ed
 f
ie
ld
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
em
. 
T
h
e 
co
m
p
an
y
 i
s 
le
d
 b
y
 A
m
ir
 K
o
n
ig
sb
er
g
 (
C
E
O
 &
 C
o
-f
o
u
n
d
er
) 
an
d
 A
d
i 
A
v
id
o
r 
(C
T
O
 &
 C
o
-f
o
u
n
d
er
),
 t
w
o
 e
x
-G
o
o
g
le
 P
h
D
s 
w
it
h
 a
n
 a
cc
o
m
p
li
sh
ed
 t
ra
ck
 r
ec
o
rd
 i
n
 s
ta
rt
-u
p
s 
an
d
 
m
u
lt
in
at
io
n
al
s 
in
 t
h
e 
fi
el
d
s 
o
f 
se
ar
ch
 a
n
d
 e
-c
o
m
m
er
ce
.”
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
2
 
6
4
 
C
o
ll
a
g
e 
M
ed
ic
a
l 
Im
a
g
in
g
: 
“
T
h
e 
co
m
p
an
y
’s
 p
at
en
te
d
 t
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 i
n
te
g
ra
te
s 
v
er
y
 h
ig
h
 r
es
o
lu
ti
o
n
, 
sh
o
rt
 r
an
g
e,
 O
p
ti
ca
l 
C
o
h
er
en
ce
 T
o
m
o
g
ra
p
h
y
 t
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 w
it
h
 S
p
at
ia
l 
L
o
ca
li
za
ti
o
n
 T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 i
n
 
a 
p
at
en
t 
p
en
d
in
g
 u
n
iq
u
e 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
 t
h
at
 e
n
ab
le
s,
 f
o
r 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
ti
m
e,
 r
el
ia
b
le
 v
ir
tu
al
 t
is
su
e 
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 o
f 
h
u
m
an
 o
rg
an
s 
at
 t
h
e 
m
ic
ro
sc
o
p
ic
 l
ev
el
. 
T
h
e 
co
m
p
an
y
’s
 b
re
ak
th
ro
u
g
h
 s
y
st
em
 
m
ak
es
 p
o
ss
ib
le
 r
ea
l 
ti
m
e 
d
ia
g
n
o
si
s,
 a
n
d
 p
ro
v
id
es
 u
n
p
ar
al
le
le
d
 d
et
ai
le
d
 m
ic
ro
sc
o
p
ic
 m
ap
p
in
g
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
n
ce
ro
u
s 
ti
ss
u
e 
w
it
h
in
 b
o
d
y
 o
rg
an
s.
 T
h
e 
en
d
 r
es
u
lt
 i
s 
a 
m
ic
ro
n
 l
ev
el
 r
es
o
lu
ti
o
n
 v
ir
tu
al
 t
is
su
e 
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
en
ti
re
 o
rg
an
 w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
fa
r 
su
p
er
io
r 
to
 t
h
e 
re
so
lu
ti
o
n
 o
b
ta
in
ab
le
 b
y
 k
n
o
w
n
 
m
o
d
al
it
ie
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
M
R
I,
 C
T
, 
an
d
 U
lt
ra
so
u
n
d
. 
T
h
e 
co
m
p
an
y
’s
 m
is
si
o
n
 i
s 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e 
a 
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
 
h
av
in
g
 t
h
e 
p
o
te
n
ti
al
 o
f 
co
m
p
li
m
en
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 u
lt
im
at
el
y
 r
ep
la
ci
n
g
 t
ra
d
it
io
n
al
 c
an
ce
r 
d
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
s.
 
C
o
ll
ag
e 
M
ed
ic
al
 I
m
ag
in
g
 w
as
 f
o
u
n
d
ed
 i
n
 2
0
1
4
 a
s 
an
 I
n
cu
b
it
 V
en
tu
re
s 
co
m
p
an
y
.”
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
J
A
G
O
: 
“J
A
G
O
’s
 P
la
y
D
at
e 
p
la
tf
o
rm
 e
m
p
o
w
er
s 
p
ar
en
ts
 t
o
 s
ch
ed
u
le
, 
m
an
ag
e,
 a
n
d
 t
ra
ck
 t
h
ei
r 
k
id
s’
 
so
ci
al
 l
iv
es
 i
n
 a
 s
in
g
le
 i
n
tu
it
iv
e 
ap
p
. 
O
u
r 
v
is
io
n
 i
s 
to
 t
ra
n
sf
o
rm
 t
h
e 
w
ay
 p
ar
en
ts
 m
an
ag
e 
th
ei
r 
k
id
s’
 
so
ci
al
 l
iv
es
, 
ch
an
g
in
g
 t
h
e 
p
ar
ad
ig
m
 f
ro
m
 o
n
-t
h
e-
fl
y
 a
rr
an
g
em
en
ts
 t
o
 s
ea
m
le
ss
 s
ch
ed
u
li
n
g
 a
n
d
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t.
 W
e 
an
ti
ci
p
at
e 
a 
ti
m
e 
w
h
er
e 
fa
m
il
y
 e
v
en
t 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 w
il
l 
b
e 
as
 o
rg
an
iz
ed
 a
n
d
 
co
n
tr
o
ll
ed
 a
s 
a 
w
o
rk
p
la
ce
 c
al
en
d
ar
. 
T
h
e 
sy
st
em
’s
 a
b
il
it
y
 t
o
 m
an
ag
e 
 t
h
e 
d
ig
it
al
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 c
h
il
d
re
n
, 
th
ei
r 
fr
ie
n
d
s,
 p
ar
en
ts
, 
ad
d
it
io
n
al
 c
ar
eg
iv
er
s,
 a
n
d
 p
ar
en
ts
 o
f 
fr
ie
n
d
s 
is
 t
h
e 
es
se
n
ce
 
o
f 
th
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
. 
O
u
r 
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 v
is
io
n
 i
s 
to
 c
ap
tu
re
, 
m
an
ag
e,
 a
n
d
 e
n
h
an
ce
 t
h
o
se
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s.
” 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
F
o
n
e.
d
o
: 
“F
o
n
e.
d
o
 i
s 
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
 a
 r
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
ar
y
 s
im
p
le
 t
o
 u
se
, 
lo
w
 c
o
st
 i
n
te
ll
ig
en
t 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
p
h
o
n
e 
sy
st
em
 y
o
u
 c
an
 s
et
 u
p
 y
o
u
rs
el
f 
in
 a
 f
ew
 m
in
u
te
s.
 W
e 
d
o
 t
h
in
g
s 
d
if
fe
re
n
tl
y
. 
F
o
n
e.
d
o
 i
s 
a 
co
m
p
le
te
 p
h
o
n
e 
sy
st
em
 f
o
r 
sm
al
l 
b
u
si
n
es
s.
 Y
o
u
 c
an
 u
se
 i
t 
fr
o
m
 y
o
u
r 
w
eb
 b
ro
w
se
r,
 m
o
b
il
e,
 a
n
d
 
d
es
k
 p
h
o
n
es
. 
O
n
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 t
h
at
 r
ec
ei
v
es
 c
al
ls
 e
v
er
y
w
h
er
e,
 a
n
y
ti
m
e.
 W
e 
ar
e 
p
ro
u
d
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
F
o
n
e.
d
o
 
te
am
 i
s 
m
ad
e 
u
p
 o
f 
cr
ea
ti
v
e 
p
eo
p
le
 f
ro
m
 d
iv
er
se
 b
ac
k
g
ro
u
n
d
s.
 T
o
g
et
h
er
 w
e 
ar
e 
ch
an
g
in
g
 t
h
e 
w
ay
 
sm
al
l 
b
u
si
n
es
se
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e.
” 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
A
p
p
In
si
g
h
t:
 “
A
p
p
In
si
g
h
t 
g
en
er
at
es
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
 v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
fo
r 
an
y
 a
p
p
, 
al
o
n
g
 w
it
h
 d
et
ai
le
d
 
re
m
ed
ia
ti
o
n
 g
u
id
el
in
es
, 
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
an
y
 i
n
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
p
ro
ce
ss
. 
W
e 
co
n
ti
n
u
o
u
sl
y
 s
ca
n
 y
o
u
r 
ap
p
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
la
te
st
 k
n
o
w
n
 v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
ie
s 
an
d
 p
ro
ac
ti
v
el
y
 a
le
rt
 y
o
u
 
w
h
en
 n
ew
 t
h
re
at
s 
to
 y
o
u
r 
ap
p
 a
re
 d
et
ec
te
d
, 
p
ri
o
ri
ti
ze
d
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 s
ev
er
it
y
 l
ev
el
. 
A
p
p
In
si
g
h
t 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
D
o
 D
is
ru
p
ti
ve
 V
is
io
n
s 
P
a
y 
O
ff
?
 
6
5
 
ra
n
k
s 
th
e 
se
cu
ri
ty
 p
o
st
u
re
 o
f 
y
o
u
r 
ap
p
s,
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 m
il
li
o
n
s 
o
f 
ap
p
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
al
re
ad
y
 b
ee
n
 
an
al
y
ze
d
. 
B
y
 d
o
in
g
 s
o
, 
w
e 
h
av
e 
b
u
il
t 
a 
h
u
g
e 
d
at
ab
as
e 
o
f 
m
o
b
il
e 
ap
p
s.
 O
u
r 
g
ro
u
p
 o
f 
to
p
 n
o
tc
h
 
se
cu
ri
ty
 e
x
p
er
ts
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
ID
F
 e
li
te
 i
n
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 c
o
rp
s 
le
v
er
ag
es
 t
h
ei
r 
ex
te
n
si
v
e 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 a
n
d
 
b
es
t 
p
ra
ct
ic
es
 t
o
 h
el
p
 y
o
u
 r
ec
ti
fy
 e
v
er
y
 d
et
ec
te
d
 v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
 a
n
d
 t
h
re
at
. 
O
u
r 
v
is
io
n
 i
s 
to
 c
re
at
e 
th
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 f
o
r 
m
o
b
il
e 
ap
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
.”
 
S
in
g
u
la
r:
 “
S
in
g
u
la
r 
is
 a
 S
aa
S
 p
la
tf
o
rm
 t
h
at
 u
n
if
ie
s 
th
e 
fr
ag
m
en
te
d
 d
ig
it
al
 m
ar
k
et
in
g
 s
p
ac
e.
 
S
in
g
u
la
r 
h
as
 b
u
il
t 
a 
m
u
ch
 d
if
fe
re
n
ti
at
ed
 t
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 t
h
at
 e
n
ab
le
s 
m
ar
k
et
er
s 
to
 s
ea
m
le
ss
ly
 i
n
te
g
ra
te
 
al
l 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
m
ar
k
et
in
g
 s
y
st
em
s 
in
to
 a
 s
in
g
u
la
r 
p
la
tf
o
rm
, 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
re
q
u
ir
in
g
 a
n
 S
D
K
 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 o
r 
d
ed
ic
at
ed
 e
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
. 
T
h
ei
r 
u
n
iq
u
e 
so
lu
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 h
as
 e
n
ab
le
d
 
th
em
 t
o
 g
ro
w
 i
n
cr
ed
ib
ly
 f
as
t 
in
 t
h
e 
p
as
t 
tw
o
 y
ea
rs
, 
an
d
 t
o
d
ay
 t
h
ey
 a
re
 w
o
rk
in
g
 w
it
h
 s
o
m
e 
o
f 
th
e 
la
rg
es
t 
an
d
 m
o
st
 s
o
p
h
is
ti
ca
te
d
 d
ig
it
al
 m
ar
k
et
er
s 
in
 t
h
e 
w
o
rl
d
: 
T
w
it
te
r,
 F
ac
eb
o
o
k
, 
M
at
ch
.c
o
m
, 
T
in
d
er
, 
S
u
p
er
ce
ll
, 
G
la
ss
d
o
o
r,
 G
lu
, 
K
ab
am
, 
W
al
la
p
o
p
, 
P
o
sh
m
ar
k
, 
G
ra
b
T
ax
i,
 a
n
d
 m
an
y
 o
th
er
s.
”
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
B
ig
a
B
id
: 
“B
ig
aB
id
 i
s 
a 
d
at
a 
d
ri
v
en
, 
d
at
a 
sc
ie
n
ce
 f
o
cu
se
d
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
 d
es
ig
n
ed
 f
o
r 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ar
k
et
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
m
o
b
il
e 
ad
v
er
ti
si
n
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
. 
T
h
ro
u
g
h
 r
ea
l 
ti
m
e 
o
p
ti
m
iz
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 u
se
r 
p
ro
fi
li
n
g
, 
B
ig
aB
id
 l
ev
er
ag
es
 u
n
re
fi
n
ed
 u
se
r 
d
at
a 
an
d
 a
g
g
re
g
at
es
 i
t 
in
to
 a
ct
io
n
ab
le
 a
u
d
ie
n
ce
 p
ro
fi
le
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 
k
ey
 b
eh
av
io
r,
 l
o
ca
ti
o
n
, 
an
d
 c
o
n
te
n
t 
tr
en
d
s.
 T
h
e 
d
at
a 
ab
o
v
e 
is
 o
b
ta
in
ed
 b
y
 u
s 
th
ro
u
g
h
 b
o
th
 o
u
r 
o
n
g
o
in
g
 m
ed
ia
 a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 s
tu
d
y
in
g
 t
h
e 
ad
v
er
ti
se
r’
s 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l 
d
at
a.
 
W
e 
zo
o
m
 i
n
 o
n
 t
h
e 
m
o
st
 r
el
ev
an
t,
 h
ig
h
ly
 a
ct
io
n
ab
le
 u
se
rs
 a
n
d
 b
u
il
d
 p
ro
fi
le
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
em
. 
T
h
es
e 
p
ro
fi
le
s,
 w
h
en
 c
o
u
p
le
d
 w
it
h
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 l
ay
er
s 
o
f 
m
o
b
il
e
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 d
at
a,
 a
n
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sc
al
e 
an
d
 r
ea
ch
 
o
f 
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
at
ic
 m
ed
ia
 b
u
y
in
g
, 
al
lo
w
 u
s 
to
 h
it
 y
o
u
r 
K
P
Is
 o
n
 e
v
er
y
 s
in
g
le
 a
d
 c
am
p
ai
g
n
, 
el
im
in
at
e 
w
as
ta
g
e 
an
d
 i
m
p
ro
v
e 
o
u
r 
p
re
d
ic
ti
v
e 
ab
il
it
ie
s 
to
w
ar
d
 y
o
u
r 
n
ex
t 
ca
m
p
ai
g
n
 w
it
h
 u
s.
” 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
C
o
o
la
D
a
ta
: 
“C
o
o
la
D
at
a 
is
 a
 c
lo
u
d
-b
as
ed
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
 w
h
ic
h
 c
o
v
er
s 
al
l 
b
ig
 d
at
a 
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 f
o
r 
d
at
a 
tr
ac
k
in
g
, 
w
ar
eh
o
u
si
n
g
, 
E
T
L
, 
d
at
a 
en
ri
ch
m
en
t 
–
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
w
ay
 t
o
 t
h
e 
v
is
u
al
iz
at
io
n
 l
ay
er
. 
It
’s
 a
n
 o
p
en
 d
at
a 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
at
 i
s 
n
o
t 
li
m
it
ed
 t
o
 p
ro
p
ri
et
ar
y
 t
o
o
ls
. 
C
o
n
n
ec
t 
to
 
y
o
u
r 
d
at
a,
 t
o
 a
ll
 y
o
u
r 
d
at
a 
p
o
in
ts
 –
 I
t 
u
n
if
ie
s 
d
at
a 
fr
o
m
 a
 m
u
lt
it
u
d
e 
o
f 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
n
d
 i
n
te
rn
al
 
so
u
rc
es
, 
in
sp
ec
ts
 i
t 
as
 o
n
e 
u
n
it
, 
an
d
 v
is
u
al
iz
es
 t
h
e 
m
o
st
 c
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
MAKING THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE WITH YOU? 
Attracting Talent through Entrepreneurs’ Social Vision 
Communication 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Early stage ventures’ success depends on the entrepreneurs’ ability to build a team 
of talented and dedicated people around them who help grow their businesses 
(Rauch, Frese, & Utsch, 2005; Sauermann, 2017). However, attracting talent (i.e. 
young highly educated professionals) is challenging for start-ups because they are 
often unknown to job seekers, expect demanding work, and have limited resources 
available for competitive salaries (Barber et al., 1999; Burton et al., 2018; Cardon 
& Stevens, 2004). Entrepreneurs’ communications play a key role in convincing 
potential recruits. In particular, recent research suggests that vision 
communication—the communications about the intrinsic or substantive value of 
what the venture aims to become and attain in the future (Baum & Locke, 2004; van 
Balen, Tarakci, & Sood, 2019)—is an important tool for entrepreneurs in 
influencing stakeholders’ perceptions (Garud et al., 2014; van Balen et al., 2019), 
because vision communication helps set the start-ups apart from other ventures (cf. 
Glynn & Navis, 2013; van Werven et al., 2015). In that light, we observe the 
increasing popularity of social vision communication in entrepreneurship practice 
and research (e.g., Branzei, Parker, Moroz, & Gamble, 2018; Bruton, Jr, & Ireland, 
2013; Lee & Huang, 2018; Markman et al., 2016). Social vision communication 
refers to the conveying of an image of the future where current issues revolving 
around nature and/or societal welfare (e.g., disadvantaged groups) are being 
addressed by the venture’s activities (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; Grant, 2008; 
Grant, 2012; Wry & York, 2017).  
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Although entrepreneurship research has yet to investigate the efficacy of social 
vision communication for recruiting talent, human resource management literature 
has been unanimously advocating the benefits of socially-oriented communications 
in attracting job seekers to organizations (Backhaus, Stone, & Heiner, 2002; 
Burbano, 2016; Evans & Davis, 2011; Greening & Turban, 2000). Job seekers 
generally value the well-being of others (de Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Schwartz & Bardi, 
2001), and therefore distill more pride and meaning from organizations that signal 
care for others (Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun, 2008; Burbano, 2016; Highhouse, 
Thornbury, & Little, 2007; Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014). However, these 
findings have been obtained from investigations of large established firms. Hence, 
their applicability to entrepreneurial contexts remain questionable, since ventures 
differ considerably from established organizations in terms of the recruitment 
offering that drives talent attraction (cf. Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Katz, Aldrich, 
Welbourne, & Williams, 2000). Whereas established organizations differentiate 
themselves in the eyes of job seekers through communicating a social impact in 
addition to clear remuneration as well as advancement opportunities (Burbano, 
2016; Jones et al., 2014; O'reilly & Caldwell, 1980; Sauermann, 2017; Wiley, 1997), 
ventures employ social vision communication to substitute their disadvantageous 
offering in terms of higher job uncertainty, working conditions, and lower salary, 
with having a broader impact on nature and society. Consequently, our knowledge 
of the effectiveness as well as the underlying mechanisms of how ventures’ social 
vision communication impact their recruitment remains incomplete. This is 
important since social visions and talent attraction are important pillars of 
entrepreneurship theory and practice.  
Contrary to the prior human resource research in large established organizations, 
we hypothesize that a job seeker is less likely to apply to and will demand higher 
salaries from a venture communicating a social vision than a venture not 
communicating a social vision. Job seekers perceive the venture communicating 
with a social vision as limiting to personal strivings and as having lower business 
viability. Because job seekers do not perceive the focal venture as an opportunity 
for achievement, the commonly expected non-pecuniary opportunities that offset 
the risks (i.e. heightened job uncertainty) of the early stage venture setting are 
considered to be no longer available.  
We tested and found empirical support for our hypotheses through a field 
experiment with 102 graduate students seeking jobs. We presented them with a real 
vacancy in a start-up, of which we manipulated the vision communication. We 
found that job seekers had 72 per cent lower odds of either providing their contact 
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information or applying for the job in the social vision condition. Additionally, we 
find that job seekers set a premium of 252 euros on the minimum required gross 
monthly salary (equivalent to 16 percent of the Dutch minimum salary) for 
considering employment at the venture. Lastly, we ascertained job seekers’ 
perceived opportunity for achievement as the underlying mechanism.  
We contribute to the entrepreneurship and organizational behavior literatures in 
four ways. First, we contribute to the literature on social for-profit ventures by 
addressing one of the pressing issues, namely struggles in hiring talent (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Smith & Besharov, 2017). We promote a deeper understanding of 
the challenges that social for-profit ventures need to overcome (McMullen, 2018; 
Wry & Haugh, 2018), and point toward a specific downside of promoting their 
social aims to potential employees. Our work shows that social visions limit job 
seekers’ ability to perceive a career at the start-up as an opportunity for achievement. 
Hence, we contribute to the view that the popularity of the social for-profit venture 
among entrepreneurs is not without contention. Second, we expand scholarly work 
on the downsides of effective vision communication (e.g., Ateş et al., 2018; Berson, 
Halevy, Shamir, & Erez, 2015; Carton et al., 2014; Conger, 1991; van Balen et al., 
2019). Our study shows that social visions can have a negative effect on a start-up’s 
ability to attract job seekers. Furthermore, we affirm the necessity of investigating 
stakeholders’ interpretations of vision content (cf. Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014) 
and motivate research to consider the potential negative effects of vision 
communication on the individuals’ perceptions. Third, our study of social visions 
sheds further light on entrepreneurial visions as a form of future-oriented impression 
management of early stage ventures (Garud et al., 2014; van Balen et al., 2019; Zott 
& Huy, 2007), and establishes social visions as a specific thematic form. In doing 
so, we broaden scholars’ understanding of how key resource holder, such as 
potential recruits, respond to entrepreneurs’ communications. Fourth, we contribute 
to literature on person-organization fit by showing that above and beyond value 
congruence, employment decision are driven by job seekers’ ability to perceive a 
future career as an opportunity for achievement (cf. Cable & Edwards, 2004). 
Moreover, we find that vision content also plays a considerable role in minimum 
salary demanded by job seekers. Last, our work provides strong practical 
implications for entrepreneurs looking to attract talent to their team. 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 Entrepreneurs’ Communications in Attracting Talent 
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Acquiring human capital is a key source of competitive advantage, growth and 
innovation for start-ups (Rauch et al., 2005; Sauermann, 2017). Yet, attracting talent 
to a venture team is challenging. First, start-ups are relatively unknown to wider 
audiences (Stinchcombe, 2000). Whereas job seekers may have knowledge and 
image attribution of existing large organizations (e.g. ‘best places to work’-rankings 
released by glassdoor.com), they lack such information about new ventures. Second, 
start-ups lack size and resources to offer the same job benefits as established firms 
(Barber et al., 1999; Burton et al., 2018; Cardon & Stevens, 2004). Third, to help 
the venture grow and become successful potential start-up employees are expected 
to go outside their formal role descriptions (if these even exist) and work long hours 
(Cardon & Stevens, 2004).  
Against these downsides, entrepreneurs’ communications play a key role in 
convincing job seekers to join a start-up (e.g., Backhaus & Tikoo, 2004; Braddy, 
Meade, & Kroustalis, 2006; Burbano, 2016; Highhouse et al., 2007; Rynes, Jr, & 
Gerhart, 1991). Communications toward potential employees affect organization-
related beliefs (Cable & Graham, 2000)—for example, whether the potential 
recruits perceive the organization as socially relevant, highly successful, genuine or 
boring (Chapman et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2011). In turn, such beliefs affect job 
seekers perceived fit with and, hence, their attraction and intentions toward a job at 
the organization (Adkins, Russell, & Werbel, 1994; Backhaus, 2003; Backhaus & 
Tikoo, 2004; Chapman et al., 2005; Hauswald, Hack, Kellermanns, & Patzelt, 2016; 
Kristof‐Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Kristof, 1996; Swider, Zimmerman, 
& Barrick, 2015).  
Particularly in the entrepreneurship literature, vision communication has been 
pointed out as an important tool for entrepreneurs in influencing stakeholders’ 
perceptions (Garud et al., 2014; van Balen et al., 2019). Vision communication 
involves the conveying of images of the future of a collective (e.g., technology, 
employees, customers, ecosystems) (Berson et al., 2015; House & Shamir, 1993; 
Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). The content of an entrepreneur’s vision 
communication informs stakeholders of the intrinsic or substantive value of what 
the venture aims to become and attain in the future (Baum et al., 1998; Baum & 
Locke, 2004; van Balen et al., 2019). Vision communication influences what people 
think is desirable or possible for the venture and the ecosystem (Stam et al., 2014; 
Wry et al., 2011), and allows entrepreneurs to set their ventures apart from other 
ventures (cf. Glynn & Navis, 2013; van Werven et al., 2015). For example, recent 
work by Van Balen et al. (2019) shows that Israeli start-ups’ communication of a 
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vision articulating a fundamental change in markets and ways of doing business has 
a substantial effect on investors’ decision to provide financial capital to the start-up. 
3.2.2 Social Vision Communication and Talent Attraction 
A common form of vision content that entrepreneurs increasingly use to set their 
ventures apart, and that has been receiving a substantial interest in entrepreneurship 
research, is communication of a social vision (e.g., Branzei et al., 2018; Bruton et 
al., 2013; Dacin et al., 2011; Lee & Huang, 2018; Markman et al., 2016). 
Popularized by the adage, ‘making the world a better place’, social vision 
communication refers to the conveying of an image of the future where current 
issues revolving around nature and/or societal welfare (e.g., disadvantaged groups) 
are being addressed by the venture’s activities (Dacin et al., 2011; Grant, 2008; 
Grant, 2012; Wry & York, 2017). Consider Dutch start-up ‘The Ocean Cleanup’, 
which communicates a vision where they aim at eradicating “the world’s oceans of 
plastic”, while retaining a financial profit from the cleanup. As of October 2018 the 
start-up had 13 open positions on their website 
(https://www.theoceancleanup.com/careers/). 
Prior research has so far unanimously advocated the benefits of socially-
oriented communications in attracting job seekers to the organization (e.g., Aguinis 
& Glavas, 2012; Backhaus et al., 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Burbano, 2016; 
Evans & Davis, 2011; Greening & Turban, 2000). For example, Jones et al. (2014) 
find that the communication of a firm’s community involvement and environmental 
practices positively influences job seekers’ intentions, because of increased feelings 
of anticipated pride and perceived value fit with the respective organization. 
Research supports this finding by pointing out that people often value the well-being 
of others (de Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) and that organizations 
that care about others are more attractive to job seekers (Cable & Turban, 2003; 
Highhouse et al., 2007; Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006; Turban & Greening, 
1997).  
However, these findings have often been obtained from large established firms. 
We challenge this positive stance toward social visions found in large established 
organizations, and argue that the effect of social visions may be different in 
entrepreneurial ventures (cf. Cardon & Stevens, 2004), because established 
organizations and ventures differ in how they use social visions. Established 
organizations use social communications to complement the existing perceptions 
job seekers may have about the organization (Burke, 2005; Du, Bhattacharya, & 
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Sen, 2010). For example, with larger organizations job seekers tend expect job 
security, competitive salaries, training and career-trajectory support (O'reilly & 
Caldwell, 1980; Rynes, Schwab, & Heneman III, 1983; Sauermann, 2017; Wiley, 
1997). Hence, these organizations differentiate themselves in the eyes of job seekers 
through communicating a social impact in addition to the existing benefits (e.g., 
Burbano, 2016; Henderson & Van den Steen, 2015; Jones et al., 2014). In contrast, 
the venture’s social vision communication substitutes their aforementioned 
disadvantageous offering in terms of higher uncertainty, limited fringe benefits, and 
lower salary, with having a broader impact on nature and society.  
In order to understand how social vision communication affects ventures’ ability 
to attract talent, we need more in-depth investigation of how job seekers interpret 
the vision communications of start-ups, and which mechanisms underlie the effects 
of vision content on job pursuit intentions In the following section, we draw from 
the literature on sensemaking to develop hypotheses about the relationship between 
venture’s social visions, talent attraction, and salary demands. 
3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 Job Seekers’ Sensemaking of Social Visions 
The majority of young highly educated job seekers are drawn to a venture depending 
on the start-up’s perceived risks (e.g., limits to job security and conventional fringe 
benefits, such as pension and health-care) and opportunities (e.g., equity, autonomy 
and intellectual challenge) (Cardon & Stevens, 2004; Roach & Sauermann, 2015; 
Sauermann, 2017). In particular, potential recruits are attracted to a venture when 
they believe and expect that the inherent risks of early stage venturing are offset by 
the availability of the particular opportunities (Roach & Sauermann, 2015; Wanous 
et al., 1983; Wanous, Poland, Premack, & Davis, 1992). In that light, a venture’s 
vision communication allows talent to build beliefs from the future oriented images 
of the vision about what their hypothetical career at the start-up may be like (cf. 
Beach, 1993; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Stam et al., 2014). Hence, we draw on 
sensemaking theory to understand how social visions affect job seekers beliefs about 
the opportunities at the focal venture. Sensemaking refers to the process by which 
job seekers interpret what the venture is doing and give meaning to its assessment 
as a career opportunity (cf. Grant, 2008; Weick et al., 2005). We hypothesize how 
job seekers interpret the group-level (or collective) outcomes of joining the venture 
as communicated by the vision, in relation to their assessment of the personal 
opportunities of joining the venture. 
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We argue that the communication of a social vision decreases job seekers’ 
attraction to the venture, because it limits the perception that the venture offers the 
opportunities that offset the risks of joining a start-up. A social vision explicitly 
highlights the entrepreneurs’ social orientation, promoting the helping of the 
environment and/or others as the raison d’être of the start-up. A social vision calls 
for transcending one’s own personal needs and needs of the people in the venture 
group, in favor of the needs of others outside of this group. People may associate 
this message with more altruistic motivations (Roberts & Woods, 2005; Tan, 
Williams, & Tan, 2005), meaning that effort and resources are allocated in achieving 
the vision with less regard for personal or economic returns to the venture and its 
employees. 
This association has two consequences. First, it creates the perception with job 
seekers that a particular level of self-sacrifice is required to achieve the venture’s 
vision, as the necessities of the individual within the venture appear to be receiving 
less weight. Moreover, while self-sacrifice can be seen as a virtue, particularly in 
religious contexts (Lips-Wiersma, 2002), it limits the perceptions that the venture 
will allow personal strivings (e.g., pursuit of ambitions, development or financial 
growth). While people may vary in their need for personal strivings, the overall 
utility of the start-up context as a vehicle for individual advancement is likely to be 
mitigated by the communication of a social vision (cf. Stern, 2004). Therefore, job 
seekers perceive the opportunities that commonly sooth the risks associated with the 
heightened uncertainty and pecuniary limitations of the start-up context to be no 
longer available.  
Second, typically altruism as emphasized in social visions is often linked to 
lower for-profit business viability of the venture (Moizer & Tracey, 2010). 
Specifically, the social aims underlying the vision often require a longer term 
perspective (Bacq & Lumpkin, 2014). The entrepreneurs’ may appear to be 
unwilling to compromise longer term social goals in favor of shorter term business 
goals and financial necessities (Bacq, Hartog, & Hoogendoorn, 2016), because of 
their seeming compassion and motivation (Bacq & Alt, 2018; Miller, Grimes, 
McMullen, & Vogus, 2012). Not only does this perception further question the 
possibilities for a job seeker’s opportunities and growth in the future, it increases 
the risks associated with a career at the start-up. 
Consequently a venture’s social vision communication is interpreted to offer less 
opportunities. Therefore, the likelihood that a job seeker is attracted to and pursues 
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a job vacancy at a start-up that communicates with a social vision is lower. We 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: A job seeker is less likely to apply to a venture 
communicating a social vision than a venture not communicating a social 
vision. 
3.3.2 Salary Demands and Employment Decisions 
Resource constraints limit start-ups to offer competitive salaries. Thus, investigating 
salary requirements is important because it allows entrepreneurs’ to understand 
what they need to offer to get talent on board. Specifically, the perceived risks and 
opportunities in a particular vacancy, and thus utility they derive from it, may drive 
job seekers to set premiums or discounts to the minimum required salary they need 
to seriously consider applying for the job (Cable & Turban, 2003; Kim, 2018; Stern, 
2004). These premiums or discounts reflect recruits’ attraction to, as well as their 
general attitude towards, work at the venture (Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012). 
Prior research argues that job seekers set discounts to the minimum required 
salary when the organization communicates social aims, because they derive utility 
from expected positive treatment by the potential employer and perceive more 
intrinsic benefits (Burbano, 2016; Jones et al., 2014). However, Burbano’s (2016) 
experimental set-up promoted the social impact in addition to the potential 
employee’s and organization’s regular activities. Thus, the communication of social 
aims garners utility complementary to the job offering of that of a large organization, 
in terms of job security and other fringe rewards. As we outlined before, with the 
start-up communicating a social vision, the potential utility of social impact is 
supplementary to the non-pecuniary activities.  
We argue that social visions are perceived by job seekers as detrimental to the 
utility derived from the balance between risks and personal opportunities to the job 
seekers. Potential recruits perceive a venture communicating with a social vision as 
not providing the opportunities that commonly balance the risks associated with the 
heightened uncertainty and pecuniary limitations of the start-up context. 
Furthermore, the association of social visions with lower business viability make 
job seekers further question the opportunities and potential for growth in the future, 
and increases the perceived risks associated with a career at the start-up. Thus, we 
expect social vision communication to decrease the utility job seekers derive from 
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a potential career at the start-up, and argue that they will set a premium on pecuniary 
rewards to compensate the perceived limitations to non-pecuniary opportunities.  
Hypothesis 2: A job seeker demands higher salary from a venture 
communicating a social vision than a venture not communicating a social 
vision  
3.3.3 Underlying Mechanism: Opportunity for Achievement 
People innately desire to develop themselves and grow towards their fullest 
potential (Deci et al., 2017). For example, the equity opportunities of the start-up 
context may result in considerable financial returns when the venture becomes 
successful, and the autonomy and learning opportunities may eventually result in 
personal excellence and distinction. Hence, we argue that job seekers decision to 
work at a venture includes an achievement orientation (Harackiewicz et al., 1987; 
Senko & Harackiewicz, 2005). That is, opportunity for personal advancement, 
influence, distinction and excellence (e.g., Honeycutt & Rosen, 1997; Jarvenpaa & 
Staples, 2001). In line with the expectancy model (Wanous et al., 1983), we argue 
that talent is attracted to a start-up when they believe the work at the venture to be 
an opportunity for achievement. Furthermore, as job seekers derive utility from the 
opportunity for achievement they set a salary discount on working in the start-up 
(cf. Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999; Ertug & Castellucci, 2013).  
We argue that social vision communication negatively impacts potential recruits’ 
perception that working in the start-up offers an opportunity for achievement. A 
social vision specifically highlights the entrepreneurs’ efforts and allocation of 
resources to the advancement of others, outside of the venture-group. The 
necessities of the individual within the venture appear to be receiving less weight, 
and therefore the pursuit of diverging personal aims may not appear to be supported. 
As a results, job seekers may interpret the entrepreneurs’ as not supportive of 
individuals’ efforts towards personal advancement and the accrual of individual 
distinction in achieving venture outcomes. Moreover, the apparent association 
between social visions and lower business viability, creates a questionable outlook 
for talent on future returns on their personal investment (in terms of putting the same 
amount of work for lower salary and heightened job uncertainty). Thus, when the 
business is not particularly successful, talent can perceive limitations to anticipated 
prestige (e.g., status derived from the venture’s acquired reputation) as well as 
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anticipated financial returns (e.g., through salary growth or equity stakes). 
Therefore, we argue: 
Hypothesis 3a: Perceived opportunity for achievement mediates the 
negative relationship between social vision communication and the 
attraction of job seekers. 
Hypothesis 3b: Perceived opportunity for achievement mediates the 
positive relationship between social vision communication and job seekers’ 
minimum salary requirements. 
Prior entrepreneurship literature suggests that job seekers’ perceived limitations to 
business viability associated with the communication of social visions can be 
actively balanced by specifically highlighting for-profit aims (e.g., Dacin et al., 
2011; Wilson & Post, 2013). In particular, we argue that these for-profit aims should 
emphasize extraordinary returns that offset the increased risks associated with a 
social vision. In the eyes of job seekers, limitations to pursuing personal aims may 
become acceptable if potential extreme financial returns and gains on prestige offset 
it. Therefore, we focus on disruptive visions (Kanze & Iyengar, 2017; van Balen et 
al., 2019). These visions highlight a venture’s aim to fundamentally change the 
market and ways of doing business. Because disruptive visions stress the 
overthrowing of incumbent businesses, with the focal venture holding the dominant 
design, it raises the expectation that the venture may become highly successful in 
the future and will provide extraordinary returns for any stakeholder involved (van 
Balen et al., 2019). Thus, we argue that explicitly combining the social vision with 
the disruptive vision mitigates the negative effect of social visions on talent 
attraction, because the anticipated extraordinary returns associated with the 
disruptive vision offset the increased risks associated with the social vision. 
Hypothesis 4: Disruptive vision communication positively moderates the 
relationship between social vision communication and perceived 
opportunity for achievement such that social vision communication reduces 
job seekers’ likelihood of applying and increases their salary demands only 
when disruptive vision communication is low.  
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3.4 METHODS 
3.4.1 Participants 
The focal unit of this research is the young highly educated potential recruit of start-
ups (in other words, talent). We recruited 212 graduate students from three Master 
of Science (MSc) programs at a Dutch university. These students were all in their 
final years of education and were in the process of finishing their degrees. 
Importantly, of the initial respondents we selected 123 individuals who were 
currently looking for a job and were considering staying in the Netherlands. We 
presented the students with a real job vacancy (see details at Design) followed by 
an online questionnaire. Students could provide their contact details and/or apply to 
the job at the end of the survey by uploading their résumé to a secured drive. In 
addition, we attempted to further motivate students’ participation by offering an 
overview of their job preferences and interests as they filled them in the survey. 
After eliminating participants that did not fully complete the survey, and after 
filtering out participants who answered carelessly on the attention checks we 
included in the survey, our final sample comprised 102 participants who were 57 
percent male, were on average 23.62 years old (S.D. = 1.59), with 53% being of 
Dutch nationality, 25% from other European countries and 22% outside of Europe. 
We checked differences on these demographic variables between the removed 
group and the final sample. We found no significant differences (largest difference 
was in age: mean difference = 0.24; t = -0.64, df. = 121, p = 0.53). 
3.4.2 Design 
We recruited a start-up through the university’s entrepreneurship program to supply 
a real vacancy for a starter position in business consulting, analytics, and operations 
research. We selected this venture because students from the selected master 
programs tend to have the skills and interests that match with such a position. 
Subsequently, we designed a 2 (low and high social vision) x 2 (low and high 
disruptive vision) randomized between-subjects experiment. Each condition was 
based on the same job posting, also keeping the job description and requirements as 
similar as possible to the original advertisement. However, we manipulated the 
venture’s vision statement over the conditions. The original vision statement was 
taken from the venture’s website and edited to match our purposes (see the 
Appendix). Last, we anonymized the name of the venture to avoid having 
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participants search for the company online during their participation in the 
experiment. 
3.4.3 Procedure 
We obtained the names and contact details of graduating MSc students from 
program administration. Each of the 619 students in the list was sent an introductory 
email on their university email address, inviting them to take part in our research on 
student job decisions and placement options. In the email we offered, in return for 
their participation, the opportunity to apply for a unique and real job opportunity 
(presented in the survey), and a comparison of their job preferences and interests 
with participant averages. Next, 212 students proceeded to click the link to an 
introductory page further explaining the details of the survey, where we informed 
participants that we would ask them about their job preferences and status, and an 
employment decision about the venture to be presented. Subsequently, students 
filled in questions about their job preferences and status. Here, we discarded those 
subjects who indicated they were not looking for a job or were not planning to stay 
in the Netherlands. Hence, we randomly assigned 123 job seeking students to one 
of our conditions. After filling in manipulation checks, they indicated their interest 
and attraction to the presented vacancy, where we provided the option to leave their 
contact details. Next, they answered questions about our mediator and control 
variables, and answered questions about salary. The survey ended with a page 
thanking the participants and asking them whether they would want to apply to the 
presented position by uploading their résumé to a secured drive. Last, they were 
informed that their résumé would only be shared with the company after closing the 
survey’s participation window. We positioned this question at the end of the 
experiment, because initial pilot testing indicated that the question may be 
disruptive to the flow of the questionnaire if it was placed right after the vacancy 
description. 
3.4.4 Measures 
3.4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Our main dependent constructs involve the attraction of job seekers to the venture’s 
vision and minimum salary requirements. We proxy participant’s attraction to the 
presented vacancy with two behavioral measures. First, we noted whether the 
students provided their contact details. Second, we recorded whether participants 
applied for the vacancy by uploading their résumé at the end of the survey. We 
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included talent attraction as a dummy variable in our models, where 1 indicates that 
students submitted their email address and/or uploaded their résumé, and 0 if they 
did not.  
Job seekers’ minimum salary requirements were operationalized by asking 
participants to indicate the minimum required salary (gross per month in Euro’s) 
that the venture would have to offer for them to seriously consider joining the 
venture (e.g., Burbano, 2016; Cable & Turban, 2003). This question was answered 
on a slider scale ranging from 1578 euro’s (Dutch legal minimum salary) to 10 000 
euro’s.  
3.4.4.2 Independent Variables 
Our manipulations of social vision and disruptive vision are listed in the Appendix. 
We include both as dummy variables in our analyses. For the social (disruptive) 
vision variable, 1 meant survey participants were exposed to high social (disruptive) 
vision condition, 0 otherwise. We measured perceived opportunity for achievement 
with four items adapted from Jarvenpaa & Staples (2001). Respondents were asked 
to indicate to what extent they agreed with the following four items on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree): “The job at this venture 
provides opportunity for my advancement and achievement”, “This venture is a 
prestigious organization to work for”, “In the job at the venture, my individual 
search for excellence has a top priority”, and “My pursuit of individual power is 
acceptable in the job at the venture” (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.69). 
3.4.4.3 Control Variables 
We controlled for various characteristics of the participants and their perception of 
the presented start-up. First, we controlled for perceived value fit of the participants 
with the presented start-up. Prior literature has established value fit as a core 
explanatory variable of employment decisions (Adkins et al., 1994; Swider et al., 
2015). This is particularly true for social visions (Jones et al., 2014). Since these 
visions are often strongly value-laden, value fit may have a considerable effect on 
attraction, salary requirements, and perceived opportunities. Hence, by controlling 
for it we can establish that the observed effects are not driven by the establishment 
of value fit alone. We measured value fit with three items adapted from Cable and 
DeReu (2002) on a 5-point Likert-scale (1 = strongly disagree – 5= strongly agree): 
“The venture’s values and goals provide a good fit with the things that I value in 
life”, “The things that I value in life are very similar to the things that the venture 
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values”, and “My personal values match the venture’s values and goals” 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.92). 
Since distance to the company may influence the feasibility of the vacancy as a 
job option, it can influence the likelihood of applying. Therefore, we control for 
whether respondents live near the company. We measured this by asking whether 
or not participants lived within 5 km radius of the city center (which is where the 
company was located) and included it as a dummy variable (0 = 5 km. or further, 1 
= within 5 km. radius). Our participants were recruited from three related, but 
distinct, Master of Science programs. Students from these master programs may 
have varying affinity and perception of skill-fit with the presented vacancy and 
venture. Furthermore, students from these programs may have different 
expectations about salaries in their subsequent jobs. The programs involved 
Business Information Management (BIM), Supply Chain Management (SCM), and 
Management of Innovation (MI). Therefore, we included the MSc program that 
participants were part of. We included the variable as separate dummies for BIM 
and SCM. We used MI as the baseline group. 
We also included respondent gender, age and nationality as controls. For 
nationality, we categorized respondents as either Dutch, other European Union (EU) 
countries, or non-EU. Last, in our model estimating minimum required salary, we 
include the subjects’ expectation of the salary the venture will pay for the job as a 
control variable called expected salary venture. The measurement scale was 
identical to minimum required salary.  
Table 1 displays the Pearson correlations among all variables. 
3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Fifty five per cent of the respondents provided their contact information or applied 
for the vacancy. Furthermore, on average participants said that for 2876.28 euro’s 
(S.D. = 607.59) minimum gross monthly salary they would seriously consider the 
vacancy and expected the venture to pay 2669.55 euro’s (S.D. = 442.52) gross 
monthly on average. 
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3.5.2 Manipulation Checks 
To assess the social vision manipulation, we asked subjects to answer on a five-
point Likert scale (strongly disagree—strongly agree) how much they agreed with 
the following statement: “In the job advertisement, the venture expresses concern 
for the natural environment, societal issues and human well-being.” One-way 
ANOVA showed strong significant differences between conditions (F(3, 98) = 
44.70, p < 0.001). Post-hoc contrast analysis revealed significant mean differences 
between all conditions involving a social vision versus those conditions that did not 
involve a social vision. The lowest significant mean difference reported was 
between the ‘social’ and ‘no vision’ conditions (mean diff. = 1.71, S.E. = 0.24, p < 
0.001; Tukey adjusted). 
To assess the effectiveness of our disruptive vision manipulation, we asked 
participants to answer on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree—strongly 
agree) how much they agreed with the statement: “In the job advertisement, the 
venture claims it aims to disrupt the market of supply chain analytics”. One-way 
ANOVA showed strong significant differences between conditions on this query 
(F(3, 98) = 7.50, p < 0.001). Post-hoc contrast analysis indicated significant mean 
differences between all conditions involving a disruptive vision versus those 
conditions that did not involve a disruptive vision. The lowest significant mean 
difference reported was between the ‘social’ and ‘social x disruptive’ conditions 
(mean diff. = -0.89, S.E. = 0.27, p = 0.007; Tukey adjusted). 
3.5.3 Testing 
Table 2 shows the results of our analyses. Model 4 displays the regression of 
attraction of talent on our control variables. In line with prior research (Cable & 
Judge, 1996; Jones et al., 2014), job seekers who perceived value fit with the venture 
(β = 1.27, S.E. = 0.43, p = 0.002) were more likely to either provide their contact 
details or submit their CV. Additionally, we observe that older job seekers (β = 0.58, 
S.E. = 0.21, p = 0.006) and those from other EU-countries were more likely to be 
attracted to the job (β = 1.49, S.E. = 0.67, p = 0.03). We conducted a Wald test to 
assess the overall effect of the nationality variable and found it to be (marginally) 
significant at α < 0.1 (χ2 = 5.20, df. = 2, p = 0.08). The difference between the job 
seekers from EU-countries and non-EU countries in terms of attraction was 
insignificant (χ2 = 1.1, df. = 1, p = 0.31).  
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Table 2. Regression results of models on job attraction. 
 Opportunity for achievement (OLS) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  
 (Std .Error) (Std .Error) (Std .Error) 
Intercept 
3.14** 
(1.00) 
3.60*** 
(0.99) 
3.37** 
(1.00) 
Social vision  
-0.30* 
(0.13) 
-0.45** 
(0.17) 
Disruptive vision   
-0.04 
(0.18) 
Social vision x Disruptive 
vision 
  
0.34 
(0.25) 
Opportunity for 
achievement 
  
 
 
Value fit 
0.33*** 
(0.08) 
0.38*** 
(0.08) 
0.39*** 
(0.08) 
Expected salary venture   
 
 
Live near company 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
Program SCM 
0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Program BIM 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
-0.25 
(0.17) 
-0.19 
(0.18) 
Gender 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
Age 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Nationality Europe 
-0.15 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.16) 
-0.24 
(0.16) 
Nationality World 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(0.18) 
R- squared 0.21 0.25 0.28 
F-statistic (df1/df2) & Log 
likelihood (df.) 
3.06** 
(8/93) 
3.43** 
(9/92) 
3.17** 
(11/90) 
Testa against competing 
models  
 
5.30* 
(1) 
1.73 
(2) 
AIC   
 
 
aFor the OLS regression, the Wald test was used (F-test statistic), and the logistic regression applied a 
likelihood ratio test (χ2 test statistic).┼ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors 
are in parentheses (S.E.).  
  
Making the World a Better Place with You? 
85 
Table 2. Regression results of models on job attraction (cont.). 
 Talent attraction (logistic regression) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  
 (Std .Error) (Std .Error) (Std .Error) (Std .Error) 
Intercept 
-19.75*** 
(5.69) 
-17.81** 
(5.82) 
-17.14** 
(5.88) 
-29.61*** 
(7.96) 
Social vision  
-1.29* 
(0.58) 
-1.49┼  
(0.81) 
-0.98 
(0.93) 
Disruptive vision   
-0.48 
(0.87) 
-0.61 
(0.99) 
Social vision x Disruptive 
vision 
  
0.39 
(1.11) 
0.05 
(1.23) 
Opportunity for 
achievement 
   
2.46*** 
(0.71) 
Value fit 
1.27** 
(0.43) 
1.47*** 
(0.44) 
1.47*** 
(0.44) 
1.07* 
(0.51) 
Expected salary venture    
 
 
Live near company 
0.27 
(0.59) 
0.39 
(0.61) 
0.36 
(0.63) 
1.08 
(0.72) 
Program SCM 
0.85 
(0.72) 
0.57 
(0.75) 
0.55 
(0.75) 
0.70 
(0.82) 
Program BIM 
0.80 
(0.71) 
0.49 
(0.73) 
0.46 
(0.74) 
1.27 
(0.86) 
Gender 
0.77 
(0.55) 
0.75 
(0.57) 
0.74 
(0.57) 
1.04 
(0.65) 
Age 
0.58** 
(0.21) 
0.51* 
(0.22) 
0.49* 
(0.22) 
0.68** 
(0.25) 
Nationality Europe 
1.49* 
(0.67) 
1.32* 
(0.67) 
1.32┼  
(0.68) 
2.28** 
(0.88) 
Nationality World 
0.68 
(0.66) 
0.85 
(0.70) 
0.86 
(0.72) 
1.21 
(0.83) 
R- squared     
F-statistic (df1/df2) & Log 
likelihood (df.) 
-51.49*** 
(9) 
-48.83*** 
(10) 
-48.67*** 
(12) 
-39.87*** 
(13) 
Testa against competing 
models  
 
5.33* 
(1) 
0.32 
(2) 
17.60*** 
(1) 
AIC 120.99 117.66 121.34 105.74 
┼ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses (S.E.).a For the 
OLS regression, the Wald test was used (F-test statistic), and the logistic regression applied a 
likelihood ratio test (χ2 test statistic). 
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Table 2. Regression results of models on job attraction (cont.). 
 Minimum required salary (OLS) 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  
 (Std .Error) (Std .Error) (Std .Error) (Std .Error) 
Intercept 
-216.41 
(881.55) 
-569.77 
(874.95) 
-339.89 
(882.99) 
489.67 
(897.64) 
Social vision  
251.48* 
(108.85) 
299.70* 
(143.58) 
188.67 
(143.48) 
Disruptive vision   
-102.68 
(154.19) 
-113.59 
(148.38) 
Social vision x Disruptive 
vision 
  
-104.30 
(208.05) 
-20.22 
(202.30) 
Opportunity for 
achievement 
   
-244.97** 
(85.70) 
Value fit 
-145.52* 
(70.56) 
-185.36* 
(71.08) 
-185.69* 
(71.23) 
-91.02 
(76.11) 
Expected salary venture 
0.82*** 
(0.12) 
0.80*** 
(0.12) 
0.80*** 
(0.12) 
0.80*** 
(0.12) 
Live near company 
118.00 
(118.38) 
86.43 
(116.49) 
109.06 
(117.19) 
57.56 
(114.17) 
Program SCM 
-68.48 
(157.54) 
-16.20 
(155.60) 
-55.47 
(157.73) 
-52.32 
(151.74) 
Program BIM 
59.48 
(148.85) 
115.44 
(147.47) 
77.07 
(149.22) 
30.33 
(144.48) 
Gender 
139.6 
(111.12) 
139.65 
(108.59) 
144.79 
(108.29) 
111.35 
(104.83) 
Age 
54.79 
(34.63) 
69.71* 
(34.45) 
62.13┼  
(34.61) 
53.08 
(33.44) 
Nationality Europe 
16.10 
(133.90) 
76.10 
(133.40) 
92.69 
(133.24) 
33.28 
(129.85) 
Nationality World 
-162.33 
(152.15) 
-176.87 
(148.82) 
-137.10 
(151.32) 
-154.62 
(145.70) 
R- squared 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.46 
F-statistic (df1/df2) & Log 
likelihood (df.) 
5.77*** 
(9/92) 
5.97*** 
(10/91) 
5.25*** 
(12/89) 
5.86*** 
(13/88) 
Testa against competing 
models  
 
5.34* 
(1) 
1.39 
(2) 
8.17** 
(1) 
AIC     
┼ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses (S.E.).a For the 
OLS regression, the Wald test was used (F-test statistic), and the logistic regression applied a 
likelihood ratio test (χ2 test statistic). 
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Model 5 provides the test for Hypothesis 1 that job seekers are less attracted to a 
venture communicating a social vision. In support of this Hypothesis, we find that 
potential recruits in the social vision conditions had 72 per cent lower odds of being 
attracted to the venture than respondents in the control or disruptive vision 
conditions (β = -1.29, S.E. = 0.58, p = 0.026). Model 8 shows the regression of 
minimum demanded salary on our control variables. The results indicate that job 
seekers who perceive value fit provide a salary discount on their gross monthly 
minimum required salary (β = -145.52, S.E. = 70.56, p = 0.042). This finding echoes 
prior research (Cable & Turban, 2003). We observe that respondents’ perception of 
the venture’s level of pay9 for the position also positively influenced their minimum 
required salaries for the position (β = 0.82, S.E. = 0.12, p < 0.001). 
We turn to Model 9 for our test of Hypothesis 2 that job seekers will ask a salary 
premium for a venture communicating with a social vision. Results show that 
respondents in the social vision condition asked a salary premium of 252 euro’s on 
their minimum required gross monthly salary (β = 251.48, S.E. = 108.85, p = 0.023). 
This finding provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2.  
Model 1 to 3 show our regressions on the respondents’ perceived opportunity for 
achievement. The joint evidence from Models 2, 7 and 11 provide initial support for 
Hypothesis 3 that the opportunity for achievement mediates the relationship 
between social vision and our dependent variables. Model 1 includes only the 
control variables. Model 2 shows that a social vision negatively influences 
respondents’ perceived opportunity for achievement (β = -0.30, S.E. = 0.13, p = 
0.024). Models 7 and 11 provide evidence that respondent’s perceived opportunity 
for achievement positively affects their attraction to the venture (β = 2.46, S.E. = 
0.71, p < 0.001) and drives them to set minimum required salary discounts (β = -
244.97, S.E. = 85.70, p = 0.005). 
To test the mediation proposed in Hypothesis 3, we conducted causal mediation 
analysis. In support of Hypothesis 3a, we find that perceived opportunity for 
achievement mediates the relationship between social vision and talent attraction (β 
= -0.09, 95% CI = [-0.19, -0.02], p = 0.026, 10,000 bootstraps10, βtotal = -0.21, 95% 
CI = [-0.39, -0.01], p = 0.03). In support of Hypothesis 3b, we find that perceived 
opportunity for achievement mediates the relationship between social vision and 
                                                     
9 We found no evidence that our manipulations affected respondents’ perception of the 
amount of pay the venture would offer for the position. 
10 We used non-parametric bootstrapping with bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) 
confidence intervals (DiCiccio & Efron, 1996). 
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minimum required salary (β = -70.75, 95% CI = [19.08, 271.47], p = 0.036, 10,000 
bootstraps, βtotal = 249.71, 95% CI = [33.66, 441.45], p = 0.024).  
To test Hypothesis 4, that disruptive vision moderates the effect of social vision 
on perceived opportunity for achievement, we included the interaction term in 
Model 3. The model provides no evidence for a statistically significant interaction 
effect between the two vision types on our mediator (β = 0.34, S.E. = 0.25, p = 0.17). 
However, moderated mediation analysis indicates that the significant mediation 
effect of opportunity for achievement on attraction is particularly pronounced in the 
social vision condition (βindirect = -0.14, 95% CI = [-0.30, -0.04], p = 0.008, 10,000 
bootstraps) and not in the social x disruptive condition (β = -0.03, 95% CI = [-0.14, 
0.06], p = 0.52, 10,000 bootstraps). Similarly, the mediation effect of opportunity 
for achievement on minimum salary requirements is driven by the social vision 
condition (β = 111.05, 95% CI = [19.08, 271.50], p = 0.026, 10,000 bootstraps) and 
not by the social x disruptive condition (β = 27.16, 95% CI = [-36.95, 158], p = 0.49, 
10,000 bootstraps). 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
We investigate whether and how social visions help entrepreneurs attract talent. 
This is an important challenge for the entrepreneurs because they are in a dire need 
of skilled professionals who help grow their venture, but for whom the venture’s 
limited resources fall short in matching the offer of large established organizations. 
While literature suggest that entrepreneurs’ vision communication can turn the tide, 
its relationship with talent attraction at the venture level remains unexplored. In 
particular, a long stream of human resource research dictates that communicating 
social impact to potential recruits help convince to join the team, albeit in large 
established firms. We challenge this dominant wisdom emanating from the human 
resources research’s findings. We hypothesize and subsequently show in a field 
experiment that social visions are less likely to attract applicants to the start-up and 
prompt higher salary demands from the applications. This is because these social 
visions limit job seekers’ perceived opportunity for achievement of a career at the 
start-up. Our research has strong theoretical implications for research on social 
entrepreneurship, vision communication, and human resources. 
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications for Entrepreneurship Research 
This study responds to the recent call for more empirical research into social for-
profit ventures and talent recruitment (Wry & Haugh, 2018: 568). A current set of 
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qualitative investigations suggest that potential recruits may struggle with the 
tension between the social and business missions of social for-profit ventures and 
that the start-ups need to actively balance these two logics in socializing them 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013; Smith & Besharov, 
2017; Wry & York, 2017). However, the effects of communicating social aims on 
the initial attraction of talent as well as the underlying causal processes of talent’s 
job decision in social ventures have not yet been considered. Our work addresses 
this gap through a field-experiment with job seekers. We show that, indeed, start-
ups purporting to be social and for-profit may have problems hiring talent, because 
the social visions they communicate can limit job seekers self-serving expectations 
about their career, hampering the perception of the job at the venture as an 
opportunity for achievement.  
In a broader sense, this contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges 
that social for-profit ventures need to overcome to acquire the necessary resources 
(McMullen, 2018; Siqueira, Guenster, Vanacker, & Crucke, 2018; Smith, W. K. et 
al., 2013; Wry & Haugh, 2018), and points toward a specific downside of promoting 
their social aims to potential employees. Namely, ventures may limit their initial 
pool of applicants by communicating a social vision. Furthermore, our findings 
suggest that job seeking audiences may not directly perceive the often coined 
balancing act between social and for-profit logics during initial communication and 
socialization efforts in the hiring process (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dacin et 
al., 2011). In fact, we found no support for any positive effects on attraction by 
explicitly communicating extraordinary returns through a disruptive vision in 
addition to the social vision. This result highlights that the hierarchical ordering of 
social and economic aims is likely to persist in the eyes of an audience who have 
incomplete information about the entrepreneurs’ intentions and the start-ups 
viability (e.g., Bacq et al., 2016; Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010; Moizer & Tracey, 
2010). Thus, simply highlighting both social and for-profit aims does not appear to 
solve the tension between them. Future research should examine how entrepreneurs 
can balance the communication of their social and business aims, in order to increase 
their chances of attracted talented team members. 
We extend the view of entrepreneurs’ vision communication as a form of future-
oriented impression management that promotes what the venture will achieve and 
will become through their proposed activities (Clarke, Cornelissen, & Healey, 2018; 
Garud et al., 2014; Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009; Navis & Glynn, 2011). 
Literature acknowledges the importance of future-oriented impression management 
efforts, such as visions, for influencing stakeholder sensemaking about the 
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distinctive qualities of a new venture (Glynn & Navis, 2013; van Werven et al., 
2015). However, empirical investigations into such efforts are scarce. A recent 
exception (van Balen et al., 2019) shows how disruptive vision communication 
affects investor sensemaking. In that light, our investigation of social visions 
contributes to the view that future-oriented communication has strong, but often 
differential effects on various entrepreneurial audiences. We also offer the social 
vision as a particular integrative theme of entrepreneurs’ communications, which 
they may use in the pursuit of particular aims (e.g., Hallen, 2008). While we broaden 
scholarly understanding of how key venture stakeholders respond to the 
entrepreneurs’ future-oriented communications and how they affect venture-level 
resource mobilization, we motivate future research to investigate other forms of 
future-oriented impression management efforts and their effects on varying 
audiences, such as customers and suppliers, and the mechanisms that underlie their 
sensemaking.  
Furthermore, research into vision communication content and the processes 
through which it may mobilize people has been scant (Van Knippenberg & Stam, 
2014). We further advance research on vision communication by espousing 
perceived opportunity for achievement as a mediator of the vision content–talent 
attraction relationship. This finding suggests that particular vision content may 
affect stakeholders’ perceptions of the venture differently. In particular, we argue 
that the type of decision the stakeholders take, strongly affect how they interpret 
vision content. For example, whereas investors may interpret vision content in light 
of potentially expected financial returns (Huang & Pearce, 2015; van Balen et al., 
2019), job seekers interpret it in light of potentially expected personal opportunities. 
By espousing such interpretative mechanisms of different stakeholders, we have 
also shown why particular downsides to visionary communications may exists. 
Thus, we expand to the limited number of works on the downsides of visionary 
communications (e.g., Ateş et al., 2018; Berson et al., 2015; Carton et al., 2014; 
Conger, 1991; van Balen et al., 2019), by showing that social visions can backfire 
in attracting talent to the venture team. 
3.6.2 Implications for the Human Resources Research 
Our investigation of job seekers’ sensemaking of social vision communication as a 
specific form of vision content responds to the call for investigating the mechanisms 
underlying the communication and applicant attraction relationship (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012; Breaugh, 2013; Celani & Singh, 2011). Specifically, we espouse 
potential recruits’ perception of the job presented in the vacancy as an opportunity 
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for achievement and show that their interpretation of the social vision may limit this 
perception. Our finding supports the notion that communication affects job seekers’ 
expectations about the particular work environment an organization offers (Wanous 
et al., 1992). However, we are the first to extend this to the venture level and 
motivate future research to further investigate underlying mechanisms.   
Last, we contribute also to the literature on person-organization (PO) fit by 
showing that beyond value congruence, employment decision are driven by job 
seekers’ perception that a future career has opportunity for personal achievement. 
Classically, this literature distinguishes between supplementary (e.g., values, goals, 
norms) and complementary fit (e.g., pay, development opportunities, task type), and 
suggests that organizational communications primarily affect the organization-
related beliefs that determine supplementary fit (Kristof‐Brown et al., 2005; Kristof, 
1996; Rynes & Miller, 1983). Therefore, as visions communicate high level goals 
(i.e. ultimate goals) and values, PO-fit theory suggests that vision communication 
will affect job seekers’ supplementary fit in order to determine attraction. However, 
we found that the negative effect of social vision communication on perceived 
opportunity for achievement in job seekers upholds beyond value fit. Our theory 
stipulates that this is because social aims may question their opportunity for personal 
achievement. This implies that, despite the clear link between vision communication 
and supplementary fit, vision communications can also affect evaluations of 
complementary fit. We remind research of the need to further investigate how and 
when organizational communications have a cross-over effect between 
supplementary and complementary fit (e.g., Cable & Edwards, 2004). For example, 
research could further investigate how pay as a signaling mechanism affects job 
seekers’ supplementary fit perceptions (cf. Cable & Judge, 1994). 
3.6.3 Managerial Implications 
A recent body of research documents that entrepreneurs’ vision communication as 
an impression management technique affects stakeholders’ understanding of a 
venture (Garud et al., 2014; van Balen et al., 2019). With visions entrepreneurs 
communicate how their venture’s activities translate into market outcomes in the 
future (e.g., how they will create societal impact and technological change). While 
entrepreneurs’ use of visions is highly recommended to communicate what the 
venture will attain, we advise entrepreneurs to craft the content of these visions with 
great care and remain attentive to the potential up- and downsides of particular 
forms of communication. Research points out that choosing to use specific types of 
language, such as figurative or assertive speech (Clarke et al., 2018; Parhankangas 
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& Ehrlich, 2014), including words high in imagery (Emrich et al., 2001), or the use 
integrative themes (e.g., focus on conveying images of growth (Baum et al., 1998; 
Baum & Locke, 2004), aspiring leadership (Martens et al., 2007), or disruption (van 
Balen et al., 2019), can have diverging effects on how stakeholders view and behave 
towards the venture. 
We extend this advice with our investigation of social visions and recruitment. 
Communicating a broader impact has gained much popularity in entrepreneurial 
practice. However, our findings show that the presentation of social visions may 
damage entrepreneurs’ ability to attract talent to the venture team as they 
communicate limited opportunity for achievement to job seekers. While further 
investigations should test the robustness of these finding and the conditions under 
which the social visions may benefit or hamper entrepreneurs, our work already 
shows that they should use them discreetly. With some reservation we advise that, 
given the implications of prior research and our findings, entrepreneurs should 
attempt to communicate a social vision as complementary to other (vision) 
communications and not in lieu of.  
3.6.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Additional due diligence by the job seeker and the entrepreneurs’ socialization 
efforts in managing job seekers’ expectations, may both play a major role in the 
eventual job decisions. However, given that start-ups are relatively unknown to 
wider audiences and have limited resources available for recruitment as compared 
to larger established companies (Barber et al., 1999; Cardon & Stevens, 2004; 
Stinchcombe, 2000), the role of vision communication is particularly crucial in 
recruits’ images of the start-up used in initial selection (cf. Beach, 1993). Our 
investigation shows that initial behavioral intentions are affected by the 
entrepreneurs’ communications. Future research should unearth how additional 
steps in this recruitment and socialization process affect job seekers intentions and 
behaviors towards the venture. 
Although our analyses did not reveal the moderating effect of disruptive visions 
(i.e. emphasizing potential extraordinary financial returns), there might be 
contingency effects that explain when, how and for whom social visions lead to 
greater or lesser attraction to the vacancy. For example, future research should 
investigate the effects of an individual’s ‘other’ vs ‘self’-orientation on job seekers’ 
sensemaking of a social visions (de Dreu & Nauta, 2009). Such orientations may 
affect how people differentially interpret specific sets of similar information.  
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Furthermore, while our work shows that using social aims as a substitute to the 
limited offering of a start-up in terms of job security, fringe benefits and pay, earlier 
work into communication of social aims and recruitment focused primarily on social 
communications as complementary to existing organizations job offerings (e.g., 
Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Backhaus et al., 2002; Evans & Davis, 2011; Jones et al., 
2014; Turban & Greening, 1997) and show strong positive effects of social 
communications. This suggests that the relationship between communication of 
social visions and recruitment may be contingent on how the social aims are 
presented. Future research should investigate whether and how social visions can be 
presented as complementary to other communications in the start-up context. 
We tested our hypotheses through a field experiment with job seeking students. 
While our sample theoretically generalizes to the population of talent often recruited 
by start-ups, it was obtained from a set of students from three master programs of a 
particular Dutch university. Furthermore, while the number of initially attracted 
students was quite high, the eventual size of the sample was somewhat smaller due 
to the fact that many of the students had already found a job and could not be 
included in the analysis. Future research should attempt to overcome these 
contextual sampling limitations, and replicate and extend our findings beyond the 
current population.   
3.7 CONCLUSION 
In summary, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs’ communication of a social 
vision for their start-up may hamper their ability to attract talent, because it limits 
recruits’ perception of the venture as an opportunity for achievement. For 
entrepreneur scholars, our work motivates scholars to further investigate how social 
for-profit ventures can overcome their communicative challenges in acquiring 
necessary resources. Also, we affirm the gravity of researching vision 
communication as a particular form of impression management for entrepreneurs, 
of which the downsides should be carefully taken into account. For human resource 
research, we suggest that the overlapping effects of the different types of fit should 
be considered in probing job seekers’ choices. Last, our work suggests that 
entrepreneurs should employ social visions, and any vision content for that matter, 
with great caution and remain aware of the many communicative aspects that may 
play a role in stakeholder sensemaking. 
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APPENDIX. FIELD EXPERIMENT VISION COMMUNICATION 
AND VACANCY MANIPULATIONS 
Experimental Condition 1: High Social Vision—High Disruptive Vision 
 
Our vision 
Who we are 
We are BrainChain: the future disruptor and sustainability leader in supply chain 
optimization. We were founded in 2015 on the belief that supply chain optimization and 
automation should help the move to a sustainable and socially responsible world and can 
be done in a fundamentally different and more effective way than the market currently 
delivers. 
 
At every turn, we ask ourselves how we can transform the market and can help the 
environment and society benefit from the optimization and automation of the world’s supply 
chains. For too long companies have optimized supply chains in a fundamentally inefficient 
and ineffective way and at the cost of negative human and environmental impact, relying on 
myopic decision making, and fragmented and outdated services. This has to change. 
 
What we do 
Our services and solutions drastically change how optimization and automation work, and 
are non-compromising in improving sustainability and social responsibility. We provide 
supply chain optimization and automation services based on advanced algorithms and 
artificial intelligence. We deliver a fully integrated approach of consulting and analytics 
with long term radical approach. Our core product is a single platform on which all world-
class algorithms operate and that is easily connected with an organization's existing 
business processes and infrastructures. 
 
Where we are going 
We are already working with many large organizations, including national railway 
companies, horticulturists, and water treatment and transportation companies. Through our 
integrated solutions, we ensure that all organizations have access to endlessly scalable 
algorithms, real artificial intelligence, and exceptional analytics. As a result, we drastically 
improve environmental and human footprints of their supply chains and revolutionize supply 
chain optimization at all levels.  
 
We listen. We innovate. We disrupt markets and help people! 
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We envision a future where supply chains work in a fundamentally different and more 
effective way, and have a positive impact on nature and society. A future where we have 
become the next standard in supply chain optimization and automation, and foster a 
sustainable world for generations to come. 
 
Job vacancy 
Business analytics / Data Science - AI & Operational Research 
Job title - Operations Research Consultant – Rotterdam office 
BrainChain is looking for you: a young and enthusiastic starter. As an operations research 
consultant at BrainChain, you fuel the paradigm shift in supply chain optimization and will 
help secure a future where supply chains give back to the world. Through our platform, 
you will provide advice, analytics and algorithms to optimize and automate organizations’ 
operational supply chain decision making. 
Join us and design, build, implement and execute groundbreaking, world-improving 
concepts, and be part of our green and disruptive team in the field of Industrial Internet of 
Things, Supply Chain Optimization, and Artificial Intelligence. 
 
What we can offer you: 
 You will learn from the best—our highly experienced people 
 You will work independently and have much freedom for your own projects and 
personal development 
 You will solve complex puzzles and hack sustainability challenges and drive our 
revolution 
 You will work on the most innovative projects out there 
 You will enjoy an honest, fun, and transparent culture 
 
Job requirements 
 Masters degree or equivalent in Business Administration, Information management, 
Economics, Supply Chain / Logistics / Transportation or Operations Research 
 A knack for aligning stakeholders and customers to help achieve our vision of a future 
where supply chain optimization works in a fundamentally different and more effective 
way, and has a positive impact on nature and society. 
 Proven track record in distilling a required solution out of a wide variety of opinions, 
data systems, and other sources 
 A can-do attitude, enthusiasm, and initiative. 
 Excellent interpersonal skills and fluent in English. 
 Experience translating customer demands into market transforming and 
responsible solutions 
 We favor data analytics skills in Python, SQL, R or Javascript. However, these 
are not necessary requirements. 
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Experimental Condition 2: High Social Vision—Low Disruptive Vision 
 
Our vision 
Who we are 
We are BrainChain: the future sustainability leader in supply chain optimization. We were 
founded in 2015 on the belief that supply chain optimization and automation should help 
the move to a sustainable and socially responsible world. 
 
At every turn, we ask ourselves how we can help the environment and society benefit from 
optimization and automation of the world's supply chains. For too long companies have 
optimized supply chains at the cost of negative human and environmental impact, relying on 
myopic decision making. This has to change. 
 
What we do 
Our services and solutions are non-compromising in improving sustainability and social 
responsibility. We provide supply chain optimization and automation services based on 
advanced algorithms and artificial intelligence. We deliver a fully integrated approach of 
consulting and analytics with a long term approach. Our core product is a single platform 
on which all world-class algorithms operate and that is easily connected with an 
organization's existing business processes and infrastructures. 
 
Where we are going 
We are already working with many large organizations, including national railway 
companies, horticulturists, and water treatment and transportation companies. Through our 
integrated solutions, we will ensure that all organizations have access endlessly scalable 
algorithms, real artificial intelligence, and exceptional analytics. As a result, we drastically 
improve environmental and human footprints of their supply chains at all levels. 
 
We envision a future where supply chains have a positive impact on nature and society and 
foster a sustainable world for generations to come. 
 
Job vacancy 
Business analytics / Data Science - AI & Operational Research 
Job title - Operations Research Consultant – Rotterdam office 
BrainChain is looking for you: a young and enthusiastic starter. As an operations research 
consultant at BrainChain, you will help secure a future where supply chains give back to 
We listen. We innovate. We help people! 
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the world. Through our platform, you will provide advice, analytics and algorithms to 
optimize and automate organizations’ operational supply chain decision making. 
Join us and design, build, implement and execute world-improving concepts, and be part of 
our green team in the field of Industrial Internet of Things, Supply Chain Optimization, 
and Artificial Intelligence. 
 
What we can offer you: 
 You will learn from the best—our highly experienced people 
 You will work independently and have much freedom for your own projects and 
personal development 
 You will solve complex puzzles and hack sustainability challenges 
 You will work on the most innovative projects out there 
 You will enjoy an honest, fun, and transparent culture 
 
Job requirements 
 Masters degree or equivalent in Business Administration, Information management, 
Economics, Supply Chain / Logistics / Transportation or Operations Research 
 A knack for aligning stakeholders and customers to help achieve our vision of a future 
where the supply chains have a positive impact on nature and society. 
 Proven track record in distilling a required solution out of a wide variety of opinions, 
data systems, and other sources 
 A can-do attitude, enthusiasm, and initiative. 
 Excellent interpersonal skills and fluent in English. 
 Experience translating customer demands into responsible solutions 
 We favor data analytics skills in Python, SQL, R or Javascript. However, these 
are not necessary requirements. 
 
Experimental Condition 3: Low Social Vision—High Disruptive Vision 
 
Our vision 
Who we are 
We are BrainChain: the future disruptor in the world of supply chain optimization. We were 
founded in 2015 on the belief that supply chain optimization and automation can be done in 
a fundamentally different and more effective way than the market currently delivers. 
We listen. We innovate. We disrupt! 
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At every turn, we ask ourselves how we can transform the market of supply chain 
optimization and automation. For too long companies have optimized supply chains in a 
very ineffective and inefficient way, relying on fragmented and outdated services. This has 
to change.  
   
What we do 
Our services and solutions drastically change how optimization and automation work. We 
provide services based on advanced algorithms and artificial intelligence. We deliver a 
fully integrated approach of consulting and analytics with a radical approach. Our core 
product is a single platform on which all world-class algorithms operate and that is easily 
connected with an organization's existing business processes and infrastructures. 
 
Where we are going 
We are already working with many large organizations, including national railway 
companies, horticulturists, and water treatment and transportation companies. Through our 
integrated solutions, we ensure that all organizations have access to endlessly scalable 
algorithms, real artificial intelligence, and exceptional analytics. As a result, we 
revolutionize supply chain optimization at all levels.  
 
We envision a future where supply chains work in a fundamentally different and more 
effective way, and where we have become the next standard in supply chain optimization 
and automation. 
 
Job vacancy 
Business analytics / Data Science - AI & Operational Research 
Job title - Operations Research Consultant – Rotterdam office 
BrainChain is looking for you: a young and enthusiastic starter. As an operations research 
consultant at BrainChain, you will help fuel the paradigm shift in supply chain optimization. 
Through our platform, you will provide advice, analytics and algorithms to optimize and 
automate organizations’ operational supply chain decision making. 
Join us and design, build, implement and execute groundbreaking concepts, and be part of 
our disruptive team in the field of Industrial Internet of Things, Supply Chain Optimization, 
and Artificial Intelligence. 
 
What we can offer you: 
 You will learn from the best—our highly experienced people 
 You will work independently and have much freedom for your own projects and 
personal development 
 You will solve complex puzzles and our revolution 
 You will work on the most innovative projects out there 
 You will enjoy an honest, fun, and transparent culture 
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Job requirements 
 Masters degree or equivalent in Business Administration, Information management, 
Economics, Supply Chain / Logistics / Transportation or Operations Research 
 A knack for aligning stakeholders and customers to help achieve our vision of a future 
where supply chain optimization works in a dramatically different and more effective way  
 Proven track record in distilling a required solution out of a wide variety of opinions, 
data systems, and other sources 
 A can-do attitude, enthusiasm, and initiative. 
 Excellent interpersonal skills and fluent in English. 
 Experience translating customer demands into market transforming solutions 
 We favor data analytics skills in Python, SQL, R or Javascript. However, these 
are not necessary requirements. 
 
Experimental Condition 4: Low Social Vision—Low Disruptive Vision 
 
Our vision 
Who we are 
We are BrainChain: a young company in supply chain optimization. We were founded in 
2015 on the belief that supply chain optimization and automation are a core need of a 
globalizing world. It is our calling. 
 
At every turn, we ask ourselves how we can help improve our client's supply chain. For too 
long companies have only worried about making supply chains work without mistakes, 
relying on reactive approaches to problems. This has to change. 
 
What we do 
Our services and solutions are proactive and drastically improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. We provide supply chain optimization and automation services based on 
advanced algorithms and artificial intelligence. We deliver a fully integrated approach of 
consulting and analytics with an innovative approach. Our core product is a single platform 
on which all world-class algorithms operate and that is easily connected with an 
organization's existing business processes and infrastructures. 
 
Where we are going 
We are already working with many large organizations, including national railway 
companies, horticulturists, and water treatment and transportation companies. Through our 
We listen. We innovate. We optimize! 
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integrated solutions, we ensure that all organizations have access to endlessly scalable 
algorithms, real artificial intelligence, and exceptional analytics. As a result, we help them 
to improve their supply chain performance on all levels. 
 
Job vacancy 
Business analytics / Data Science - AI & Operational Research 
Job title - Operations Research Consultant – Rotterdam office 
BrainChain is looking for you: a young and enthusiastic starter. As an operations research 
consultant at BrainChain, you will help secure our success. Through our platform, you will 
provide advice, analytics and algorithms to optimize and automate organizations’ 
operational supply chain decision making. 
Join us and design, build, implement and execute new concepts, and be part of our dream 
team in the field of Industrial Internet of Things, Supply Chain Optimization, and Artificial 
Intelligence. 
 
What we can offer you: 
 You will learn from the best—our highly experienced people 
 You will work independently and have much freedom for your own projects and 
personal development 
 You will solve complex puzzles and drive our success 
 You will work on the most innovative projects out there 
 You will enjoy an honest, fun, and transparent culture 
 
Job requirements 
 Masters degree or equivalent in Business Administration, Information management, 
Economics, Supply Chain / Logistics / Transportation or Operations Research 
 A knack for aligning stakeholders and customers to help optimize supply chains 
 Proven track record in distilling a required solution out of a wide variety of opinions, 
data systems, and other sources 
 A can-do attitude, enthusiasm, and initiative. 
 Excellent interpersonal skills and fluent in English. 
 Experience translating customer demands into novel solutions 
 We favor data analytics skills in Python, SQL, R or Javascript. However, these 
are not necessary requirements.
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
NEVER CHANGE A WINNING TEAM?  
The Moderating Effect of Prior Team Performance on the 
Membership Change - Venture Team Success Relationship. 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs need to build an effective venture team to achieve high performance 
and high growth. Maintaining this high performance is essential for ventures’ 
continued growth. However, a rapidly growing business creates a constant influx of 
new people, and an outflow of old team members (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; 
DeSantola & Gulati, 2017). Despite decades of scholarly work how team structures, 
processes, and dynamics can create high performing teams (for reviews, see Cronin, 
Weingart, & Todorova, 2011; Humphrey & Aime, 2014; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; 
Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & Alliger, 2014; Mathieu, Hollenbeck, van 
Knippenberg, & Ilgen, 2017), less is known about how to sustain high team 
performance during the phase in which businesses are continuously attracting new 
talent. This raises the question how membership change affects venture teams that 
have achieved high performance. 
While acknowledging the importance of investigating the dynamics of the entire 
venture team in explaining early stage venture success (Cooney, 2005), literature on 
new venture teams have predominantly studied the entrepreneurs or leadership of 
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the start-up (e.g., Beckman & Burton, 2008; Carland & Carland Jr, 2012; Hmieleski 
& Ensley, 2007; Hmieleski, Cole, & Baron, 2012; West III, 2007). For example, 
while scholars clearly show that venture management team dynamics and shifts in 
the leadership structure affect important venture outcomes, they also acknowledge 
that such changes may stem from changes in the broader venture team (Beckman, 
Burton, & O'Reilly, 2007; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Ensley, Hmieleski, & Pearce, 
2006). However, dynamics of the broader venture have so far not been investigated. 
We extend our scope to include all individuals working at the venture that both 
actively participate in the development and implementation of the evolving strategy 
of the new venture and in its daily operations (cf. Klotz et al., 2014: 227). In that 
sense, early stage venture teams can be seen as project teams founded around 
entrepreneurs’ ideas. Thus, we draw from the rich team literature in answering our 
question.  
This stream of research suggests that as past performance increases, team 
members converge in their thinking and develop rigid routines (Mohammed et al., 
2010; Peterson & Behfar, 2003; Staw et al., 1981), which in turn stifle creativity and 
subsequent performance (Katz, 1982; March, 1991). Membership change—changes 
in team composition due to new members joining (i.e., newcomers) and/or existing 
ones leaving the team (i.e., leavers)—has been suggested as a remedy to counteract 
inertia and stagnation (e.g., Choi & Thompson, 2005; March, 1991; Perretti & 
Negro, 2007). Accordingly, membership change introduces new perspectives and 
ideas to the team (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Choi & Levine, 2004; de Dreu & 
West, 2001), and helps team members redefine the team’s routines to meet changing 
task demands (Arrow & Mcgrath, 1993). 
We challenge this received wisdom and argue that membership change is 
detrimental to team performance, especially for those teams with high prior 
performance, such as entrepreneurial teams that have achieved high venture growth 
and want to maintain it. Membership change disrupts that team’s coordination 
routines, and urges them to redefine these routines for subsequent tasks (e.g., 
Argote, L., Insko, Yovetich, & Romero, 1995; Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 
2007; Summers, Humphrey, & Ferris, 2012). Whereas teams with low prior 
performance use the disruption as an opportunity to reflect on their existing routines, 
teams with high performance converge in their thinking and become less likely to 
adapt their routines. This is because teams with high prior performance tend to favor 
existing routines, as they believe that what worked well in the past should work well 
in the future. However, these routines may prove to be dysfunctional in light of a 
new team composition. Additionally, high performing teams may experience 
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friction when socializing newcomers, as existing members discourage any 
newcomer behavior that deviates from the status quo (e.g., Choi & Levine, 2004; 
Cini, Moreland, & Levine, 1993; Gruenfeld, Martorana, & Fan, 2000; Kane, Argote, 
& Levine, 2005; Molleman & van der Vegt, 2007). This friction makes it more 
difficult to integrate fresh perspectives brought by newcomers, fostering conflict 
between the oldtimers and newcomers and leading to coordination problems 
between the two subgroups. Therefore, we hypothesize a mediated moderation 
model wherein prior team performance moderates the relationship between 
membership change and team coordination problems, which in turn affects 
subsequent team performance (Figure 1). We collected longitudinal performance 
and team membership data from 665 video game sequels released between 1978 and 
2002. We chose this empirical setting of the video game industry from this period 
to proxy the venture team context. The team dynamics in that era of video game 
industry match that of the venture team context, as most project were initiated by a 
single entrepreneur who grew a team around them. The results of our analyses of 
these data provide empirical support for our theoretical model. 
This study offers four contributions to team and entrepreneurship research alike. 
First, our study motivates entrepreneurship and venture management team research 
to broaden its scope to the effects the larger venture team on important venture 
outcomes (e.g., Busenitz et al., 2005; Ensley et al., 2006). Second, we challenge the 
received wisdom that membership change acts as a panacea for stagnation in teams 
with high prior performance. Our results show that membership change creates 
more coordination problems in teams with high prior performance than in teams 
with low prior performance, which in turn hamper subsequent performance. Second, 
our work offers prior team performance as a novel contingency factor for research 
on routines and mental models (cf. Lewis et al., 2007; Summers et al., 2012) and 
newcomer socialization literature (for a review, see Rink, Kane, Ellemers, & van, 
2013). Specifically, we identify coordination as the factor underpinning the negative 
effects of prior team performance and membership change on subsequent team 
performance. Third, we emphasize that prior team performance is more than just a 
control variable in team research, and is itself an important determinant of 
subsequent team processes. We respond to calls for research that incorporates prior 
team outcomes as contingency factors of processes in team dynamism (cf. Cronin 
et al., 2011; Humphrey & Aime, 2014; Mathieu et al., 2014). Our paper shows that 
prior team performance is an important group level characteristic that needs to be 
taken into account when examining teams experiencing membership change. 
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Figure 1 
Graphical Representation of Theoretical Model 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
4.2.1 Prior performance and Stagnation 
Team members form expectations about future team outcomes by observing past 
outcomes (Dirks, 2000). Hence, prior team performance alters beliefs and reference 
structures of individuals in the team (Peterson & Behfar, 2003; Staw, 1975), which 
in turn affect subsequent member interactions and team performance (Cronin et al., 
2011; DeShon et al., 2004; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008). For example, 
high prior performance raises high expectations for future performance. The 
feedback implied by high performance fosters inertia in the form of reinforced team 
processes and behaviors, as team members believe that having “common 
expectations for the task and team” (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993) 
helps the team to maintain their level of performance in the future (Mathieu et al., 
2000; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001). This optimistic inertia can be to the detriment of 
team performance, however, in that teams may become more rigid and less adaptive 
in times of uncertainty (Geiger & Antonacopoulou, 2009; Levinthal & March, 
1993), which makes them vulnerable to stagnation over time (Katz, 1982; March, 
1991).  
4.2.2 Team Membership Change as a Solution to Stagnation 
Membership change has been advocated to prevent such rigidities by infusing teams 
with diverging perspectives and new ideas through the entry of newcomers (Ancona 
Membership 
change 
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Team 
performance 
Prior team 
performance 
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H2 
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& Caldwell, 1992; de Dreu & West, 2001; De La Hera, Carlos Maria Alcover & 
Rodriguez, 1999). As early as 1960, work by Ziller and colleagues showed that 
teams undergoing membership change exhibit greater creative output (Ziller & 
Behringer, 1960; Ziller, Behringer, & Goodchilds, 1962; Ziller, 1965). Choi & 
Thompson (2005) affirm these findings, and add that the entry of new individuals 
not only provides new ideas and perspectives directly, but also has the potential to 
make residing members themselves (i.e., oldtimers) more creative. Indeed, 
newcomers and their influence on oldtimers can push the team towards more 
explorative behaviors and thus boost innovative output (March, 1991; Perretti & 
Negro, 2007). Consequently, membership change stimulates reflective behaviors 
and makes the team less rigid and more adaptive (Arrow & Mcgrath, 1993; Gorman, 
Amazeen, & Cooke, 2010). 
We challenge the received wisdom about the ability of membership change to 
break stagnation in team processes. Specifically, we theorize that high performing 
teams, which are supposedly prone to stagnation, suffer more from membership 
change than do teams with low prior performance. Two mechanisms underlie our 
theory: the team’s ability in (i) adapting to disruptions created by departing team 
members, and in (ii) socializing newcomers. First, departing team members cause a 
loss in access to knowledge and interrupt interaction patterns that are foundational 
to team processes. While such a disruption may help teams with poor prior 
performance weed out poorly performing members, and provide an opportunity to 
reflect and improve upon suboptimal team processes, it hurts teams with high prior 
performance. Specifically, in such teams, the rigidity of their routines and team 
mental models prevent them from adapting their routines to the new team 
composition, creating coordination problems. Second, residing members of high 
performing teams fail to appropriately socialize their newcomers, which further 
hinders coordination. In the following section, we develop a mediated moderation 
model such that coordination mediates the team performance effects of the interplay 
between prior team performance and membership change (see Figure 1). 
4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Coordination is one of the central determinants of a team’s performance. 
Coordination is “the process of orchestrating the sequence and timing of 
interdependent actions” (Marks et al., 2001: 376-368) and involves explicit and 
purposeful exchange of information to synchronize team members’ actions and 
behaviors (Brannick et al., 1993; Rico et al., 2008). Teams that have previously 
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achieved high performance have benefitted from effective coordination among their 
members.  
Membership change disrupts coordination through both inward and outward 
flows of team members. In the former case, the addition of new members requires 
residing members to integrate new individuals into their coordination routines and 
knowledge structure. In the latter case, the exit of team members weakens 
knowledge structures and interrupts interaction patterns. Taken together, a team 
facing membership change thus needs to explicitly re-coordinate: team members 
need to reallocate tasks and agree on new patterns of interaction in light of both 
incoming and outgoing members.  
We argue that membership change has distinct effects on subsequent 
coordination in teams with either high or low prior performance as those teams 
differ in how they (i) adapt to disruptions created by departing team members, and 
in how they (ii) absorb newcomers. 
4.3.1 Prior Team Performance and Team Mental Models 
First, members leaving the team disrupt the team’s mental model about members' 
knowledge and roles. Team mental models foster a common understanding about 
members' knowledge, roles, and task environment, and how these factors contribute 
to team success (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; He, Butler, & King, 2007; 
Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005; Ren & Argote, 2011). 
A shared and well-developed mental model allows team members to develop a 
common anticipation of which efforts and responsibilities to expect, and helps the 
team to coordinate actions and adapt behavior to task demands (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992). Failing to adapt team mental 
models, therefore, can hamper subsequent coordination (Lewis et al., 2007).  
We argue that teams with high prior performance lose highly valuable 
knowledge and proven routines when members leave the team. More importantly, 
these teams suffer most acutely from membership change because their team mental 
model is rigid and maladaptive to changes, making them unwilling and unlikely to 
adapt in the face of change. Specifically, the achievement of high performance 
initiates performance feedback narratives that shape team member beliefs about the 
foundations of their team’s performance. In case of a high performing team, 
performance feedback entrenches within them the shared belief that they possess 
hard-to-replace qualities that allow the team to perform well on the task at hand 
(DeShon et al., 2004; Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002) and compels 
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team members to attribute their success to the superiority of their current approach, 
and to naturally feel no need to adapt (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Miller. & Ross, 
1975). Thus, achieving high performance drives team members to incorporate 
shared evaluative belief structures about their performance (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1993; Mohammed, Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000) and the team states that members 
prefer or expect based on prior experiences (Mohammed et al., 2010) in their team 
mental models. 
Therefore, as membership change presents the team with a new and uncertain 
situation, teams that have previously performed highly experience such a change as 
a threat to the continued performance of their team and therefore become more rigid 
in their behaviors. As a result, when re-establishing coordination, residing members 
tend to repeat behavioral patterns that they believe to have worked well in the past 
and are less reflective of their behaviors and routines. These routines and behaviors 
may be dysfunctional in light of the void created by departing members by being 
too dependent on underlying knowledge structures and routines that are no longer 
intact. Thus, membership change hampers coordination in high performing teams. 
In contrast, we argue that lower performing teams experience the disruptive effects 
of membership change on coordination to a lesser extent. In a team that has not yet 
achieved high performance, the mental model of roles, knowledge, and task 
environment, and how they each relate to high performance, diverges more widely 
among individual team members (cf. Mathieu et al., 2000). Indeed, it is less likely 
in lower performing teams that there is a strong or salient common understanding 
of which behaviors and interactions contribute to high performance. However, their 
lack of success may make team members more likely to have a shared sense of what 
fails – that is, a common understanding of what to avoid in subsequent tasks 
(Cannon & Edmondson, 2001). Thus, membership change offers the opportunity to 
weed out poorly performing members, and the departure of members fuels an 
opportunity for oldtimers to reflect and change potentially dysfunctional routines. 
In lower performing teams, therefore, the negative effects of the disruption to 
existing routines is counterbalanced by a potential impetus to pursue functional 
improvements to these routines in subsequent efforts. 
4.3.2 Prior Team Performance and Newcomer Socialization 
The second mechanism that explains how high and low performing teams 
experience membership change is the socialization of newcomers. To benefit from 
the unique knowledge and fresh perspectives that newcomers bring to the team, 
residing members need to engage in the socialization of newcomers—a two-way 
Chapter 4 
108 
process whereby the newcomers assimilate the shared cognition, knowledge, norms 
and values needed to perform their roles in the team, as well as the team’s 
assimilation of the newcomers cognition, knowledge, norms and values (Anderson 
& Thomas, 1996; Cooper-Thomas & Anderson, 2006; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; 
Levine & Moreland, 1991; O'Connor, Gruenfeld, & McGrath, 1993). Depending on 
how the socialization process unfolds, new member additions can be a great source 
of novel ideas and perspectives (March, 1991; Rink et al., 2013) that can broaden 
the team’s stock of task-related knowledge (Argote, Linda & Ingram, 2000) and 
boost learning to prevent stagnation (Gruenfeld et al., 2000; Katz, 1982; Perretti & 
Negro, 2007) which in turn motivates reflection on the team’s vested routines.  
In teams with high prior performance, there is more friction inherent in 
newcomer socialization. We reiterate that high prior performance reinforces 
oldtimers’ estimation of which elements contributed to their success and entrenches 
the shared belief of the superiority of their current approach, biasing them against 
change and novelty. Consequently, newcomers face strong one-way socialization 
pressures to conform to the in-place cognition, knowledge, norms and values that 
are esteemed among veterans of a team. This effectively amounts to the oldtimers 
exerting strong asymmetrical socialization pressures on the newcomers, 
discouraging any behaviors that are new to the team in the eyes of oldtimers. 
Newcomers are discouraged from imparting their unique knowledge to the team, 
and even if the newcomer decides to share new information, existing members are 
less likely to consider newcomer inputs as legitimate and valuable, further 
hampering the integration of new knowledge in the subsequent team decisions (Choi 
& Levine, 2004). Overall, high performing teams fail to assimilate the new 
perspectives and knowledge new team members bring in, preventing the team from 
learning through renewal.   
To the extent that newcomers feel that their contributions to the team can be 
uniquely valuable, but observe an unwillingness of residing members to accept 
them, they develop resistance to the one-way socialization pressures. Consequently, 
newcomers do not feel a sense of belonging to the team (cf. Haunschild, Moreland, 
& Murrell, 1994). That is, we argue that prior team performance increases the 
dynamic of in-group versus outgroup sentiment between oldtimers and newcomers, 
which, in combination with socialization pressures, may lead the team to develop 
dysfunctional conflict between subgroups (Peterson & Behfar, 2003). Therefore, 
prior team performance exacerbates extant coordination problems during the 
redevelopment of team routines due to heightened conflict between oldtimers and 
newcomers.  
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For similar reasons, we argue that lower performing teams experience less 
friction when socializing new members into the team. Members of such teams have 
less incentive to retain approaches from earlier, less effective efforts, and thus exert 
less socialization pressure on new additions to conform to vested cognitions, norms, 
values, and knowledge. Hence, poor past performance increases the likelihood of 
considering newcomer contributions and noting their value, additionally making 
newcomers feel more comfortable sharing ideas and perspectives. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Prior team performance moderates the relationship between 
team membership change and coordination, such that teams with high prior 
performance experiencing membership change coordinate worse than do 
teams with low prior performance. 
 
4.3.3 Mediating Effect of the Coordination Process 
Effective coordination is essential to achieving high performance (Lepine et al., 
2008; Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005). When members coordinate well, their 
actions tend to be aligned and in sync, optimizing the use of teams’ temporal and 
knowledge resources, thereby helping overall team performance. Conversely, when 
there are problems in coordination in a team, members are out of sync and 
misalignments arise. Output quality suffers because members’ knowledge 
utilization is suboptimal, and tasks may take longer and can become unnecessarily 
costly. We build on arguments for Hypothesis 1 by arguing that membership change 
creates more problems in establishing effective coordination in teams with high 
prior performance than those with low prior performance, and that these detriments 
to coordination negatively affect subsequent team performance. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Team coordination mediates the moderated relationship 
between membership change and team performance. That is, membership 
change deteriorates coordination in teams with high prior performance, and 
hampers subsequent team performance to a greater extent than it does in 
teams with low prior performance.  
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4.4 METHODS 
4.4.1 Data 
Entrepreneurial teams are essentially project teams founded around a new idea or 
innovation, generally led by a passionate entrepreneur. Unfortunately, data on 
entrepreneurial team dynamics is hard to obtain. While many venture teams are 
founded each year, their membership composition is not accurately tracked over 
time. To remedy this, we chose to sample the video game development industry 
between 1978 and 2002 to proxy the nature of small entrepreneurial teams. First, in 
this industry core development teams are clearly defined, and membership 
accurately monitored (Mortensen, 2015), and since these organizations create 
sequels, we can accurately track changes in team membership and ensue 
performance through time. Second, the small team and project nature of this period 
in the video game industry resembles that of contemporary early stage 
entrepreneurship. In this period of the video game industry, new ideas or innovations 
(i.e. the video games) were often founded by single game developers, who formed 
a team around them to further develop the video game and often experienced high 
team dynamism. Importantly, after 2002 maturation in the video game industry 
stemming from the advent of Internet production and distribution of videogames, 
spawned divergent business models amid converging platform architecture 
standards under high competitive pressures. Since mid-2000, publishing houses 
have been forced to assign different teams working in parallel on the development 
of sequels within the same video game family. Such a practice confounds tracking 
membership change. In addition, we also observe a proliferation of cross-team and 
cross-company collaborations in developing video games since the late 2000’s – 
blurring project team boundaries and mitigating the industry’s similarity to the 
venture team context.  
We compiled our dataset from www.mobygames.com using a web-scraper, and 
manually corrected for completeness and accuracy. The MobyGames database is an 
Internet repository documenting video game information since 1999. Owners of the 
database define its mission as “To meticulously catalog all relevant information – 
credits, screenshots, formats, and release info – about electronic games (computer, 
console, and arcade) on a game-by-game basis.” Because of such painstaking detail, 
the database has been favored by several scholars in the past (e.g., De Vaan, Stark, 
& Vedres, 2015; Mollick, 2012). Our unit of analysis is game sequels, allowing us 
to track team membership pre- and post-sequel and to assess the performance effects 
of those changes. The original full, web-crawled data set consisted of 41,200 video 
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games released between 1978-2013. The data between 1978-2002 contained 22,739 
released games. 
We removed video games that were add-ons or compilation software and those 
with no performance score or team information. This elimination reduced our data 
set to 15,223 video games, which we used to derive many of our control variables. 
Among these games, 681 produced one or more sequels for a total of 1333 sequels 
(i.e. the set from which our main variables of interest are derived). After discarding 
games with additional missing values on our variables of interest, our final sample 
included 665 sequels. In addition, we manually corrected the data to include only 
members of the development team and to exclude individuals from publishing-
houses. Also, we incorporated roles solely pertinent to the production of video 
games: producers, designers, programmers, artists, sound technicians, coders, 
directors, concept/story board artists, video technicians/graphics, editors, 
composers and software designers. Unspecified roles and non-essential roles were 
excluded such as packaging, voice acting, musicians, motion capturing artists, 
marketing, network maintenance, and secretaries.   
4.4.2 Variables 
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is team performance. We utilized industry expert 
assessments to measure team performance as provided by the MobyGames 
database. Expert assessments ranging on a scale from 0 to 100 (with 100 being best) 
entail reviews and rankings of professional critics and reviewers from many media 
outlets. Quality, accuracy, and consistency of these different reviewers can vary 
sharply. Thus, the weighted average for individual critics is formed by each expert’s 
history, accuracy, and past variance. As the MobyGames website points out: 
“Critics with high accuracy, low variance, and high reputation have their scores 
weighted higher in the MobyRank calculation than critics with low accuracy, high 
variance, and low reputation.” Critic scores appear in the database only if at least 
six reviews for a video game on a particular platform have been offered.  
We also purchased sales data from a market research firm, which were available 
only for games published between 1995 and 2002, significantly reducing the sample 
size (N = 361). Our results remain qualitatively similar when unit sales is used as 
our dependent variable (see the robustness analysis section for details).   
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4.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Our main independent variable is team membership change. We measured 
membership change as the ratio of new and departing members to the sum of new, 
departing and residing members. We chose this operationalization of membership 
change because it more accurately captures the total fluctuation in membership for 
teams that have varying rates of individuals leaving and entering the team (cf. 
Mortensen, 2015). 
Our main moderator variable is a video game development team’s prior 
performance. We used the prequel’s performance to measure prior performance (see 
definition of performance above as the dependent variable).  
Our mediator variable is coordination. We proxy coordination as the time (in 
years) between consecutive video game sequels. We reverse coded the variable, 
such that the faster the project was completed, the higher a team’s coordination 
would be. In the highly competitive video game development industry the ability of 
teams to finish their project timely is of utmost importance to team performance. 
Video game development follows strict development schedules, often tailored to the 
seasonal demands of the consumer market. Extending deadlines is a precarious 
action, as competitors may encroach the game’s target market if they release at an 
earlier point in time. Moreover, the many technologies involved and developed in 
the project may become obsolete in a matter of months – new platforms will be 
released and/or make certain graphics out-of-date (MacCormack & D’Angelo, 
2004). In meeting these tight schedules optimal coordination is an essential 
requirement. Any misalignment of team members’ efforts is, per definition, 
associated with surpassing these schedules. 
4.4.2.3 Control Variables 
To account for alternative explanations, we applied several controls, including 
team-, game-, industry-, and firm-related factors. First to mention is a control 
characteristic of membership change itself. The quality of newcomers and leavers 
has often been cited as an important factors influencing the effect of membership 
change on team performance (Bunderson, Van der Vegt, Gerben S, & Sparrowe, 
2013; Chen, 2005; Summers et al., 2012). Hence, we controlled for average 
newcomer quality and average leaver quality by calculating the historic average 
performance of newcomers and leavers from the performance of all video game 
development projects these individuals took part in before the focal project. 
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Second, we controlled for team characteristics. We add team size as a covariate 
because a larger team requires more coordination (Mueller, J. S., 2012). 
Additionally, we controlled for team tenure since teams that work together longer 
tend to converge in their thinking and build routines that facilitate coordination. 
Team tenure is quantified as the number of previous sequels that a certain team 
produced. Also, teams that have more diverse experience in video game types are 
more likely to adapt to changing circumstances—a critical feature of teams in an 
industry driven by technological shifts and popular trends. We controlled for team 
genre diversity by calculating Blau’s index (Harrison & Klein, 2007) over the 
number of games that each team published in any of the genres before the focal 
game. Last, we controlled for team size change since resizing teams may affect the 
availability of knowledge resources and the ability to coordinate effectively. The 
third set of controls relates to the game traits. We controlled for game genre: Action, 
Adventure, Racing/Driving, Roleplaying, Simulation, Sports, and Strategy. Genres 
attract target audiences, creating diverse expectations for novelty and quality 
criteria. Also, we control for media exposure. Prolific games tend to enjoy more 
media exposure, affecting the perceived quality of the game by industry experts. We 
proxy media exposure by calculating the number of critic reviews that the video 
game received. 
Fourth, we included a control external to the focal game. Since games compete 
in the marketplace, we controlled for competition as measured by the total number 
of video games released in the full market during the release of the focal sequel.  
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations among 
variables.  
4.4.2.4 Analytical Approach 
Once a video game releases a sequel, a family of games commences. With every 
consecutive sequel referring to the premise of its predecessors, the family grows 
with individual observations (i.e. the video games) nested within these families. 
Nestedness imposes family-level effects on individual-level outcomes in the model 
(Bliese, 2013). To deal with nesting of the data, multilevel mixed-effects modeling 
has been used for analysis, including an additional error term to account for intercept 
variance.  
We assessed whether this approach was appropriate. In our full sample data, 
family grouping accounts for 37% of the variance in team performance (ICC1), with  
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Table 2. Multilevel Regression Results of Coordination 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) 
-0.11  
(0.11) 
-0.12  
(0.11) 
-0.13  
(0.11) 
Team size 
0.07┼  
(0.04) 
0.04  
(0.04) 
0.05  
(0.04) 
Team size change 
-0.28***  
(0.05) 
-0.19***  
(0.04) 
-0.20***  
(0.04) 
Team tenure 
0.08*  
(0.03) 
0.09**  
(0.03) 
0.08*  
(0.03) 
Team genre diversity 
-0.05  
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
-0.02  
(0.04) 
Competition 
0.17┼  
(0.09) 
0.19*  
(0.08) 
0.19*  
(0.08) 
Genre dummies Included Included Included 
Media exposure 
-0.05┼  
(0.03) 
-0.04┼  
(0.03) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
Average newcomer quality 
-0.10*  
(0.05) 
-0.08┼  
(0.04) 
-0.06  
(0.05) 
Average leaver quality 
-0.07┼  
(0.04) 
-0.05  
(0.04) 
-0.04  
(0.04) 
Team membership change  
-0.40***  
(0.05) 
-0.42***  
(0.05) 
Prior performance   
-0.08*  
(0.04) 
Team membership change x 
Prior performance  
  
-0.08*  
(0.04) 
Within family R-squared 0.14 0.21 0.22 
Between family R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.23 
AIC 1690.63 1623.36 1615.83 
Log Likelihood -827.31*** -792.68*** -786.93*** 
Test against competing models  69.27*** 11.49** 
┼ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All variables, excluding the genre dummies, were 
z-score standardized. N = 665. 
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Table 3. Multilevel Regression Results of Team Performance 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
Estimate 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) 
72.99***  
(1.17) 
73***  
(1.17) 
73.59***  
(1.04) 
73.65***  
(1.04) 
Team size 
1.05**  
(0.39) 
1.01*  
(0.39) 
0.68┼  
(0.35) 
0.63┼  
(0.35) 
Team size change 
0.40  
(0.47) 
0.49  
(0.48) 
0.93*  
(0.45) 
1.11*  
(0.46) 
Team tenure 
-1.95***  
(0.36) 
-1.91***  
(0.36) 
-0.77**  
(0.29) 
-0.88**  
(0.30) 
Team genre diversity 
0.69  
(0.47) 
0.73  
(0.48) 
0.96*  
(0.4) 
0.99*  
(0.40) 
Competition 
1.50  
(0.91) 
1.52┼  
(0.91) 
1.46┼  
(0.86) 
1.31  
(0.86) 
Genre dummies Included Included Included Included 
Media exposure 
2.38***  
(0.28) 
2.39***  
(0.28) 
1.75***  
(0.24) 
1.78***  
(0.24) 
Average newcomer 
quality 
2.82***  
(0.48) 
2.83***  
(0.48) 
1.31**  
(0.47) 
1.37**  
(0.47) 
Average leaver quality 
-0.02  
(0.43) 
0.01  
(0.43) 
-0.14  
(0.39) 
-0.09  
(0.39) 
Team membership 
change 
 
-0.47  
(0.51) 
-0.60  
(0.47) 
-0.29  
(0.49) 
Prior performance   
4.82***  
(0.4) 
4.88***  
(0.4) 
Team membership 
change x Prior 
performance  
  
-1.26**  
(0.41) 
-1.19**  
(0.41) 
Coordination    
0.81*  
(0.39) 
Within family R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.41 0.42 
Between family R-
squared 
0.29 0.29 0.47 0.48 
AIC 4788.43 4789.56 4689.14 4686.68 
Log Likelihood -2376.22*** -2375.78*** -2323.57*** -2321.34*** 
Test against competing 
models 
 0.87 104.42*** 4.46* 
┼ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All variables, excluding the genre dummies, were z-
score standardized. N = 665. 
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a reliability of 47% (ICC2). A model featuring random intercept variance fits the 
data better than a model without it (Log-ratio test = 65.84, p < 0.001, AICnested = 
4959.54, AICnon-nested = 5009.89). Therefore, we applied multilevel modeling in our 
analyses. Additionally, we conducted causal mediation analysis over our multilevel 
models. We used R-package ‘mediation’ because it offers causal mediation analysis 
over multilevel models (R Core Team, 2017; Tingley et al., 2014). Quasi-Bayesian 
Monte Carlo simulations (King, G., Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000) are used to 
calculate the 95% confidence intervals. This approach approximates the posterior 
distribution of quantities of interest by their sampling distribution and is considered 
most efficient for causal mediation analysis with parametric models (Imai, Keele, 
& Tingley, 2010). 
4.5 RESULTS 
4.5.1 Testing 
Table 2 displays the multilevel regression estimation on coordination. Variance 
inflation factors did not exceed 2 in any of the models, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern. Model 1 in Table 2 includes only the control 
variables. In the control model, we see that larger changes in team size (β = -0.28, 
S.E. = 0.05, p < 0.001) and higher quality of newcomers (β = -0.10, S.E. = 0.05, p = 
0.045) are negatively related to coordination. Conversely, team tenure increases the 
level of coordination in teams (β = 0.08, S.E. = 0.03, p = 0.02). In Model 2, we added 
membership change. We clearly observe a strong negative relationship of 
membership change (β = -0.40, S.E. = 0.05, p < 0.001) with coordination. 
In Model 3, we added the interaction between membership change and prior team 
performance on coordination. The overall moderating effect is significant (β = -0.08, 
S.E. = 0.04, p = 0.049). Figure 2 depicts this interaction for 1 standard deviations 
above (i.e. high performing teams) and below (i.e. low performing teams) the mean 
prior team performance. Simple slope analysis confirms that membership change 
hurts coordination of teams with high prior performance (β = -0.50, S.E. = 0.07, p < 
0.001) and, to a lesser extent, also negatively affects the coordination of low 
performing teams (β = -0.35, S.E. = 0.06, p < 0.001). Hence, these results provide 
evidence for Hypothesis 1. We note that the direct effect of prior team performance 
(β = -0.08, S.E. = 0.04, p = 0.037) on coordination is negative. Ostensibly, this minor 
effect may seem counterintuitive. However, our measure of coordination assumes 
that the less time the team took to complete the project the stronger their 
coordination. In that sense, this finding is in line with prior work, suggesting that 
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higher performing teams may set higher goals, are allocated more resources, and, 
thus, experience increased task complexity (DeShon et al., 2004). This hampers 
effective coordination (e.g., Argote, L. et al., 1995; Weingart, 1992).  
Table 3 presents the multilevel regression results on team performance. In Model 1, 
which includes only the control variables, we observe that larger teams (β = 1.05, 
S.E.= 0.39, p = 0.008), teams with more media exposure (β = 2.38, S.E.= 0.28, p < 
0.001) and teams with higher quality of the newcomers (β = 2.82, S.E.= 0.48, p < 
0.001) attain higher team performance.  
 
Table 4 
Causal Mediation Results with Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals 
 Direct: 
unmediated 
Indirect: 
mediated by 
coordination 
Total effect 
Team membership change -0.35 -0.35* -0.70 
Team membership change* -1 S.D. 
Prior performance 
0.78 -0.28* 0.50 
Team membership change* +1 S.D. 
Prior performance 
-1.53* -0.41*  -1.94** 
┼ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 5  
Quasi-Bayesian 95% Confidence Intervals of Mediation Results 
 Direct: 
unmediated 
Indirect: mediated 
by coordination 
Total effect 
 Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Team membership change -1.34 0.62 -0.69 -0.05 -1.65 0.23 
Team membership change* -1 
S.D. Prior performance 
-0.22 1.89 -0.58 -0.01 -0.49 1.62 
Team membership change* +1 
S.D. Prior performance 
-2.94 -0.24 -0.85 -0.02 -3.33 -0.69 
1000 Monte Carlo Simulations  
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This latter effect echoes the informational perspective on newcomer contributions 
to a team (cf. Rink et al., 2013). However, the model also shows that teams with 
longer tenure (β = -1.95, S.E.= 0.36, p < 0.001) had lower performance, which is in 
line with research on team longevity (e.g., Katz, R., 1982; Schippers, Den Hartog, 
Koopman, & Wienk, 2003; West & Anderson, 1996). In addition, video games 
published in the simulation genre performed better than games in other genres (β = 
3.80, S.E. = 1.02, p < 0.001) and games in the racing genre scored lower (β = -3.23, 
S.E. = 1.24, p = 0.01). Model 2 shows no significant effect of membership change 
(β = -0.47, S.E. = 0.51, p = 0.36), which would be expected based on the conflicting 
findings from the literature. 
Thus, in Model 3 we show that there is evidence for Hypothesis 1, stating that 
there is a moderating effect of prior team performance on the relationship between 
team membership change and team performance (β = -1.26, S.E. = 0.41, p = 0.002). 
We plotted this interaction in Figure 3 for 1 standard deviations above (i.e. high 
performing teams) and below (i.e. low performing teams) the mean prior team 
performance, accompanied with simple slope tests. Simple slope analysis shows full 
support for the negative effect of membership flux for teams that had higher 
performance (β = -1.88, S.E. = 0.65, p = 0.004), and a null-effect for lower 
performing teams (β = 0.47, S.E. = 0.54, p = 0.38). Last, Model 4 adds our mediator 
to the regression equation. As expected, coordination is positively related to team 
performance (β = 0.81, S.E. = 0.39, p = 0.038). Post-hoc analysis of the interaction 
effect of prior team performance and membership change on team performance 
(while controlling for coordination) shows that the slope for teams with low prior 
performance becomes significant at 1.6 standard deviations below the mean (β = 
1.40, S.E. = 0.70, p = 0.046). 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that coordination mediates the moderated relationship 
between team membership change and team performance. We test Hypothesis 2 
through causal mediation analysis suitable for multilevel modelling. Table 4 
presents mediation coefficients. Table 5 shows the quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence 
intervals of the estimates from Table 4. We find that teams with high prior 
performance suffer more in subsequent performance due to detriments in 
coordination (β = -0.41, 95% CI = [-0.85, -0.02], p = 0.04, 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulations) than teams with low prior performance (β = -0.28, 95% CI = [-0.58, -
0.01], p = 0.046, 1000 Monte Carlo simulations). Thus, our results support 
hypothesis 2. 
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Figure 2. Interaction Plot of Team Membership Change and Prior Team 
Performance on Coordination. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction Plot of Team Membership Change and Prior Team 
Performance on Subsequent Team Performance (Based on Model 3, Table 3). 
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4.5.2 Robustness Analyses 
We verified robustness of our results by regressing all four models (as specified in 
Table 3) on unit sales of the video games between 1995-2002 (N = 361). We 
purchased this data set from the NPD group which tracks the consumer purchases 
in the video game industry in the US. We find similar results when regressing unit 
sales (in thousands) on the variables included in Model 4 (of Table 2) (βcoordination = 
78.5, S.E. = 39.32, p = 0.048) and when conducting mediated moderation analysis 
with the model as specified in Model 3 (of Table 3). Namely, these mediation results 
dictate that teams with high prior performance suffer more in subsequent unit sales 
due to detriments in coordination (β = -43.82, 95% CI = [-89.9, 1.74] , p = 0.046) 
than teams with low prior performance (β = -27.06, 95% CI = [-59.48, -0.68], p = 
0.044). Hence, our conclusions remain qualitatively similar when regression models 
on unit sales. 
Furthermore, we need to address concerns that the observed pattern of 
performance change in our study is not due to the naturally occurring statistical 
pattern of regression to the mean (RTM), but a result of membership change. RTM 
occurs when repeated measurements are made on the same unit of observation 
(Barnett, van der Pols, Jolieke C, & Dobson, 2005). In our case this amounts to the 
following: at every measurement of team performance over time, the more severely 
a team’s performance deviated from the population mean before the higher the 
chances that this team will be closer to the population mean at current measurement. 
Barnett et al. (2005) advice researchers to minimize the effect of RTM by correcting 
for within and between group variance (over the different time points), potentially 
using an ANOVA style analysis that corrects for a baseline mean. We already 
address this by conducting multi-level random coefficient modelling (cf. Bliese, 
2013). Additionally, because RTM increases with larger measurement variability 
(Barnett et al., 2005), we can reduce this variability by only including teams that 
had more than one performance measurement. Hence, we re-ran our analyses 
excluding those teams that only produced one sequel (N = 486). We find that the 
results of membership change (β = -0.48, S.E. = 0.06, p < 0.001) and the interaction 
effect with prior performance (β = -0.11, S.E. = 0.05, p = 0.038) on coordination, as 
well as the results regarding the interaction effect (β = -1.10, S.E. = 0.51, p = 0.03) 
and coordination (β = 1.01, S.E. = -0.99, p = 0.03) on team performance remain 
qualitatively similar. Finally, mediation results also proved alike for both low (β = 
-0.40, 95% CI = [-0.80, -0.05], p = 0.02) and high (β = -0.60, 95% CI = [-1.20, -
0.02], p = 0.44) prior performance of teams. 
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4.6 DISCUSSION 
Our results demonstrate that membership change inhibits coordination and 
subsequent performance to a greater extent in teams that had already attained high 
performance compared to those that had not. These results have several theoretical 
implications for team researchers, as well as for practitioners who are concerned 
about creating and retaining successful teams. 
4.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
Entrepreneurial teams are highly dynamic and their composition changes frequently 
as they grow their business (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). Crucial talent frequently 
enters the team, while residing members leave when the business outgrows them 
(Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005). Despite the clear the importance of investigating 
venture team membership change, research has given it scarce attention and has yet 
to consider venture team dynamics beyond the founding team (Cooney, 2005; Klotz 
et al., 2014). Specifically, this stream of research has often employed theories on 
teams and leadership in explaining the effect of management team composition and 
member change on venture outcomes (Carland & Carland Jr, 2012; Ensley et al., 
2006; Hmieleski & Ensley, 2007; West III, 2007), but ignores how dynamics of the 
broader venture team influence important venture outcomes (e.g., Busenitz et al., 
2005). For example, leadership may emerge and shift as the team grows and its 
composition changes (e.g., Hmieleski et al., 2012). Research should consider that 
members outside the founding team may affect how leadership and team dynamics 
develop subsequently. Our work motivates entrepreneurship and venture team 
research to consider the dynamics of the growing entrepreneurial team, including 
all its members, in explaining important venture outcomes.  
We challenge the received wisdom that membership change offers performance 
benefits through renewal, especially regarding teams with high prior performance. 
Specifically, prior work has suggested that as past performance increases, team 
members converge in their thinking and develop rigid routines, risking team 
stagnation (e.g., Katz, 1982; March, 1991; Mathieu et al., 2000). Membership 
change is said to have the potential to break stagnation by introducing new 
perspectives and ideas, thereby helping team members to redefine the team’s 
routines to navigate changing team composition and task demands. In contrast, we 
hypothesize and show that the same convergence and rigidity that have helped these 
teams achieve high performance previously now prevent them from benefiting from 
membership change, due to resulting coordination problems.  
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Moreover, our work bridges two streams of membership change research that 
have provided fairly separate insights up till now (Humphrey & Aime, 2014). On 
the one hand, studies have focused on the effects of newcomer socialization on 
innovation, oldtimer reflection and, subsequently, increases in team performance 
(see Rink et al., 2013 for a review; e.g., Choi & Thompson, 2005; Gruenfeld & Fan, 
1999; Perretti & Negro, 2007). On the other hand, separate research has argued that 
membership change (especially through departures) disrupts team mental models 
and team processes, and, consequently, hampers team performance (Akgün & Lynn, 
2002; Argote, L. et al., 1995; Lewis et al., 2007; Summers et al., 2012). Yet, neither 
stream of research has payed attention to the impact of prior team performance on 
this dynamic, nor have they unearthed coordination as the team process 
underpinning the negative effects of prior performance and membership change on 
team performance.  
Thus, our work extends the findings of newcomer socialization literature on the 
effects of prior team performance, and we offer prior team performance as a novel 
contingency factor in research on team processes. Importantly, the consideration of 
prior team performance allows scholars to explain when and how the knowledge 
utilization and coordination effects of membership change on team performance are 
most pronounced. Post-hoc analysis of the interaction effect of prior team 
performance and membership change on team performance (while controlling for 
coordination) shows that the slope for teams with low prior performance becomes 
significant at 1.6 standard deviations below the mean (β = 1.40, S.E. = 0.70, p = 
0.046). This, in combination with our mediation results and prior findings from 
newcomer socialization research (e.g., Choi & Levine, 2004; Choi & Thompson, 
2005; Kane et al., 2005), implies that, in the process of membership change, 
knowledge utilization and reestablishment of coordination are distinct processes that 
are affected differently by prior team performance. Hence, we offer the field new 
insights into why high performing teams tend to suffer from membership change 
but low performing teams stand to gain from it. 
Lastly, we (re)emphasize prior team performance as a theoretical angle in need 
of investigation in the context of teams. The concept of prior team performance as 
an important facet of team life is not fully new: team researchers often consider it 
as control variable (e.g., DeRue et al., 2008; Perretti & Negro, 2007; Summers et 
al., 2012). Our work shows that prior team performance is an important group level 
characteristic that needs to be taken into account when examining teams 
experiencing membership change (cf. Cronin et al., 2011; Mathieu et al., 2008). 
Thus, we emphasize that prior team performance is more than a control variable in 
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team dynamics research, and that it has distinct effects on team transitions from one 
period to the next. Therefore, we advocate for and improve the field’s understanding 
of the influences of group level outcomes on individual team member interactions 
and team routines. These findings call for future research that fully incorporates 
prior team performance as a crucial contingency factor of processes in team 
dynamism (cf. Humphrey & Aime, 2014; Mathieu et al., 2014). 
4.6.2 Managerial Implications 
Venture teams are highly dynamic. Talented employees may enter the team, hoping 
to find a new challenge, while others exit as the new organization rapidly outgrows 
them. However, our findings not only advise entrepreneurs. For managers of 
existing organizations, change is inevitable as well. For example, in the United 
States alone, individuals change jobs more than 11 times during their careers on 
average (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). In addition, to increasing labor 
mobility, organizational level practices, such as the wider use of temporary project 
teams, promotions, downsizing, and rotation of new employees, make teams far 
from stable entities. Our results provide novel insights into how this particular state 
of flux affects teams and venture teams that have already achieved high 
performance, thereby informing appropriate strategies for entrepreneurial and 
managerial practice.   
Our results warn founders and managers against churn in high performing teams. 
In such teams, membership change disrupts the well-functioning processes and 
routines that generated the superior performance in the first place. Moreover, these 
teams are prone to continue behavior they believe worked well in the past and over-
socialize newcomers. Therefore, membership change leads to more coordination 
problems for teams with high prior performance than for teams with low prior 
performance, preventing high performing teams from sustaining their subsequent 
performance at a comparable level. Hence, we suggest that entrepreneurs and 
managers should aim to limit change of teams with high prior performance, and 
remain aware of the potential interventions needed to allow these teams to deal with 
change and prevent dysfunctional rigidities. 
4.6.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our study is not free of limitations. First, while our study ostensibly investigates the 
effects of venture team dynamics on team performance of high performance 
ventures, we tested our theory on a dataset of video game development teams from 
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the early stages of the video game industry. Our decision was based on the clear 
similarities between the newly formed teams in this phase of the video game 
industry and contemporary early stage venture teams, and we expect these 
similarities to uphold. Data on real venture teams is hard and costly to obtain, 
because an exhaustive dataset of such teams does not exists. Many early stage 
ventures do not survive their first years of existence (Kerr et al., 2014). Despite this, 
future research should replicate our findings in other empirical settings, preferably 
even closer related to the early stage venture team context. 
Second, our choice for this field setting further has broader consequences for our 
conclusions about team dynamics. Prior research has often studied membership 
change as replacing only one team member with another (e.g., Argote et al., 1995; 
Arrow & Mcgrath, 1993; Baer, Leenders, Oldham, & Vadera, 2010; Huckman, 
Staats, & Upton, 2009; McCarter & Sheremeta, 2013; Summers et al., 2012). While 
those studies offer stronger causal claims, more research in field settings has been 
called for. Beyond offering external validity, field settings capture the fact that 
teams experience membership change not only in the form of a single member 
replacement, but also in varying rates of departures and entries. Our analyses allow 
accounting for such flows.  
However, this field setting also includes an empirical condition that limits our 
inferences in industry-level labor mobility. The video game industry’s labor market 
is highly dynamic, characterized by significant cross-collaboration, aggressive 
head-hunting for high-quality producers, and the use of freelancers. Our sample 
alone demonstrates an average turnover of about 50% after each sequel production. 
In addition, we could not account for whether the departures were voluntary or 
involuntary (Park. & Shaw, 2013; Shaw, Park, & Kim, 2013). Future research 
should aim to expand these findings to industries with less transient labor conditions 
and address the cause of membership change. 
We argued that the interplay between membership change and prior performance 
affects coordination because of the rigidity of residing member thinking and the 
effects of newcomer socialization. Our work leaves open several important 
questions in this regard. Specifically, ‘what can help to break the rigidity of residing 
members of winning teams in relying on former processes and help them become 
more reflective’? And, ‘how can we help oldtimers of winning teams to accept 
newcomer contributions and thus boost team innovation’? Future research could 
productively explore interventions that may help high performing teams to sustain 
their performance, such as influence tactics or identity strategies that help to 
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increase newcomer knowledge utilization (Kane & Rink, 2016; Rink & Kane, 
2014). Moreover, there is the opportunity for additional research into which 
characteristics of residing members help them to be more receptive to change (Park, 
G. & DeShon, 2010). 
Finally, we cannot rule out that the results of this study can be partly explained 
by a statistical phenomenon called regression to the mean. This phenomenon occurs 
when repeated measurements are made on the same unit of observation (Barnett et 
al., 2005), as is the case with our measurement of teams’ performance time. We the 
followed advice given by Barnett and colleagues (2005) to minimize the effect of 
regression to the mean and find nearly identical results as compared to our original 
analyses. However, to completely rule out the potential bias of regression to the 
mean in our results, future research should conduct a carefully designed 
experimental study including control groups. Inclusion of control groups can be 
used to estimate the baseline effect of regression to the mean in the sample.   
4.7 CONCLUSION 
Membership change is a pressing issue for both entrepreneurs and managers alike. 
As a result, sustaining the performance of high performing teams (such as high 
growth venture teams) becomes more and more challenging. Yet, we still have 
limited knowledge of the effects of membership change in high performing teams. 
Our findings suggest that the development of team processes, as a function of prior 
team performance, exerts influence on team coordination, and, eventually, on team 
performance. Thus, our study paves the way for the examination of how team 
processes unfold both at higher levels and lower levels of prior team performance, 
encouraging team researchers to develop even more finely-grained theories of 
venture team dynamics.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
The early stages of high growth venture teams are probably the most precarious 
stages of venture life. Start-up survival depends on the entrepreneurs’ overcoming 
of the challenges inherent to these stages: the acquisition of vast amounts of 
financial capital, the attraction of dedicated talent to the venture team, and the 
management of team dynamics. I provided new insights in this dissertation with 
respect to each of these paramount challenges. Particularly, I have shed more light 
on (1) how the communication of disruptive visions affects early stage 
entrepreneurs’ ability to acquire financial investments, (2) how the communication 
of social visions affects their ability to attract talent to the venture team, and (3) 
whether entrepreneurs should promote or prevent team membership change in their 
high performance venture teams. Through a set of detailed theoretical perspectives, 
unique empirical settings and rigorous methodology, I provide evidence that these 
behaviors play a significant part in achieving the growth outcomes of early stage 
venture teams. 
In the following section I present an overview of the chapters. Next, I discuss the 
theoretical contributions of this dissertation. Last, I elaborate on the managerial 
relevance of my work, and discuss directions for future research. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
130 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2. Disruptive visions have become a prevalent phenomenon in 
entrepreneurial practice in the last two decades. Entrepreneurs often communicate 
these visions to investors in order to secure a first round of financial capital. 
However, research had so far ignored the investigation of such communications by 
entrepreneurs and their effect on investor decision making. In Chapter 2, I set out to 
investigate how the communication of disruptive visions affected entrepreneurs’ 
ability to acquire a first-round of financial funding. By integrating impression 
management and real options theory I theorized that disruptive vision would have a 
higher likelihood of attracting a first-round of investments, because among a 
portfolio of similar investment opportunities the start-up with a disruptive vision 
raises expectations of extraordinary return with investors. However, a highly 
disruptive vision also indicates much uncertainty regarding a venture’s potential for 
success in the future, deterring investors from making large speculative investments 
into the venture initially. In a study of 918 Israeli start-ups, I confirm my hypotheses 
and found that start-ups that increased their disruptive vision communication by one 
standard deviation had 22 percent higher odds of acquiring a first round of 
investments, but obtained 24 percent less funds in that round. Furthermore, in an 
online randomized experiment with 253 participants I found that investors’ 
expectations of extraordinary return mediate the positive relationship between 
disruptive visions and the investment decision. The chapter concluded with 
important theoretical contributions to research on disruptive innovations, real 
options theory, impression management, and vision communication. 
Chapter 3. In this chapter, I investigated the phenomenon of the for-profit 
venture that communicates a social vision to stakeholders. Increasingly 
entrepreneurs’ communicate a social vision for their start-up in the hopes of 
convincing stakeholders to support their aims. In particular, early stage ventures 
need to attract dedicated talent to their team. However, prior exploratory research 
suggests that ventures with social aims may struggle with hiring and retaining 
employees, but the theoretical underpinnings of this observation remain unclear. 
Chapter 3 centered on the effects of social vision communication on job seekers’ 
attraction and salary demands. I hypothesized that social vision communication 
negatively impacts talent attraction, because social visions prevent job seekers from 
perceiving the venture as an opportunity for personal achievement—i.e. opportunity 
for personal advancement, influence, distinction and excellence. Furthermore, I 
argued that social vision communication drives job seekers to set a premium on the 
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minimum required salary to seriously consider employment at the venture. A 
randomized field experiment with 102 job seekers provided support for my 
hypotheses. A start-up that communicates with a social vision had 72 percent lower 
odds of job seekers’ providing either their contact information or applying for the 
job, and drove job seekers to set a premium of 252 euro’s on the minimum required 
salary Furthermore, I found that potential recruits’ perception of opportunity for 
achievement mediated this relationship. The chapter concluded with strong 
theoretical implications for research on social entrepreneurship, vision 
communication, and recruitment. 
Chapter 4. As entrepreneurs attract talent, they start organizing their team for 
high performance and high growth. Maintaining high performance is essential for 
venture growth, however it is not a given that they do, given the dynamic nature 
high growth ventures. Therefore, in Chapter 4 I investigated how membership 
change affects high performing teams. I hypothesized that the coordination routines 
that underlie the performance of high performing teams, are severely disrupted by 
membership change. This is not only because change breaks the teams shared stock 
of knowledge and shared understanding of the task, but also because high 
performing teams tend to over-socialize newcomers, making the team less receptive 
to newcomers’ ideas and perspectives. This disruption of coordination routines 
caused by membership change leads to detriments in subsequent team performance. 
I find that support for my hypotheses in a dataset of 378 video game development 
teams. My results indicate that teams with high prior performance suffer from 
membership change, whereas teams with low prior performance may gain from it. I 
find that coordination problems mediate this relationship. The chapter concludes 
with contributions to the literature teams and team dynamics. 
5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
5.2.1 Contributions to Entrepreneurship Research 
My dissertation and its chapters provide contributions for broader scholarly work 
on entrepreneurship, vision communication, and team dynamics. First, this 
dissertation contributes to research on how entrepreneurs can overcome the central 
challenges in the early stages of their venture’s life cycle. Despite underlining its 
importance, prior research has scarcely investigated entrepreneurs’ ability in 
overcoming the challenges inherent to early stage venturing (DeSantola & Gulati, 
2017; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Prior work has often centered on the challenges of 
ventures in later stages, when they have already obtained earlier rounds of funding 
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(e.g., Martens et al., 2007; Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014; Mueller et al., 2012). Such 
an approach does not consider the effects of initial selection (e.g. Gompers, 1995; 
Kanze & Iyengar, 2017; Ter Wal et al., 2016). I look at entrepreneurs’ efforts in 
obtaining a first round of resources (i.e. attracting investments and talent). My work 
helps to understand the factors contributing to venture growth in the early stage. In 
particular, I espouse the effects of communicating to external stakeholders on in 
obtaining a first round of funding and talent.  
Second, this dissertation responds to a call for more empirical research about 
entrepreneurs’ interactions (i.e. what they do) within their environments after 
venture establishment (Wood & Mckinley, 2017, p. 31). This field of research is 
built on the perspective that start-ups are a means to enact entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and that this enactment is an ongoing interaction between the 
entrepreneurs and their stakeholders (Alvarez & Barney, 2013). Chapters 2 and 3 in 
this dissertation contribute to this stream of literature from the linguistic perspective 
of opportunity enactment (e.g., Ramoglou & Zyglidopoulos, 2015; Ramoglou & 
Tsang, 2016), enhancing scholarly understanding of the relationship between 
entrepreneurs’ communications and opportunity sensemaking by the receiving 
audiences (Alvarez et al., 2015; Bird & Schjoedt, 2009; Garud et al., 2014). In 
particular, Chapter 2 looks at the mobilizing of investor audiences and how 
disruptive vision communication affects their sensemaking of the venture as an 
opportunity. Chapter 3 elaborates on job seeking audiences and whether the 
venture’s social vision communication drives their attraction to the venture as a 
career opportunity. My findings underscore the need for entrepreneurship research 
into the interpretation of communications by stakeholder audiences during the 
opportunity enactment process (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Breaugh, 2013; Celani & 
Singh, 2011).  
Specifically, Chapters 2 and 3 introduce vision communication as a particular 
category of entrepreneurs’ future-oriented impression management efforts. Despite 
acknowledging the importance of future-oriented communications in understanding 
outcomes at the venture-level, prior research has predominantly focused on 
entrepreneurs’ backward-looking communications (i.e., accomplishments) with 
which they legitimize their claims (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001; Martens et al., 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). With vision communication 
entrepreneurs attempt to convince stakeholders of the intrinsic or substantive value 
of what the venture aims to achieve and they build more distinctive claims about 
their venture. I show that disruptive and social visions have far-reaching effects on 
audience decisions concerning the start-up, and that entrepreneurs should craft their 
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message carefully as particular types of content can have unforeseen up- and 
downsides. This sets the stage for future scholars to further investigate the effects 
of future-oriented communications on entrepreneurial outcomes. 
5.2.2 Contributions to Vision Communication Research 
Third, Chapters 2 and 3 in this dissertation shift the investigation of vision 
communication away from the strict leader-follower relationship and extends the 
concept of vision communication to theories on influencing tactics and impression 
management (e.g., Garud et al., 2014; Yukl, G., Kim, & Falbe, 1996; Yukl, Gary & 
Falbe, 1990; Zott & Huy, 2007). Classically, the leadership literature builds on the 
notion that vision communication is a central activity for leaders in mobilizing 
followers. This leader-follower perspective is often applied to organizational studies 
and therefore presumes a hierarchical ordering between sender and receiver of the 
vision as a message. Chapters 2 and 3 jointly show that entrepreneurs may use vision 
communication to mobilize people external to the start-up, to support their aims—
either by investing in the venture or by joining the team as an employee. Thus, this 
opens the field to investigation of the relationship between vision communication 
and audience vision pursuit in lateral and up-ward situations, such as entrepreneurs’ 
communication to stakeholders.  
Fourth, my work contributes to calls for research into vision content and their 
sensemaking by various audiences. To date, the content of vision communication 
and how receiving audiences interpret this content remains an under-researched 
topic (van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). Prior vision research has predominantly 
focused on communication style rather than thematic content (e.g., social or 
disruptive visions). For example, most scholars prescribe the effectiveness of 
repetition, rhythm, balance, contrasts, lists, puzzles, alliteration, imagery, analogies 
and metaphors, classification, generalization, and authority (Carton et al., 2014; 
Conger, 1991; Den Hartog & Verburg, 1998; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; van Werven 
et al., 2015), but forgo investigation of the effects integrative themes on people’s 
sensemaking. Integrative themes yield synergistic effects that strengthen a distinct, 
collective perception about ventures and entrepreneurs (e.g., a high growth venture, 
Baum et al., 1998; an aspiring market leader, Martens et al., 2007; a collaborator or 
competitor, Ansari et al., 2016).  
 I espouse the underlying mechanisms that explain how audiences or followers 
make sense of thematic communications. In particular, Chapter 2 investigated how 
investors make sense of entrepreneurs’ disruptive visions and shows that their 
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expectations of extraordinary return underlie effects on investment decisions. 
Chapter 3 adds upon this by investigating how job seekers deal with entrepreneurs’ 
social vision communication. My findings show that job seekers’ perception of a 
career at the venture as an opportunity for achievement underlies the relationship 
between vision communication and talent attraction. Together with the these 
findings, my conceptualization of social and disruptive visions opens up a new 
research avenue with respect to integrative themes in entrepreneurs’ vision 
communication and their effect on audience sensemaking. Importantly, the focus on 
vision content—namely, disruptive and social visions—shows that particular forms 
of content can backfire in attaining early stage venture growth outcomes. Thereby, 
the findings of my chapters also contribute to the scant work on downsides of 
visionary communications (e.g., Ateş et al., 2018; Berson et al., 2015; Carton et al., 
2014; Conger, 1991) and challenge the often presumed unilateral positive returns 
from it (Baum et al., 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). 
The focus on disruptive and social visions, has shown that 
5.2.3 Integration of Team Dynamics and Venture Team research 
Fifth, Chapter 4 provides unique insights for broader team literature and motives 
future research to further investigate venture team dynamics. The chapter provides 
insights into the organizational perspective of opportunity enactment (e.g., Mueller, 
S. et al., 2012) by delving deeper into the relationship between venture team 
dynamics and subsequent venture team performance. Importantly, by approaching 
Chapter 4 from the broader literature on team dynamics I motivate the field of 
venture team research in entrepreneurship to consider the more established literature 
in team dynamics to explain the venture team phenomenon. This is important, 
because the burgeoning research into new venture management teams only 
investigates the dynamics concerning the start-ups founders and management team. 
However, in doing so it cannot provide consistent theory on how to deal with the 
dynamics of growing venture teams a whole, and how this affects their performance. 
Specifically, while prior work suggests that teams with high prior performance 
may benefit from membership change because it breaks the convergence in team 
member thinking and maintains the flexibility of routines (e.g., Choi & Thompson, 
2005; March, 1991; Perretti & Negro, 2007), I challenge this wisdom by showing 
that high performance teams mainly suffer from membership change, and only 
teams with low performance may benefit from it. By doing so, we motivate broader 
research to consider prior team performance as a crucial contingency factor for team 
processes (cf. Humphrey & Aime, 2014; Mathieu et al., 2017). Furthermore, despite 
Discussion 
135 
the Chapter 4’s theoretical focus on teams literature in general, its empirical findings 
should drive future research to consider team dynamics in the context of the early 
stage venture.  
5.3 MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The studies in this dissertation also provide strong implications for entrepreneurial 
practice. The entrepreneurs of early stage start-ups put great effort in trying to 
pursue their high growth business ideas. However, many of them fail to realize their 
envisioned growth and often do not survive the initial years of their existence. My 
studies provide insights into the role vision communication in the acquisition 
financial and human resources essential to the growth of start-ups. Additionally, I 
espouse how the management of team membership change affects venture team 
performance amidst an ever-growing and changing venture team. Specifically, I 
motivate entrepreneurs to reflect on how they communicate to investors, how they 
use their communication to attract talent, and whether they should manage the 
retention of this talent for team performance.  
The findings of Chapters 2 and 3 show that developing elaborate visions and 
strategies for the future of the market is not enough to attract resources. The 
communication of this vision informs stakeholders of the goals and purpose of the 
organization. Thus, entrepreneurs should be aware that the communication of these 
visions has considerable effects on the sensemaking of investors and job seekers. 
Importantly, both Chapters 2 and 3 point out that blindly following popular types 
vision content, such as disruptive or social visions for their venture, may have 
unforeseen downsides. For example, communicating a highly disruptive vision 
increases the likelihood of receiving an investment, but tends to decrease the amount 
of funds received in that investment. Additionally, communicating a social vision 
shows detriments to the entrepreneurs’ ability to attract talent to the venture team. 
Hence, my findings should drive entrepreneurs to carefully consider the end-goal of 
communicating to external stakeholders, and to craft their message with the various 
stakeholder audiences in mind. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs and managers alike face the challenge of maintaining 
high performance of their teams. However, venture teams are highly dynamic and 
are in constant flux. Chapter 4 provides crucial insights about the effects of 
membership change on team performance and provides important recommendations 
for entrepreneurs and managers alike. My results warns them against too much 
change if their teams have achieved high performance, because it hampers their 
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coordination routines. Conversely, my findings suggest membership change if their 
teams underperform, as these teams stand to benefit from the perspectives 
newcomers can bring in. Thus, my findings suggest that entrepreneurs and managers 
should be aware of the performance of their team and remain critical of whether and 
when they should aim to change team members. 
5.4 THE ROAD AHEAD: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The chapters of this dissertation addressed three prudent challenges that 
entrepreneurs face in the growth of their start-ups. While I unearthed the significant 
role of vision communication on resource acquisition, and highlighted the 
importance of management of team dynamics as core activity of entrepreneurs, these 
three challenges are only a very small set of the tremendously larger category of 
problems that entrepreneurs may face in pursuing the growth of their businesses 
(e.g., DeSantola & Gulati, 2017; Fisher et al., 2016; Mueller, S. et al., 2012). Future 
research should make an attempt to extend investigations of vision communication 
and management of team dynamics, and their interaction, to the broader set of 
challenges faced by entrepreneurs. For example, future research can investigate 
whether vision communication affects employee turnover and retention. However, 
research should also be motivated to consider other challenges, including the 
ongoing communication between investors and entrepreneurs, the emerging 
development and implementation of strategy, or the structural transformation from 
small to large organization. Last, the role of vision communication and venture team 
dynamics can also be extended to the later stages of the venture life cycle. For 
example, future research should investigate how the in- and outflow of talent affects 
both the ongoing the development of the venture’s strategy and vision. 
While disruptive and social visions are two common types of vision 
communication, both in practice and academia, many other forms of content may 
exist. In that sense, the conclusions of Chapter 2 and 3 are limited to how these types 
of visions compare with other content types, such as growth visions (cf. Baum et 
al., 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004). Different content may serve different purposes for 
entrepreneurs in achieving crucial outcomes (e.g., Hallen, 2008). This presents a 
valuable opportunity for future research to investigate how common integrative 
themes in (vision) communication affect the growth outcomes of early stage 
ventures.  
The conclusions of my Chapters are perhaps limited to the contexts in which they 
have been tested. However, in all Chapters an attempt was made to carefully choose 
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a setting that maximizes generalizability the other context. For example, the Israeli 
start-up scene (Chapter 2) is one of the world’s most impactful entrepreneurial 
environments, with more high-tech start-ups per capita than any other country. In 
that sense, conclusions generated from this context should be highly comparable to 
other entrepreneurial settings in developed economies, such as Silicon Valley in the 
United States. Furthermore, Chapter 2 also tests its main hypotheses in a 
complementary experiment, facilitating both claims of ecological validity, 
generalizability and causality. Similarly, Chapter 3 conducts a randomized field 
experiment, including real job seekers and a real vacancy, and Chapter 4 uses the 
early video game development industry as its context, because of comparability to 
the team conditions of contemporary early stage venturing. Further examining 
whether the findings of my Chapters indeed hold in related settings, as well as 
triangulating findings through complementary research methods is an interesting 
opportunity for future research in strengthening the academic and practical impact 
of my Chapters. 
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SUMMARY 
We increasingly expect start-ups to tackle the great systemic problems of the world, 
with a rising demand for game-changing innovations that are both sustainable, 
responsible and economically viable. However, most of these ventures fail to realize 
their envisioned growth, or do not even survive their first four years of existence. 
This is because entrepreneurs face hard-to-overcome challenges to start-up growth 
and survival. Amongst other things in the early stages of their venture’s life cycle, 
the most important challenges they face are the acquisition of financial resources, 
the attraction of talent, and the organization of this talent into an effective team. In 
this dissertation, I espoused the roles of vision communication and the management 
of team dynamics in facing these three challenges.  
First, entrepreneurs’ vision communications are elementary in attracting both 
financial and human resources. The communication of visions influences how 
investors and potential recruits make sense of the venture as an opportunity and 
informs them of what the venture aims to achieve in the future. However, while the 
communication of a vision for the venture is perhaps one the most engaged in 
activities by entrepreneurs in practice, additional academic insights are needed to 
understand how visions affect the decision making of investors and job seekers. 
Therefore, I investigated how disruptive (Chapter 2) and social vision (Chapter 3) 
communication by early stage venture affects entrepreneurs’ ability to attract 
investments and recruits, respectively. I show that disruptive and social visions 
affect the sensemaking of these audiences and may therefore have unforeseen 
downsides in convincing them to support the venture. 
Second, as the venture team achieves high performance and grows through the 
influx of talent, many individuals will also leave the team. This form of membership 
dynamism presents entrepreneurs with the challenge of maintaining high 
performance as their organization continues to grow. Literature on new venture 
teams currently provides conflicting accounts on whether membership change will 
help or hamper teams that have achieved high performance before. Thus, I have 
investigated exactly this issue (Chapter 4), and focused on the underlying 
mechanism that explains this relationship. I show that both entrepreneurs and 
managers should attempt to minimize membership change in high performance 
teams. 
In summary, I have shown that both vision communication and management of 
team dynamics contribute significantly to the crucial growth outcomes of start-ups. 
Summary 
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The insights of this dissertation provide numerous opportunities for future research 
to deepen the understanding of how entrepreneurs attract and organize financial and 
human resources. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
De huidige samenleving verwacht dat ondernemers de problemen van deze tijd 
kunnen oplossen door zowel sociale als economisch verantwoorde innovaties op de 
markt te brengen. Maar de meeste ondernemingen blijken niet in staat de 
voorgestelde groei en impact te verwezenlijken. Sterker nog, startende 
ondernemingen overleven vaak niet eens de eerste cruciale jaren, als zij er niet in 
slagen investeerders en talent te werven en het niet lukt om leiding te geven aan een 
dynamisch team.  
De visie van de onderneming is cruciaal in het aantrekken van kapitaal en talent. 
De inhoud van de visie informeert men over wat de onderneming probeert te 
bereiken in de toekomst en heeft daarom grote invloed op potentiële investeerders 
en werknemers. Ondanks dat het belang van visiecommunicatie in de praktijk vaak 
benadrukt wordt, is er meer wetenschappelijk onderzoek nodig om te begrijpen hoe 
dit werkt. Daarom onderzocht ik in deze dissertatie de invloed van disruptieve 
visiecommunicatie op het verkrijgen van investeringen (Hoofdstuk 2) en de invloed 
van sociale visiecommunicatie op het werven van getalenteerd personeel 
(Hoofdstuk 3). De twee hoofdstukken tonen dat visiecommunicatie een grote impact 
heeft op de besluitvorming van potentiële investeerders en werknemers. Daarnaast 
kunnen bepaalde vormen van visiecommunicatie juist nadelig zijn voor beginnende 
ondernemingen in het werven van zowel kapitaal als werknemers.  
Wanneer ondernemers bekwame werknemers in dienst hebben en het team 
maximaal presteert, kan er een nieuw probleem ontstaan. Hoe kunnen ondernemers 
deze hoge mate van prestatie in stand houden wanneer het team snel van personeel 
wisselt? De huidige literatuur geeft geen duidelijk antwoord op deze vraag. Ik 
onderzocht hoe de wisseling van individuen in succesvolle teams de toekomstige 
prestaties kunnen beïnvloeden (Hoofdstuk 4). Daarnaast analyseerde ik het 
onderliggende mechanisme, waaruit bleek dat zowel ondernemers als managers 
moeten proberen om wisselingen in succesvolle teams te minimaliseren omdat het 
anders de coördinatie in het team verslechterd. 
Samenvattend onderzocht ik in deze dissertatie het effect van visiecommunicatie 
en teamdynamiek op drie belangrijke speerpunten van een beginnende 
onderneming: het werven van financiële middelen, het rekruteren van talent, en de 
prestaties van het team in een groeiende organisatie. De resultaten bieden 
perspectief voor toekomstig onderzoek naar de communicatie en teamdynamiek van 
startende ondernemingen. 
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Challenges of Early Stage 
Entrepreneurs
The Roles of Vision Communication and  
Team Membership Change
TIMO VAN BALEN
We increasingly expect start-ups to tackle the great systemic problems of the world, with a rising demand 
for game-changing innovations that are both sustainable, responsible and economically viable. However, 
most of these ventures fail to realize their envisioned growth, or do not even survive their first four years  
of existence. This is because entrepreneurs face three hard-to-overcome: acquisition of financial 
resources, the attraction of talent and the organization of this talent into an effective team. In this 
dissertation, I espouse the roles of vision communication and the management of team dynamics in 
facing these three challenges.
First, the dissertation investigates how entrepreneurs’ vision communication affects the way investors 
and potential recruits view the venture. Results point out that disruptive and social vision communication 
strongly affect their perception about the venture. Specifically, both types of visions may have unforeseen 
downsides in convincing investors and recruits to join the start-up’s pursuits. Second, we show that 
the management of team membership change is elementary to sustaining the high performance of 
venture teams. We find that both entrepreneurs and managers should attempt to minimize membership 
change in high performance teams. Overall, this dissertation provides numerous practical and academic 
contributions to the fields of entrepreneurship, impression management, vision communication and  
team dynamics.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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